contents | page |
* * * |
* the book * |
* * * |
Glossary | c |
Regional Organization | d |
Rules of Pronounciation | e |
Foreword by General Franz Halder | 1 |
Introduction by General Hans von Greiffenberg | 2 |
THE SITUATION IN CROATIA AFTER 1942 | 5 |
PARTISAN ORGANIZATION IN CROATIA | 8 |
GERMAN ORGANIZATION AND BATTLE COMMAND | 15 |
TACTICAL EXAMPLES FROM THE PARTISAN WAR | 23 |
Combing the Bilo Gora and the Papuk, 6 - 18 July 1943 | 23 |
The situation | 23 |
The objectives | 24 |
Command | 24 |
The Plan of Operations | 24 |
Results achieved | 25 |
HOW THE 54TH RIFFLE REGIMENT PERFORMED ITS MISSION | 26 |
THE TACTIC OF THE PARTISANS | 28 |
The Flaw in the Planning | 29 |
THE CAPTURE OF THE SIGNAL COMMUNICATION PLATOON OF THE 54TH RIFFLE REGIMENT AT PIVNICA ON 13 JULY 1943 | 34 |
THE MOPPING UP OF THE FRUSKA GORA BY THE 9TH SS AND POLICE REGIMENT 24 JULY AND 3 AUGUST 1943 | 34 |
ATTACK ON THE GARRISON OF GASINCI | 37 |
Time | 37 |
Situation | 37 |
ATTACK ON LUDBREG | 43 |
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE GARRISON OF CASMA | 45 |
DEFENSE AREAS | 52 |
Defensive Measures | 55 |
BATTLES FOR NASICE | 55 |
EVEN BANJA LUKA PROVES IMPOSSIBLE TO HOLD | 59 |
October 1944 | 61 |
CONCLUSIONS | 63 |
THE BILO GORA OPERATION AS A TEST CASE | 73 |
Further Plans | 75 |
The Croatian Population | 75 |