| contents | page |
| * * * |
| * the book * |
| * * * |
| Glossary | c |
| Regional Organization | d |
| Rules of Pronounciation | e |
| Foreword by General Franz Halder | 1 |
| Introduction by General Hans von Greiffenberg | 2 |
| THE SITUATION IN CROATIA AFTER 1942 | 5 |
| PARTISAN ORGANIZATION IN CROATIA | 8 |
| GERMAN ORGANIZATION AND BATTLE COMMAND | 15 |
| TACTICAL EXAMPLES FROM THE PARTISAN WAR | 23 |
| Combing the Bilo Gora and the Papuk, 6 - 18 July 1943 | 23 |
| The situation | 23 |
| The objectives | 24 |
| Command | 24 |
| The Plan of Operations | 24 |
| Results achieved | 25 |
| HOW THE 54TH RIFFLE REGIMENT PERFORMED ITS MISSION | 26 |
| THE TACTIC OF THE PARTISANS | 28 |
| The Flaw in the Planning | 29 |
| THE CAPTURE OF THE SIGNAL COMMUNICATION PLATOON OF THE 54TH RIFFLE REGIMENT AT PIVNICA ON 13 JULY 1943 | 34 |
| THE MOPPING UP OF THE FRUSKA GORA BY THE 9TH SS AND POLICE REGIMENT 24 JULY AND 3 AUGUST 1943 | 34 |
| ATTACK ON THE GARRISON OF GASINCI | 37 |
| Time | 37 |
| Situation | 37 |
| ATTACK ON LUDBREG | 43 |
| THE DESTRUCTION OF THE GARRISON OF CASMA | 45 |
| DEFENSE AREAS | 52 |
| Defensive Measures | 55 |
| BATTLES FOR NASICE | 55 |
| EVEN BANJA LUKA PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD | 59 |
| October 1944 | 61 |
| CONCLUSIONS | 63 |
| THE BILO GORA OPERATION AS A TEST CASE | 73 |
| Further Plans | 75 |
| The Croatian Population | 75 |