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* the book * |
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PART ONE. THE MILITARY POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE BALKANS |
(October 1940 - March 1941) | 1 |
Chapter 1. The Great Powers |
I. Germany | 2 |
II. Italy | 3 |
III. Soviet Union | 7 |
IV. Great Britain | 9 |
Chapter 2. Germany's Satellites in the Balkans |
I. Hungary | 10 |
II. Romania | 10 |
III. Bulgaria | 12 |
Chapter 3. The Other Balkan Countries |
I. Turkey | 16 |
II. Yugoslavia | 20 |
PART TWO. THE YUGOSLAV CAMPAIGN (Operation 25) |
Chapter 4. Political and Strategic Planning | 25 |
I. Military Topography | 26 |
II. Hitler's Concept of the Strategic Factors | 27 |
Chapter 5. The Plan of AttackI. The Outline Plan | 29 |
II. The Timing of the Attacks | 30 |
III. Second Army | 31 |
IV. First Panzer Group | 32 |
V. XLI Panzer Corps | 33 |
Chapter 6. The Defense Forces |
I. General | 33 |
II. Defensive Plans | 33 |
III. Training and Tactics | 35 |
IV. Guerrilla Warfare | 35 |
V. Fortifications | 36 |
VI. Order of Battle | 36 |
VII. Deficiencies and Confusion | 37 |
Chapter 7. The Attack Forces |
I. Command Posts | 38 |
II. The Luftwaffe | 39 |
III. Second Army | 39 |
IV. First Panzer Group | 41 |
V. XLI Panzer Corps | 41 |
Chapter 8. Logistical Planning and Assembly of Second Army |
I. The Rail Transportation Problem | 42 |
II. The Danube as a Route of Transportation | 44 |
III. Other Logistical Planning | 46 |
IV. The Assembly of Second Army | 47 |
Chapter 9. Operations |
I. The Air Bombardment of Belgrade | 49 |
II. The Three - Pronged Drive on the Yugoslav Capital | 50 |
III. Secondary Attacks | 55 |
IV. Italian and Hungarian Operations | 60 |
V. The Final Drive on Sarajevo | 61 |
VI. Armistice Negotiations | 63 |
VII. Losses | 64 |
Chapter 10. Lessons |
I. General | 64 |
II. Coalition Warfare | 65 |
III. Assembly | 65 |
IV. Other Organizational and Tactical Improvisations | 66 |
Chapter 11. Conclusions |
I. Yugoslav Military Unpreparedness | 66 |
II. Internal Disunity | 68 |
III. German Propaganda | 69 |
IV. Seeds of Unrest | 69 |
PART THREE. THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN GREECE (Operation MARITA) |
Chapter 12. General |
I. Political and Military Events (October 1940 - April 1941) | 70 |
II. Military Topography | 74 |
II. Topography | 74 |
III. Strategic Factors | 77 |
Chapter 13. The Defense Forces |
I. Yugoslav Forces | 79 |
II. Greek Forces.... | 79 |
III. British and Imperial Forces | 80 |
Chapter 14. The Attack Forces | 81 |
15. The Plan of Attack | 82 |
16. The Assembly - Logistical Problems | 83 |
17. Operations |
I. The German Thrust across Southern Yugoslavia | 86 |
II. The 2d Panzer Division Drive to Salonika | 87 |
III. The Struggle across the Metaxas Line | 88 |
IV. The Seizure of Western Thrace | 89 |
V. Capitulation of the Greek Second Army | 89 |
VI. The German Estimate of the Situation on 9 April | 89 |
VII. The Breakthrough to Kozani | 91 |
VIII. The Withdrawal of the Greek First Army | 94 |
Chapter 17. Operations Continued |
IX. Securing the German Rear Areas | 96 |
X. The Fighting near Mount Olympus | 96 |
XI. Continuation of the XL Panzer Corps Drive | 100 |
XII. Regrouping of German Forces | 102 |
XIII. The Last British Stand at Thermopylae | 104 |
XIV. The Seizure of the Isthmus of Corinth | 107 |
XV. The German Drive on Athens and across the Peloponnesus | 111 |
XVI. Losses | 112 |
Chapter 18. Lessons |
I. Employment of Armor in Mountainous Terrain | 112 |
II. Air Support | 112 |
III. Flying Columns | 112 |
IV. Mission Type Orders | 114 |
V. Mountain Training and Equipment | 114 |
VI. Patrol Activities | 114 |
VII. Obstacles and Demolitions | 116 |
VIII. Pacification of Enemy Territory | 116 |
Chapter 19. Conclusions | 116 |
PART FOUR. THE SEIZURE OF CRETE (Operation MERKUR) |
Chapter 20. General |
I. Strategic Factors and Planning | 119 |
II. Situation in the Eastern Mediterranean | 120 |
III. Military Topography | 121 |
IV. The Defense Forces | 123 |
V. The Attack Forces | 124 |
VI. The Plan of Attack | 126 |
VII. The Assembly - Logistical Problems | 127 |
Chapter 21. Operations |
I. The Initial Airborne Landings (20 May 1941) | 129 |
II. The Seaborne Invasion (20-22 May) | 133 |
III. The Continuation of the Struggle (21 May-1 June) | 133 |
VI. Casualties and Losses | 140 |
Chapter 22. Lessons | 141 |
23. Conclusions | 147 |
PART FIVE. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CAMPAIGNS IN THE BALKANS AND THE INVASION OF RUSSIA | 148 |
Chapter 24. Influence of the Plans for Operation BARBAROSSA on the Campaigns in the Balkans |
I. Hasty Execution of the Balkan Campaigns | 149 |
II. Hurried Redeployment from the Balkans | 149 |
III. Defective Occupation of Yugoslavia and Greece | 149 |
Chapter 25. Effect of the Balkan Campaigns on Operation BARBAROSSA |
I. Delay of Operation BARBAROSSA | 150 |
II. The Redeployment of the Ground Forces | 150 |
III. The Influence on Air Operations | 151 |
IV. The Balkan Campaigns as a Diversion | 151 |
Chapter 26. Conclusions | 152 |
APPENDICES |
I. German Chain of Command at the Start of the Balkan Campaigns (6 April 1941) | 152 |
II. Chronological Table of Events | 153 |
III. Bibliographic List | 158 |
MAPS |
1. General Reference Map | 1 |
2. German Operations and Plans July 1940 - March 1941 | 5 |
3. The Campaigns in the Balkans - Deployment and Initial Objectives | 42 |
4. The German Campaign in Yugoslavia (Operation 25) | 49 |
5. The German Campaign in Greece (Operation MARITA) | 70 |
6. The Strategic Importance of Crete | 119 |
7. The Seizure of Crete (Operation MERKUR) | 122 |
ILLUSTRATIONS |
1. The Military Bridge across the Danube | 18 |
2. Bridge across the Drava River Damaged by the Yugoslavs | 28 |
3. Yugoslav Obstacles across the Railway Tracks near Spielfeld | 34 |
4. German Supply Column Crossing a 4,100-Foot Pass in Bulgaria | 40 |
5. German Emergency Bridge Replaces Demolished Structure | 45 |
6. Prime Movers Towing Heavy Trucks along Muddy Road | 51 |
7. German Patrol Returning from a Raid across the Yugoslav Border | 56 |
8. Man and Beast Working Together to PuIl Vehicles out of the Mud | 59 |
9. German Mark III Tank Advancing through Mountain Pass Protectedby Flak | 62 |
10. Disabled Yugoslav Tank | 67 |
11. Gun Emplacements in a Greek Mountain Position | 73 |
12. Antitank Obstacles along the Metaxas Lie | 76 |
13. Obstacles along the Yugoslav-Greek Border | 78 |
14. German Infantry Marching through Bulgarian Mountains toward theGreek Border | 80 |
15. Oxen and Horses Hitched in Tandem to Ierman Field Kitchen in theMountains of Bulgaria | 85 |
16. German Artillery Firing at Meaxas line Fortifications | 87 |
17. Metaxas Line Defenses near Rupcl Gorge | 88 |
18. Road Block near Greek Border | 90 |
19. Mountain Division on the March thro,:gt! Nor",ern Greece | 92 |
20. German Infantry "Invading" Islands i, tLe A ;sn Sea | 95 |
21. German Tank Burns during Attack on the Rid:e.near Platamon | 97 |
22. German Tank Descending Slope toward Pinios River | 99 |
23. German Tanks Get Stuck during the Crossing of the Pinios River | 101 |
24. German Convoy Waiting to Cross the Pinios River on a Pneumatic Boat Ferry | 103 |
25. German Tanks Approaching the Thermopylae Pass | 105 |
26. Construction of an Emergency Bridge near Thermopylae Pass | 106 |
27. The Airborne Operation against the Isthmus of Corinth | 108 |
28. Right: The Destruction of the Corinth Canal Bridge.Top: The Canal after the Explosion | 109 |
29. Motorized Column Advancing along the Railroad Tracks from Thebesto Athens | 110 |
30. A Motorized and a Mountain Infantry Column Share Road to Athens | 113 |
31. Difficult Terrain in Central Greece | 115 |
32. German Engineer Using Mine Detector | 117 |
33. German Motor Sailer Three Miles Southwest of Cape Spatha | 125 |
34. Mountain Troops Preparing for Airlift to Crete | 128 |
35. Maleme Airfield with Hill 107 in Background | 131 |
36. Airborne Landings West of Maleme | 134 |
37. Disabled British Tank near Canea | 136 |
38. The Struggle for Heraklion Airfield | 138 |
39. The First Mules Have Arrived in Crete | 140 |
40. Airborne Landings over the North Coast of Crete | 144 |
41. Antitank Gun, Attached to Five Parachutes, Is Dropped over Crete | 146 |
(Most of the illustrations are U. S. Army photos from captured German films; a few are reproductionsfrom the collection of captured combat paintings now in the custody of the Chief of Military History, SpecialStaff, U. S. Army.) |
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