| contents | page | 
| *  *  * | 
| * the book * | 
| *  *  * | 
| Glossary | c | 
| Regional Organization | d | 
| Rules of Pronounciation | e | 
| Foreword by General Franz Halder | 1 | 
| Introduction by General Hans von Greiffenberg | 2 | 
| THE SITUATION IN CROATIA AFTER 1942 | 5 | 
| PARTISAN ORGANIZATION IN CROATIA | 8 | 
| GERMAN ORGANIZATION AND BATTLE COMMAND | 15 | 
| TACTICAL EXAMPLES FROM THE PARTISAN WAR | 23 | 
| Combing the Bilo Gora and the Papuk, 6 - 18 July 1943 | 23 | 
| The situation | 23 | 
| The objectives | 24 | 
| Command | 24 | 
| The Plan of Operations | 24 | 
| Results achieved | 25 | 
| HOW THE 54TH RIFFLE REGIMENT PERFORMED ITS MISSION | 26 | 
| THE TACTIC OF THE PARTISANS | 28 | 
| The Flaw in the Planning | 29 | 
| THE CAPTURE OF THE SIGNAL COMMUNICATION PLATOON OF THE 54TH RIFFLE REGIMENT AT PIVNICA ON 13 JULY 1943 | 34 | 
| THE MOPPING UP OF THE FRUSKA GORA BY THE 9TH SS AND POLICE REGIMENT 24 JULY AND 3 AUGUST 1943 | 34 | 
| ATTACK ON THE GARRISON OF GASINCI | 37 | 
| Time | 37 | 
| Situation | 37 | 
| ATTACK ON LUDBREG | 43 | 
| THE DESTRUCTION OF THE GARRISON OF CASMA | 45 | 
| DEFENSE AREAS | 52 | 
| Defensive Measures | 55 | 
| BATTLES FOR NASICE | 55 | 
| EVEN BANJA LUKA PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD | 59 | 
| October 1944 | 61 | 
| CONCLUSIONS | 63 | 
| THE BILO GORA OPERATION AS A TEST CASE | 73 | 
| Further Plans | 75 | 
| The Croatian Population | 75 |