

## A b s c h r i f t .

Chef der Sicherheitspolizei  
und des SD.

Berlin, den 20. August 1943

S. B. Nr. /1943.

1.) Vermerk:

Der Reichsführer-~~H~~ hat den Italien-Bericht Dr. H ü t t l 's dem Führer vorgelegt, den Bericht aber bis/Seite 7) entnehmen lassen.

Es ist vom Amt VI insbesondere auch der Sohn B a d o ' g = l i o 's gut beurteilt worden, was politisch angesprochen falsch gesehen ist.

Insgesamt hat die politische Berichterstattung den Mangel, dass sie sich in Werturteilen ergeht, die den Nachrichtenerp f nger oder hohen politisch Anwertenden in falscher Richtung ansprechen geeignet ist.

Die Berichterstattung hat sich fotografisch genau an mit Sorgfalt erhobenen Tatsachen zu halten und Quellen anzugeben.

Hieran kann und soll sich eine Beurteilung des Nachrichtendienstes anschließen (also des Amtes VI oder des C.d.S.) in Form von Aufzählung aller aus dem Nachrichtmaterial zustehenden Schlüsse. Dies hat übersichtlich und mit Geist zu geschehen.

Hierüber bitte ich Amtschef VI noch um mündliche Rücksprache.

ges. Dr. Kaltenbrunner

~~H~~-Obergruppenführer  
und General d. Pol.

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*Col. Bliss*  
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AUTH: CG, Third US Army  
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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

Interrogation Section 9 July 1945

CONTENTS

The SD and the RSHA

- I The Development of the SD
- II The RSHA
- III High Command Echelons of the SD

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

Preamble

Dr Wilhelm HOETTL composed and dictated the following treatise on the SD and the RSHA during a prolonged stay in the hospital at PREISING, Bayern.

HOETTL, a native Austrian and former professor of modern history at the University of WIEN, joined the SD in 1938. He served in the domestic branch first as Referent for church questions, and later as Referent for Southeastern EUROPE in the SD Leitabschnitt WIEN.

At the beginning of 1942 he incurred the disfavor of HEYDRICH, then chief of the RSHA, and was ousted, only to be recalled by KALTENBRUNNER in February 1943.

His main field of activity in the RSHA after February 1943 was in the Southeastern EUROPE section of Amt VI, a field for which he was well-suited by virtue of his historical education and Austrian background.

As deputy chief of Gruppe VI E under WANECK (also captured) and as an Austrian, he carried considerable weight with KALTENBRUNNER, although he was in constant opposition to official policy of the Foreign Office.

In March 1944 he was sent to HUNGARY as chief representative of Amt VI and political adviser to the German plenipotentiary, ambassador VERSENMAIER (also reported captured).

In the RSHA, HOETTL was the outstanding member of the Austrian clique, which played its own game after KALTENBRUNNER took over, towards the end even attempting a rapprochement with the Austrian resistance movement.

HOETTL is acknowledged to be one of the most intelligent SD functionaries in the field of foreign affairs, with a remarkable grasp of the conflicting interests that have turned EUROPE, especially the Southeast, into a political maelstrom.

The following paper does not pretend to treat exhaustively of the SD or the RSHA. However, it should give some idea of the interplay between the SD and the agencies of the German government directly concerned with the formulation and execution of policy.

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SECRETINTERROGATION REPORT No 15I. The Development of the SD1. Short History of the German Secret Servicea. Foreign Intelligence.

It is a fact that of the people of the world the Germans are among the least adept in intelligence work, and furthermore they have not shown any particular interest in such work. It is for this reason that there has never existed a continuous, soundly and organically developed German intelligence service.

Before the first world war, both in GERMANY and in AUSTRIA - HUNGARY, the intelligence service was more or less the step-child of the General Staff. Only in times immediately preceding or during wars did it succeed in achieving greater significance. During such periods expansions of the intelligence service became vital. Moreover, at no time did this intelligence service blanket the countries of the globe. It was limited in its work to areas in which there existed actual operational plans of the General Staff. Here it dealt exclusively with purely military requirements completely neglecting all political intelligence.

At the same time, the German Foreign Office, which would have been competent to handle political intelligence, never stimulated enough interest in its activities to be able to develop a real organization for the collection of intelligence. Practically, such activities were contingent upon the interest shown by the Chief of the Mission in each country.

For this reason well-organized nets did exist in certain countries, but only in those where the diplomatic representative had taken an active interest in their establishment. The intensity and quality of that interest varied from country to country and no general conclusion as to the effectiveness of the measures taken can be drawn.

b. Domestic Intelligence.

An internal intelligence service never existed in GERMANY. The only exceptions were the agencies operated by various police authorities. Especially after the Napoleonic wars, until the year 1848, such institutions thrived. METTERNICH, for example, developed a system of surveillance over the citizens never surpassed.

c. Recent Developments.

During the nineteen - twenties we find the first signs of reconstruction within the German intelligence services, completely destroyed during the first world war. It was during that time, under the cloak of strictest secrecy, a small number of Reichswehr officers were trained for intelligence work. These officers later provided the cadre for the military intelligence service, the Abwehr.

The program gained in importance during the period of HINDEBURG's presidency and was thrown into high gear during the short time of SCHREIBER's tenure of office as Reichskanzler. The institution of compulsory military service, however, gave the system the necessary impetus for greater and complete expansion.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

2. The Intelligence Service of the NSDAP and the Formation of the SD

a. Background.

The NSDAP had instituted an information service at a comparatively early date. This system had been organized for the specific needs of a political party, i e, its activities were limited to surveillance of the political parties opposed to National Socialism and of the various institutions and personalities connected with the State.

At first no specific agency had been entrusted with these tasks, a large proportion of which fell within the province of the Party's propaganda section. As time progressed the collection and dissemination of intelligence had gained increasing importance and its coordination into one agency became necessary in 1931. This service, the Sicherheitsdienst or SD (Security Service), was entrusted to the control of HIMMLER in his capacity as Reichsfuehrer SS, then still subordinate to the Chief of Staff of the SA.

b. HEYDRICH appears.

HIMMLER appointed Oberleutnant zur See Reinhard HEYDRICH to be commanding officer of the new agency. It can not be said that this service turned out to be a model of efficiency right from the beginning. As can be explained, at least partially, by the reluctance of the Party to abandon control over some of its own, sometimes rather valuable, agencies. Instead the use of the service for local Party needs continued.

During that period there existed, parallel to that of the SD, an intelligence net of the NSDAP, one of the SA, and others. This state of affairs was radically changed with the Nazi assumption of power in 1933. At that time HIMMLER became head of the Bavarian political police, and HEYDRICH, as his assistant was charged with actual operations. After firmly consolidating all police powers in his hands he began to concentrate the SD at MUENCHEN, his new scene of activity.

HIMMLER never liked to see too much power united in the person of any one of his collaborators. He therefore almost immediately placed a man with HEYDRICH, as his deputy for SD matters, who, he knew, had neither the ability nor the inclination to engage in any plots with the former. This man was the well-known and infamous Herrmann BERCHTOLD, who had gained his unsavory reputation in the great Feme trials.

This experiment ended with a result which could have been predicted from a knowledge of HEYDRICH's personality and temperament. BERCHTOLD, after attempting to show up HEYDRICH's egotistical machinations, was arrested by HEYDRICH as implicated in the plot of 30 June 1934. After a long period in various prisons he was discharged and from then on disappeared into obscurity.

c. The SD moves to its permanent home.

With the appointment of HIMMLER as GOERING's deputy commander of the Prussian Secret Police, HEYDRICH's main effort was shifted from MUENCHEN to BERLIN. Since that time BERLIN has remained the center of SD activities. Although the so-called SD Hauptamt had already been formed during the MUENCHEN period, a real organization took shape after the transfer to BERLIN had occurred.

~~SECRET~~INTERROGATION REPORT No 153. Nature of the SD during the first period, immediately after 1933a. Early Organization.

In complete accordance with its traditions the first main field of SD activity was to point out the shortcomings of the State, then not at all penetrated by National Socialism. In the first organizational phase an SD Referent was appointed for each SS Oberabschnitt (usually identical with the area of a "ehrkreis"). This later developed into the institution of SD Ober- and Unterabschnitte. The areas of the former were usually identical with those of the SS Oberabschnitte, while the latter corresponded to the SS Abschnitte.

b. Centralization in the SD - Hauptamt.(1) Structure.

Only this expansion and the establishment of a structure covering all of GERMANY (about 1936-37) provided the basis for an organization which corresponded to the present-day SD. Parallel with this organization of the external structure, a reorganization of the internal structure of the SD Hauptamt began. The plans for this new set-up had been developed by MEHLHORN, then Amtchef I. They provided for the organization of three Aemter.

Amt I was concerned with matters pertaining to personnel and administration; Amt II was charged with the supervision of the Spheres of German life (Lebensgebietmässige Erfassung des Deutschen Reiches); and Amt III was to take charge of Counter-Intelligence (Abwehr).

(2) Progress.

The completion of this reorganization met with considerable delay, however, and the labor pains continued until after the annexation of AUSTRIA in 1938. This was the first instance where the SD played a part of actual major importance. In spite of the lack of structural cohesion during that period, a certain pattern began to emerge for the nature and the activities of the SD, even though it had not reached the ultimate ramifications of a later day.

(3) The Sections.

Amt I, which is of less concern in a survey such as this, still managed to gain a position of prominence rarely seen in a personnel section of any other agency. Almost all chiefs of sections knew that their predecessors had maintained their positions only by their untrammeled influence on the selection of personnel. It can easily be understood that Amt I and its members were correspondingly unpopular with the rest of the personnel.

Amt II was enlarged considerably during 1937 and 1938 and thus the foundation was laid for the all-inclusive work of its successor, the Inlandamt III. The sub-sections of Amt II (as in the other two Aemter) were so-called Hauptabteilungen (corresponding to Gruppen in the later organization) subdivided into Abteilungen (later Referate) and finally Referate (corresponding to the later Sachgebieten).

The most important Hauptabteilungen were coordinated into Zentralabteilungen. This coordination was based not so much on considerations of factual necessity, but rather on the reasoning that certain important members of the SD Hauptamt simply had to be given positions as Zentralabteilungsleiter under the revised T O.

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3. Nature of the SD during the first period, immediately after 1933 (Continued)(4) Internal Intelligence(a) In the Hauptamt

The main effort in internal intelligence at that time was concentrated in the two Hauptabteilungen II/1 and II/2. The former included all groups inimical to the State, i.e., under II/11 Jews, Freemasons, and the Church, while II/12 included Marxists, Reactionaries, and other members of the Opposition. The sub-divisions and sub-sub sections went as far as numbers of four digits (such as II/1211).

The Hauptabteilung II/2 had a similar structure. It included the fields of Law and Administration (later an independent Gruppe in Amt III). Theoretically this Hauptabteilung was to be entrusted with the positive and constructive sector, while II/1 had as its concern the more or less negative field of observation and surveillance. For all practical intents and purposes this distinction disappeared. II/2 as well was confined to the collection of information. Practical suggestions had a chance of realization only in the case of personal collaboration with the representatives of agencies of the State.

Hauptabteilung II/3 was in charge of all problems of an economic nature. Chief of the combined Hauptabteilungen II/1, II/2, and II/3 was Prof Dr F a SIX, later Ambassador and Chief of the Information Branch of the Foreign Office.

(b) At lower level

The same internal organization was instituted in the various SD Ober- and Unterabschnitte. After a period of operation it was found that the existence of Oberabschnitte gave rise to a large number of conflicts due to overlapping of authority and for this reason the Oberabschnitte were dissolved towards the end of 1938.

The field organization now included Abschnitte and Leitabschnitte. The latter were Abschnitte in regions of special importance, but on the same organizational level as the former. These Abschnitte also included in their structure representatives of Amt I, concerned with personnel and administration, and of the Counter Intelligence Amt III.

(5) Foreign Intelligence

The organization of an intelligence service in foreign countries is of comparatively recent origin. It received its start with the formation of the Haupt- (later Zentral-) abteilung III/3. Any activity in this field prior to this date had no place in the organizational pattern and was due almost entirely to personal ambitions of certain individual members of the SD.

The offensive phase of operations (as distinguished from the defensive or counter-intelligence phase) received its first major task prior to the annexation of Austria. As the agency responsible for liaison between the underground Nazi party in Austria and governmental authorities in GERMANY, it proved to be instrumental in the success of the operation.

The other Referate within Amt III were of a purely defensive nature, such as the organization of the Werkschutz (industrial security), etc. The Chief of Amt III at that time was SS Brigadefuehrer Heinz JOST. He was later removed by HEYDRICH or STRECKENEICH (for many years, Amtschef I) under peculiar circumstances.

4. SD and GESTAPO

a. Conflicts

The development and organization of the SD during the first few years was without any direct relation to that of the Secret Police. In many fields the corresponding developments and spheres of interest were overlapping and gave rise to conflicts of authority and jurisdiction. From the very beginning there was no love lost between the two institutions and an intense feeling of rivalry developed.

During the beginning of 1938 a fundamental agreement (Grundsatzvereinbarung) was reached between Gestapo and SD, clearly defining the various critical sectors of responsibility. Nevertheless the conflicts continued for many years to come, e.g. in the field of "internal enemies" (innere Gegner) where SD and Gestapo were active on the same level, in the field of Counter-Intelligence (Abwehr) where the Stapo had all the advantages on its side because of its executive powers, in foreign countries, etc. The latter was one of the favorite fields of activity of the Secret Police and only after years of squabbling and fighting was this sector abandoned, only to give rise to new disagreements and independent work by the Stapo at the slightest provocation.

b. HEYDRICH as arbitrator

These perennial conflicts and the indicated parallelisms were completely of HEYDRICH's making and met with his approval. His prime motivating force was the fear that one of his subordinate agencies, and with that its chief, might become indispensable and of fundamental importance. According to his inclination, HEYDRICH had more sympathy for the Stapo, for it furnished him with greater power. If he seemed to favor the SD occasionally in his decisions then that can usually be explained by personal reasons, such as a desire to spite SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr BEST (Head of the Gestapo), whom he regarded as a dangerous rival.

c. Party vs State

Not even the establishment of the RSHA, including SD Hauptamt Gestapo and Kripo, succeeded in completely eliminating all overlapping and in settling every conflict. It never did succeed in eliminating the most fundamental difference between the SD and the Police Center, namely the fact that the former remained, administratively at the very least, under complete control of the Party, while the latter were organs of the State. The regular member of the SD continued until the last to draw his salary from the funds administered by SCHWARZ, the Party Treasurer.

d. Metamorphosis of the Stapo

After the reorganization of the various agencies within the framework of the RSHA, serious attempts to instill a spirit of cooperation were made. The death of HEYDRICH was the signal for a further intensification of unification measures. All this work was crowned with only a minimum of success. Although the structure appeared homogeneous in its external manifestations, its inner core was heterogeneous.

The divergence of methods and opinions between the members of Center III and VI on one hand and those of Unit IV on the other was not conducive for the ripening of friendships, frequently not even for the cooperation necessary to deal with the business under consideration. A large measure of this enmity was due to the inclusion of officials of the Gestapo and Kripo in the ranks of the SS, as ordered by HIMMLER.

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- 5 -

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

4. SD and GESTAPO (Continued)

This step was especially galling to old SD men (frequently only of minor SS rank), since the newcomers received SS rank corresponding exactly to their civil service position. For instance, an Oberregierungsrat was automatically appointed SS Obersturmbannfuhrer or a Kriminalkommissar, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer.

Under the influence of the hue and cry raised by the old guard, HIMMLER was forced to modify this transfer order somewhat, at least in theory. In practice, however, the principle was not fundamentally changed. Now one could observe the interesting phenomenon of these officials, hitherto of a distinctly leftist tinge in PRUSSIA and of a clerical one in BAVARIA becoming more radical and more brutal than most old Party men who had belonged to the SS for years.

Many of these men now seemed to have found the true stage for their activities as the executive arm of a repressive police system and vied with one another in devising new and ever more reprehensible means to achieve this end. Especially during HEYDRICH's reign, where military bearing was of prime importance, the evils of this system of equalization (Gleichschaltung) became fully apparent. The officials under discussion were sent to the occupied territories as officers, and then commenced to justify their being called officers by applying their "military instincts" to the unlucky civilian population.

It would be an interesting, although slightly nauseating, statistical study to find out the exact measure and percentage of the horrors committed by members of the Gestapo and even the Kripo, as compared to those of the SD, within the framework of Sipo activities in German-occupied countries.

~~SECRET~~INTERROGATION REPORT No 15II. The RSHA1. Amt I

This section had acquired a disproportionate position of power during the first years of the RSHA. After HEYDRICH's death and before KALTENBRUNNER's appointment, this influence had been strengthened even further by SS Gruppenfuhrer (then SS Hauptsturmfuhrer) STRECKENBACH, the Amts-  
chef I.

a. Functions(1) RSHA and the Armed Forces

Amt I's function was the appointment of personnel, which had been nominated or requested by other sections. In this operation Amt I had a purely administrative function but no decisive voice. Persons who had been recruited for work by the other Sector merely had to be appointed or transferred through Amt I. During the course of the war this usually involved deferral or transfer from one of the armed services.

Difficulties inherent in this task were frequently so great that no transfer could be effected. This was especially true in the case of men of class of 1915 or younger, who usually could not be saved from front-line commitment. A way out of this dilemma was found, however.

The men in question were first drafted by or transferred to the Waffen SS, and then posted by this branch to its headquarters company (Stabskompanie) in the RSHA. This neat device could only be used, however, if transfer to the Waffen SS became possible, and if various command echelons of the branch agreed on the measures to be adopted.

After total war had been proclaimed, increasing difficulties had to be met, and eventually most of the old non-commissioned cadre personnel of the Sipo and the SD had to be donated to the Waffen SS. Similar measures had also been put into operation with regard to officer personnel.

Amt VI and Amt III found different means. Since Amt III was a military headquarters by definition, people who were needed were transferred from the Army or Navy to Amt III and thus became available for service. Since most sections of VI and III were equivalent and staffed identically, the personnel of III were available to fill corresponding positions in VI.

(2) Sipo and SD in occupied territory

In this period when the whole organization had taken on a rather definite form, and Amt I could no longer continue its arbitrary manner, it created new influence and power for itself in a different sector. This came about in the course of the organization of the so-called Task Forces (Einsatzkommandos).

These were units formed of Sipo and SD personnel, which moved into occupied territory with the advancing armies, and then consolidated the territory until it could be taken over by the Befehlshaber and Kommandeure. The organization and selection of personnel for these Kommandos were a function of Amt I.

The selection was made in a completely arbitrary manner, following the whims of the personnel section. As far as the commanders of these units were concerned, appointment to such a position usually brought with it an increase in rank.

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- 7 -

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

1. Ant I (Continued)

Appointments to head Einsatzkommandos were not an undisguised blessing, however. Many officers found that on their return their sinecures in the RSHA had been taken over by somebody else and that their commitment had only been used to get them out of the way for one reason or another.

It must be remembered that most of these Einsatzkommandos are responsible for some of the most brutal acts committed by the German security police in occupied territory. The guilt for these measures devolves to a large extent on Ant I, since it selected the men it thought would live up to the customary reputation of the German political police.

b. Commanders

STRECKENBACH's successor, Brigadefuehrer SCHULZ, proved to be particularly weak and inefficient. He was dismissed by KALTENBRUNNER and transferred to SALZBURG. He was succeeded by SS-Oberfuehrer EHRLINGER, a comparatively young man. EHRLINGER had been trained by SIX within the old Ant II. His career had then taken him to the occupied areas in the East and later to BELGIUM. He was a very energetic and active person and attempted to revive to a certain extent Ant I's waning influence.

c. BRÄUNE and the Table of Organization

EHRLINGER's most important collaborator and first assistant was SS Obersturmbannfuehrer BRÄUNE. He was the real head of the personnel branch. In the section for many years, he had become a real power behind the throne. His influence was rather great, since his opinion was vital for all promotions and advancement. He was charged with the devising of Tables of Organization and the distribution of positions according to these tables (Planstellenwesen).

TO positions were always a controversial subject and had been subjected to frequent changes. The old scheme decreed that in the RSHA a Sachbearbeiter would have the TO rank of Hauptsturmfuehrer, a Hilfsreferent would have the TO rank of Sturmbannfuehrer, a Referent would have the TO rank of Obersturmbannfuehrer, and a Gruppenleiter's TO rank would be that of Standartenfuehrer.

The TO positions with SD Abschnitte or Stapo (leit) Stellen were always lower, by one grade. Thus the Abschnittsfuehrer or Stellenleiter was equivalent in rank to a Referent in the RSHA.

The latest TO suggested an advancement in grade, especially within the RSHA. Under this plan a Gruppenleiter of an important Gruppe could become a Brigadefuehrer. Similarly the TO rank of the Antschef, which previously had been equivalent to that of a Befehlshaber - Brigadefuehrer, was to be upgraded. Thus an Antschef could hold the rank of Obergruppenfuehrer.

None of these changes were final, however, especially during the war and its resultant confusion. The many compromises and the enlarged freedom of action further increased the importance of the Personalant.

Another important man in Ant I was SS Obersturmbannfuehrer WÄNNINGER. He was responsible for personnel questions in occupied territories. As far as knowledge and familiarity with the personalities of most members of the RSHA is concerned, BRÄUNE would be a more useful source.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 151. Ant I (Continued)d. Influence on Ant Mil

After the consolidation with Abwehr, Oberstleutnant HUEBNER was placed on duty with Ant I. His function was the supervision of all military personnel. EHRLINGER immediately evinced interest in this field, with the intention of gaining a way to influence the selection of military personnel. SCHELLENBERG, however, kept his own council and understood how to build up Ant Mil according to his own ideas.

2. Ant IIa. Functions(1) Funds

Ant II always had purely administrative functions only and never reached a position of importance. The most important consideration within the jurisdiction of this ant was the administration of all funds. As far as payment of officers, non-commissioned officers, employees, and officials of the Sipo and the SD was concerned, this was purely a technical affair involving bookkeeping, but nothing more. The funds for the police sections were contributed by the Ministry of the Interior, while those for the SD came from the treasury of the NSDAP.

The distribution and administration of the special funds for intelligence purposes (Nachrichtemittel) presented an entirely different problem. The various center had a certain monthly allowance for these purposes and the accounting system used was a rather complicated one. Ant VI and Mil, especially, were always in need of large amounts of foreign currency and of gold.

To obtain these large sums, personal intervention by SCHELLENBERG or KALTENBRUNNER became frequently necessary. Funds were made available either by SCHLIERIN-KROSIGK's Finance Ministry or by FUNK's Ministry of Economics. Another source of "money" was the manufacture of counterfeit foreign currency.

(2) Weapons

Another concern of Ant II was the equipment of members of Sipo and SD with uniforms and weapons. Sufficient funds for this purpose became available only during the most recent period. Until 1944 not even the service pistol could be issued to every member of the security services.

Only recently did more and heavier weapons become available. These included machine pistols and machine guns. It appears that internal unrest was expected and every headquarters of Sipo or SD was to be made into a small fortress.

(3) Other Sections

Several sub-sections of Ant II dealt with technical matters. For instance the motor transport section was of considerable extent. The sections for means of communication (Nachrichtemittelabteilung) was detached in 1944 and formed into the independent Ant N.

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- 9 -

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

2. Ant II (Continued)

b. Personalities

Concurrent with the appointment of EHLINGER (to Ant I), KALTENBRUNNER also changed the chief of Ant II. He entrusted SS Oberfuehrer (then SS Standartenfuehrer) SPACIL with this task. SPACIL had been his administrative assistant (Verwaltungsfuehrer) when KALTENBRUNNER was still in charge of Oberabschnitt DONAU. SPACIL seems to have been a capable technician and appears to have worked efficiently.

3. Ant III

Ant III controlled the complete internal intelligence and information service. It consisted of the following five Gruppen:

- III A Verwaltung und Recht (Administration and Law)
- III B Volkstum und Volksgesundheit (Nationality and Public Health)
- III C Kulturelles Leben (Cultural Life)
- III D Wirtschaft (Economic Life)
- III G Gesellschaftsnachrichtendienst (Intelligence through sources in high social circles)

a. Gruppe III A

(1) Administration

This sub-section was concerned with three main fields of interest (Hauptsachgebiete), namely law (Recht - III A 2), administration (Verwaltung - III A 3) and party (Partei - III A 4). Standartenfuehrer Dr GENGENBACH, who had been Gruppenleiter for many years (killed in an automobile accident in 1944), succeeded in making his voice heard in questions of administrative reform.

In this fashion the SD had gained quite a bit of influence in this field. To further this end, questions of administrative reform were declared priority reports, and the Abschnitte were instructed to transmit periodic reports on that topic.

This is the explanation of why the Abschnitte attempted to recruit the services of experts in that field, and certain rather sensible suggestions and far-reaching plans were handed in. All this was to be in preparation for the day when HITLER would take over the Ministry of the Interior.

That day came and with it stark disappointment. HITLER, as usual when faced with a concrete task, proved to be a complete failure. Instead of bringing order out of chaos, HITLER permitted conditions within the Ministry to reach a new, all-time low.

All plans for reform, written with so much confidence by III A, were put back into the safes and GENGENBACH had to resort to the usual underhanded means in order to gain even the slightest semblance of success.

(2) Law

Referat Recht (III A 2) had only an advisory function. The Abschnitte had to report on the results of new legislation and to conduct a survey of popular opinion and morale after each major decision of the judiciary. It is to be understood that most of these reports were of a negative character. They were of absolutely no consequence, however,

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Ant III (Continued)

Occasionally in the General Survey of the Situation in Germany (Reichslagebericht), the most comprehensive report submitted by Ant III, gentle hints were dropped on the subject of "prostitution of the law in GERMANY."

An especially touchy subject was the well-known hostility of HITLER and HIMMLER to all lawyers and everything reminiscent of jurisprudence. Once the results of this stand had to be mentioned even in the cautious reports of Ant III. That was after HITLER's "speech against the lawyers," when the Lagebericht had to touch on the indignation and ire of all those still engaged in the administration and maintenance of the law.

Generally the Referat committed many sins of omission. Especially the ever-increasing lawlessness, which finally became equivalent to absolute anarchy, was never commented on by this sub-section.

THIERACK, the Minister of Justice, as well as FREISLER, the president of the People's Court, enjoyed the complete support of Ant III. And that in spite of continuous, strongly negative reports from the agencies collecting information.

(3) Party

Activities of Referat III A 4, the NSDAP Referat, were surrounded with special secrecy. All intelligence involving party activities had to be kept a strict secret from the Gauleitungen, as well as the superior Party command echelons. The intention behind this activity was of course a supervision of all aspects of Party operations.

Reports were full of indications of unpopularity, inefficiency, and corruption. No action could be taken, however, since such reports could not be transmitted to the proper agencies. Material collected by III A 4 should be of considerable historical interest, however.

b. Gruppe III B

(1) Public Health

The Health-Referat was of no great importance and its personnel of rather poor quality. Reports were of a purely informative nature. Conclusions reached, until the very end, were that the German population in spite of the war and frequent bombings was in an excellent state of health. This was brought out especially in comparative studies with the first World War.

A pet project of III B was the mass X-ray survey (Roentgenreihuntersuchung), carried out by Professor HOHLFELDER. The good professor had a whole battery of motorized X-ray apparatus under his command and with their aid succeeded in X-raying the whole German population and even large sections of the German minority in the various Balkan countries. His findings were then submitted to the proper Health Office, which could supervise the work of curing the diseases and defects indicated by the X-ray studies. This method proved of great preventive value.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Art III (Continued)

(2) Nationality

(c) Purpose and Guilt

When an allotment of criminal and moral guilt is made among the various sections of the SD, the Referat Nationality (Volkstum) should receive a large share. Behind the harmless title it was responsible for all crimes committed against foreigners within GERMANY and German-occupied EUROPE. This includes treatment of foreigners singly and in national minority groups.

In this field the SD had practically unlimited power, and also a large share of that executive control which is usually attributed to the police sections. The inhuman treatment meted out to national groups, such as Czechs and Poles, was based on recommendations made by the SD Referat, III B. The III B Referate in the various Abschnitte were also entrusted with the determination of national origin (Volksdeutsche).

(b) Applications

The inhuman and brutal application of these doctrines took two specific forms. On one hand we find the enforced elimination of certain national groups (either directly by physical elimination or indirectly by appropriate educational and psychological measures), and on the other hand the forced Germanization of other groups. A large share of the responsibility for all these measures rests with III B.

III B for instance decided, in the field of education, that in so-called "predominantly German" territories, Czech children could attend only grade-schools, while all intermediate and advanced schools were to be visited by Germans only. Conversely the decision as to who was Czech and who was German also rested with the SD. These measures were designed to make the reappearance of Czech intellectuals impossible for all times.

We also find that the SD arbitrarily decided that certain families, which had long been absorbed by the Czechs and had accepted Czech nationality, were declared Germans, had to move to GERMANY, and were forcibly re-made into Germans.

The SD followed similar lines in questions of the resettlement of minorities along the boundaries of GERMANY. Many sins were committed there as well (for instance, in the resettlement of Slovenes, etc.).

(c) Results

In the question of the treatment of the slave laborers, III B and Stapo worked hand in hand. Many joint orders of Art III and IV existed on these questions. Even in counter-intelligence close cooperation prevailed, counter to the usual practices. Many of the under-cover agents among foreigners worked both for Art III and Art IV. The Lageberichte concerning these topics indicated a perennially intransigent stand.

Strong criticism of all organizations thinking along different lines was the recurring tenor of these reports. III B demanded a visible differentiation between German and Foreign workers and treatment of the latter consistent with their alleged inferiority.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Ant III (Continued)

When the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (the Nazi trade union) attempted to extend its benefits to foreign laborers, the SD demurred. Even the designation - non-German comrades-in-work (nicht-deutsche Werkkameraden) - invented by the DaF to raise the morale of the slave laborers, was rejected by the SD.

III B was also the representative of the most radical point of view concerning the children of non-Germans. It was largely due to its insistence that the law concerning compulsory abortions in the case of pregnancy of a female slave-worker, was promulgated.

(3) III B and German Minorities

One of III B's main concerns was the fate of the German minorities in foreign countries. Here the SD worked on the principle that every German, no matter where he found himself, was entitled to preferential treatment as compared to other nationals.

For the future it was planned to create a continuous German area extending from RUMANIA to the ADRIATIC Sea. This strip of all-German territory was to be the barrier across which no non-German nation could penetrate into the heart of Europe.

The dislike and hatred of National Socialism and GERMANY evinced recently by many members of Southeastern European States is due to a large extent to an understanding of these imperialistic German aims.

(4) III B vs Ant VI

The strong preoccupation with national minority problems within Ant III can also be traced to a desire on the part of this agency to gain greater influence in foreign countries and on the conduct of German foreign policy. Certain countries, such as those of the old Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, were always claimed by Ant III as belonging within its sector of responsibility. The same holds true for SLOVAKIA, which only very recently was taken over by Ant VI, and with that fell into the realm of foreign political intelligence.

The divergent opinions on these topics, as held by Anter III and VI, gave rise to continuous frictions and conflicts between the two branches of the SD. These frictions sometimes reached serious proportions as in the case of the various Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD in the territories concerned.

While Ant VI considered all territory outside of the official German border as non-German, regardless of its occupation by German military forces, Ant III held fast to the tenet that HUNGARY, SLOVAKIA, certain parts of JUGOSLAVIA, etc were parts of GERMANY proper (Inland) and therefore falling under its jurisdiction. It therefore organized its intelligence net in these territories similar to its net within GERMANY itself. This of course gave rise to strong protests from the side of Ant VI and finally KALTENBRUNNER was prevailed upon to favor the latter.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Ant III (Continued)

(5) The Men in Charge

The Gruppenleiter of III B, SS Standartenfuehrer Dr EHLICH, was a man utterly without ability. His experience (physician without ever having had a practice) either in questions of public health or of nationality problems was nil. In spite of his ignorance (or maybe because of it) he is the main responsibility for the crimes mentioned above.

c. Gruppe III C

(1) Extent

This section was indubitably the largest of the whole SD. It was of very great importance, especially during the war and the contingent necessity of preventing a cracking of the home-front. Its exhaustive surveys and reports (Lageberichte) included almost all phases of German life and have reached fantastic proportions.

(2) Efficacy of the SD as an Intelligence Service

Based on the Hauptabteilungen II/1 and II/2 of the old SD-Hauptamt, the original purpose of internal intelligence was the uncovering of all the weaknesses, faults, and unexpected and undesirable results of an authoritarian regime. Lacking other means of popular expression and being aware that continued existence hinged on a combination of popularity of the dictatorship and brutal repression of all its opponents, the SD was to provide a means for the attainment of these two ends.

Success could have only come if this information service could not only point out these faults and weaknesses of the system, which made it unpopular, but at the same time could submit, and be assured of their acceptance, suggestions for alleviation of these unpopular measures as well as for other necessary reforms. Such a service could have been constructed properly within the framework of theoretical ideologically consistent Fascism but not of political National Socialism.

The RSHA provided a level on which the measures of repression could be coordinated and carried out effectively. No similar echelon existed for the constructive part of the program. As a matter of fact very few of the positive suggestions and reforms ever suggested were ever approved by the highest authorities, and fewer still translated into actuality.

At the same time another factor must be considered and that is that strict adherents to a doctrine such as National Socialism cannot allow themselves to be swayed by popular opinion. And with such a static outlook pervading the minds of its officials, the SD could not hope to provide a receptive ear for the likes of the populace.

With these considerations in mind it becomes obvious why the internal SD, and especially III C, in spite of its extensive network and its large number of expert agents never succeeded in actually influencing the fate of the German people. Here all decisions are made at the top, a constructive intelligence service is selfdestructive and only the repressive aspects of such an agency can be permitted to subsist.

3. Ant III (Continued)

(3) Science

The Referat Science (Wissenschaft) had no constructive functions. Again it was only concerned with the effects of laws and ordinances as far as these concerned science and learning. Under consideration here was of course not objective science, but the bastard brood of 100 percent National Socialist Science. All attempts of German science however feeble, to loosen the shackles met with the strictest opposition in the reports of III C.

Of the greatest importance for German science was the fact that III C had a great deal of influence in the selection of university professors. The appointment of all instructors, associates, and professors had to be approved first by III C. In this fashion the strictest control could be maintained and it was insured that only fanatical Nazis were appointed to these positions.

In problems concerning students, closest cooperation existed between III C and the NS Studentenbund (Nazi Student's League). This friendly relation was to a large extent due to the influence of the head of the Studentenbund, Dr SCHEEL, who at the same time was a member of the SD.

(4) Education and Religious Life

The juxtaposition of education and religious life (Erziehung und religioeses Leben) within one of the Referate of III C did not make for homogeneity of subject. The religious life part of it was added only recently.

Before fall 1943 there existed a special Referat for church affairs (Kirchenreferat) which, however was transferred to the Stapo Amt at that time. The following year showed that under the new system the churches would be treated only from a police point of view, and no intelligence would be forthcoming from them.

Therefore a new Referat III C 5 was created in 1944, to take charge of the intelligence aspects of the problem, while all other considerations connected with religion came under the jurisdiction of III C 4, the Erziehungsreferat.

On questions of church problems, III C has always been completely intolerant, radical, and completely anti-religious. For once the RSHA found common ground with the Party Chancery. BORMANN and his advisor on church affairs, Ministerialrat Dr KRUEGER, were of an opinion similar to that of III C.

III C made determined attempts to support all trends promising to take the place of the established churches and their services. Questions of neo-pagan festivals (harvest-thanksgiving celebrations - Erntedankfest; solstice celebrations - Sonnenwendfeiern, et al) received serious consideration and whole-hearted support. The Catholic Mass was to be replaced by a so-called morning-devotional (Morgenfeier).

Educational problems were further sub-divided into the sectors School and Hitler Youth (Schule und Hitlerjugend). An interesting point came up with the proposed introduction all over GERMANY of the Austrian-type Hauptschule instead of the Prussian Mittelschule. The former left a certain possibility for individual education, while the latter was the prototype of the strict, disciplined, mass institution, with military flavor. The SD of course favored the latter.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Art III (Continued)

A large proportion of III C reports were devoted to the ever-decreasing educational level of German schools as well as to the ever-increasing amount of juvenile delinquency. This question was treated in detailed reports by all Abschnitte in 1942 under the title "Juvenile delinquency and lowered moral standards in the third year of the war" (Jugendverwahrlosung und sinkende Moral im dritten Kriegsjahr).

The results of this survey were so damning that III C never did publish the comprehensive report it had planned. It can be imagined that with the further progress of the war conditions became even worse.

Art III never did approve of the Hitler Youth movement and the doctrine represented by it of education by youth of the same age as those to be educated. The constant criticism of the HJ was the cause of ever deteriorating relations between leaders of this movement and the SD and with it of the SS in general.

(5) Customs

Even after the outbreak of war, the SD still continued to give support to all engaged in the perpetuation of ancient customs. The Referat Volkskultur, concerned itself with all societies and clubs engaged in the practice and preservation of ancient customs and costumes.

(6) Spiritual Aid

Another separate Referat dealt with spiritual help to the population (Seelische Betreuung). Its main activities were diatribes against the DAF and the KdF Program (Strength through Joy), mainly at subordinate levels.

(7) Press and Propaganda

Of special importance during wartime was the field of activity concerned with questions of press and propaganda. This sector was one of the most extensive concerns of the SD. Its apparatus was so large and so well organized that reaction to all measures of German and Allied propaganda could be gauged almost instantaneously.

The main customer for reports of this sort was to be found in GOEBBELS and his Propaganda Ministry. He has been reported as having said upon several occasions that his work would have been impossible without the efficient service of the SD. In reality he paid very little attention to the findings of the SD and continued to conduct propaganda exactly as he pleased.

Still the information service in this Referat was excellent. The chief, SS Sturmbannfuhrer von KIELPINSKI, ran his organization like an efficiently-run newspaper of major importance and his results were accordingly good.

His influence was greatest in the field of the official weekly newsreel (Deutsche Wechsenschau), put out by the Propaganda Ministry. But even here his influence was only short-lived. In 1944 an ordinance appeared stating that henceforth only positive criticism could appear from the press and propaganda Referat.

The Gruppenleiter III C, SS Standartenfuhrer Dr SPENGLER, was a man of somewhat retiring demeanor, but with the soul of a fanatic. The position and measures taken by his Gruppe are his complete responsibility.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Ant III (Continued)

d. Gruppe III D

(1) Field of Action

III D was second only to III C in size. The field of economic intelligence had always been the personal province of OHLENDORF, the Chief of Ant III. His Gruppenleiter III D (SS Standartenfuehrer Dr SEIBERT) was an absolute zero and so he continued to exercise effective control over this sector until the end.

His organization was very extensive, especially on the lower levels (Abschnitte) and thus III D had its informants and agents in every single cranny of German economic life. The information reaching III D about German economic life was both profound and sound.

OHLENDORF, as was common within the SD, used the influence gained thereby for the enhancement of his personal power and glory. It was, however, unavoidable that in its control over German economic life the SD as well should gain in stature.

(2) First Nexus of SD and State

This was not so noticeable in the Ministry of Armaments (SPEER) or the Ministry of Agriculture (BACKE), but became very pronounced in the Economic Ministry (FUNK). Here OHLENDORF was engaged in a systematic campaign, and finally even managed to become Secretary of State HEYLER's second in command.

This was the first case of an SD official gaining an important post within the machinery of the State proper. How much the enormous organization of the SD, especially in this field, aided him in the fulfillment of his official duties is difficult to judge. Generally OHLENDORF was liable to place his personal advantage in the foreground. Also it is hard to see what positive action he could have taken on the many reports criticizing the pitiful state of German economy.

e. Gruppe III G

III G (Gesellschaftsnachrichtendienst - society intelligence service) was formed to provide intelligence by employing persons in "high society." There were absolutely no factual justifications for the creation of this Gruppe in 1944. There already existed a section within Ant VI (VI Kult) with similar aims, and in Ant IV the Nachrichten or N-Referat fulfilled the same functions. The real reason for the creation of the new agency was once again an attempt by Ant III to gain some influence on foreign affairs.

At first III G, which originally had been called III N, was small. It was intended to be a trial balloon to test the reaction of Center IV and VI. When these agencies chose to merely ignore an attempt which they considered childish and ridiculous, Ant III misconstrued their reaction as an indication of future non-interference and commenced to really start its enterprise in great style. Each Abschnitt was staffed with a Referent for III G. The aid of Referenten on other III topics was enlisted in order to obtain as large a number of contacts as possible. Still the expected results were not forthcoming.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Art III (Continued)

There were numerous reasons for this state of affairs. The leadership was incompetent. The opportunities were small. In 1944 GERMANY had almost no direct contact with the rest of EUROPE. The number of persons traveling into foreign countries from GERMANY was getting smaller. Similarly, fewer and fewer foreigners came to visit GERMANY. Thus opportunities to enlist members of International Society and similar groups (the purpose of the Referat) were few and far between.

VI Kult was suffering under similar disadvantages but at least, due to the excellent foreign information service of Art VI, all persons travelling into Germany from foreign countries were known and could thus be tapped for intelligence purposes.

The chief of III G, SS Sturmabfuhrer Dr WEGENER, an officer of mediocre ability, brought no qualification of background to his position. His right hand and driving force, SS Hauptsturnfuhrer GERN, was at best a second-rate confidence man.

f. Evaluation of Results Achieved

(1). The Lageberichte

If an appreciation of the importance and influence of Art III on the conduct of German affairs is desired, the question of quality and objectivity of reports submitted looms large. The institution of the so-called Lageberichte dates back to the period immediately following the outbreak of the war. The Abschnitte were ordered at that time to submit a daily survey of the situation in their sector to the RSHA at BERLIN. Later the periods elapsing between reports was extended considerably.

(2) Objectivity of Spot Reports

Those reports, based on the intelligence gathered by the Mussenstellen (smallest SD unit), and on information gleaned from the agents under the direct control of the Referat at Abschnitt-level, generally gave an absolutely correct and objective picture of the situation. This was true in the beginning, at least.

(3) Changes at the lower level

Later on some experienced Referenten learned that their objective reports never reached publication in their original form, but were changed, toned down, and made more palatable to those in power. Some of the Referenten therefore resigned themselves to the fact that truth was not wanted and so started to color their own reports and changed the trend of their recommendations. In this fashion they saved their superiors the trouble of having to do so later on.

Others reacted in exactly the opposite manner. Reasoning that their reports would be toned down, no matter what they wrote, they decided to paint things blacker than they really were. Thus, they argued, even after the usual change at the next echelon enough of the truth would remain to provide an approximation to reality.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Ant III (Continued)

(4) Coloring by Indoctrination

Such measures, of course, detracted from the objectivity of the Lageberichte as handed down by the Abschnitte. As a rule, however, these reports still gave a correct estimate of the situation. This holds true only of the purely informative part of the report, the so-called morale report (Stimmungsbericht). The second part, dealing with suggestions and recommendations was no longer objective.

In conferences, directives, and by all other means, the various Referenten had been indoctrinated with official doctrine. Anything that did not meet with the full approval of the general line of Ant III had no chance of acceptance. Especially during HEYDRICH's reign no voices of opposition were suffered in the organization. Thus robbed of all individuality, Referenten became no more than mouthpieces for official Ant III policy.

(5) Muzzling to prevent offense to the Mighty

An added difficulty of great import was the fact that reports against leading personalities of the Reich or criticism of measures effected by them necessarily indicated the person under consideration. Officially no names were mentioned, but it was only too obvious who was meant at all times. But among the personalities leading HITLER's GERMANY, there was not one of sufficient stature to be able to bear criticism of his person.

Obviously the RSHA was in no position to change matters any. For that reason all reports had to go through HIMMLER's hands. HIMMLER as the supreme chief of all intelligence services then would have had the duty to inform HITLER, the final authority, of all short-comings of the system uncovered by this intelligence service.

But HIMMLER was not the man to risk an open break with anybody who still had some vestige of power. Therefore no reports against leading personalities ever penetrated beyond HIMMLER, unless it was for his own purposes.

(6) HIMMLER takes a Hand

HIMMLER's strong adherence to certain prejudices was well known. It did not pay to annoy an opinionated boss with such power. Thus few reports ever left the RSHA without bearing the indirect but ever present imprint of HIMMLER's personality and ideas, even before reaching his exalted presence.

But even those few objective reports which went through the mill of the RSHA unscathed never created as much as a stir in official circles. They found their final resting place in HIMMLER's desk. They might be used for some future intrigue, but to accomplish the thing for which they were intended - very rarely indeed.

(7) Dissemination

All Lageberichte, provided they did not implicate any leading personalities, were sent to all Ministers, all Reichsleiter of the Party, and most other officials of equal rank. They were no longer objective in the least, and simply reproduced official policy in most cases. Even here enough of the truth remained to make them uncomfortable reading for some. So Ant III resorted to the device of leaving out of the appropriate report all sections even vaguely connected with the Minister or official to whom a particular copy was sent.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Am. III (Continued)

GOEBBELS and BORMANN evinced the most interest for these reports. They at least received them without any sections having been cut out. There even existed a liaison officer of the RSHA with BORMANN, one SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Lt Justus BEYER. His influence with BORMANN was non-existent.

(8) Fundamental Difficulties

A further important disadvantage can be found in the overdeveloped centralization of the Nazi State. Instead of allotting sufficient power to the Abschnittsleiter, so that certain local difficulties could be settled right then and there, everything had to go through the RSHA. Usually that was the end of the problem, because there the difficulty simply disappeared while going through channels.

In the few cases where a decision was handed down, for example involving the Gauleiter, the latter blamed the Abschnittsleiter for being bawled out and for all other difficulties, and his relation with the SD officer deteriorated even further. If there were any complaints from the Gauleiter, however, HEYDRICH simply used to fire his Abschnittsleiter.

KALTENBRUNNER followed a different line; he instructed his subordinates to establish good relations with the Gauleiter, at all costs, in order to be able to gain advantage of him at a later date (Ihn einzuscifen).

Certain special reports, usually classified Geheime Reichssache and with a very small distribution were slightly more successful. These reports were usually in the form of a memorandum, and KALTENBRUNNER usually did everything in his power to insure their receipt by the desired person (usually HITLER).

Another factor which must not be forgotten is the inadequacy of the human material involved. Most SD officers were young fanatics without the detachment and background necessary for the efficient conduct of an intelligence service.

(9) Conclusions

Some of the results deriving from the factors discussed above have already been discussed. As a final conclusion one might say that Am III had the inherent capability of serving as an instrument of collecting objective and factual intelligence as well as of evaluating and utilizing this intelligence effectively. The reasons preventing it from ever assuming that function, however, were stronger by their very nature than those favoring that development.

To put the same conclusion slightly differently: under the National Socialist regime some of the faults inherent in this regime made the collation and evaluation of objective internal intelligence as well as its utilization impossible. The most important of these reasons was the fact that such a service would carry in it the seed of self-destruction (which leads to the discovery that effective internal intelligence in all its aspects is only possible under a system very far removed ideologically from the Nazi State. It would be idle to ask whether such a state would have any need of an effective internal intelligence service).

~~SECRET~~INTERROGATION REPORT No 154. Ant IV (formerly SD Hauptamt Gestapo)a. Stapo Membership and Party Affiliation

Ant IV was by far the most dreaded section of the whole RSHA. As the high Command of the Stapo (Secret Police) its reputation inside and outside of Germany was probably the worst of all the institutions of the National Socialist State. It is a paradox, however, that originally its members were by no means selected for their adherence to the ideological tenets of Nazism.

On the contrary, the number of so-called Alte Kaempfer within its ranks, as well as former members of the para-military organizations of the NSDAP, such as SS, SA, NSKK, etc was comparatively small. This was changed only when all its officials were taken over into the SS in line with HITLER's attempts of complete SS domination of all police services.

b. Quality of Work performed

Nor did the Gestapo, contrary to popular belief, work particularly efficiently as a secret police. The former Austrian Secret Police, which was absorbed almost fully into Stapo-Stelle WIEN was a much more efficient organization.

The reason for the Gestapo's peculiar effectiveness must be sought in the type of personnel it employed. The average Stapo official was below average in intelligence, but endowed with cunning and filled with boundless brutality. Quite a few of this number were men with criminal or pathological records or tendencies.

All of them were united in the desire to be the willing tools of the state and to engage in the suppression and complete elimination of all opposition tendencies. The fact that the state happened to be a National Socialist one was purely incidental. They would have served any other master with the same loyalty, using the same means, as long as it would have given them the same power of life and death over the average citizen.

Of course National Socialism was particularly fitted to produce that atmosphere of utter lawlessness and all-pervading fear which made the Secret Police thrive and perpetuated its reputation.

c. MUELLER, Typical Gestapo Man

All these tendencies can be easily observed by a consideration of Ant IV's last chief, SS Gruppenfuehrer MUELLER. With an undistinguished background, he had been a small official within the Bavarian Political Police, when somehow HEYDRICH's attention was directed to the little man. HEYDRICH, certain that here was a man who would do his bidding, took him to BERLIN with him.

He rose steadily and finally became the successor of Dr BEST, the previous head of the Stapo under HEYDRICH. While the Hangman was still alive, MUELLER was his closest confidant and most willing creature. With his death he assumed complete control over his organization and succeeded in modeling it completely after his own ideas.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

4. Amt IV (Continued).

Without any moral scruples, even without any conception of moral values, cunning to the point of brilliance, with sadist leanings and definite pathological tendencies, he was the prototype of the Gestapo man. He succeeded in eliminating from the leadership of the Stapo anybody who could possibly provide cause for conflicts. At the same time he succeeded in completely pleasing HITLER, to whom he bore a definite resemblance in his character.

d. Organization of Amt IV

Organizationally Amt IV was of slightly different structure than the other center of the RSHA. It consisted of only three Gruppen - A, B, and G. Under the Gruppen there were subdivisions called abteilungen, which were then followed by the usual Referate. The inclusion of abteilungen within the organizational scheme has been attempted in other centers, but had never been officially adopted there.

5. Amt V

The Amt controlling the activities of the Criminal Police (Kripo) never became a full-fledged member of the Security Services of the State. It was mainly concerned with routine processes of criminal investigation. Although its members had been taken over into the SS and it had officially been made part of the Sipo in connection with HITLER's complete control of all police services, the amount of actual penetration remained slight. Especially in the lower levels the Kripo was still a police organization to the exclusion of all other tendencies.

There was a certain amount of cooperation between Amt IV and Amt V at intermediate and high echelons but until the end almost no connection existed between Amt V and the two SD centers.

6. Amt VI

d. Early History (Foreign Intelligence under JOST)

(1) The Beginning

The beginnings of a political intelligence service outside the confines of GERMANY can be traced back to 1937. In this year Amt III of the SD Hauptamt began the establishment of an information net in various countries of South-Eastern EUROPE, as well as in CZECHOSLOVAKIA and AUSTRIA.

(2) Two Patterns

At that time SS Brigadefuehrer JOST was Chief of Amt III, while the newly formed Hauptabteilung III/3, charged with foreign intelligence, came under the command of Dr FILBERT. His name is intimately connected with almost all phases of German intelligence operations during this first period.

Work in AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA was not organized according to a strict and uniform pattern, while activities in the other countries were planned according to a scheme which was to retain its validity for many years, in spite of many defects and shortcomings.

6. Ant VI (Continued)

The different organization in AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA can be explained by the fact that operations there were entrusted to the indigenous Nazi or pro-Nazi parties, which frequently had a structure reminiscent of the NSDAP in GERMANY.

Intelligence organizations in other countries were usually activated as follows: an attempt was made to enlist the services of a thoroughly versed expert in the affairs and history of the country under consideration. This man usually had the complete confidence of Ant III, and generally also was a member of the SS.

The operative was then dispatched to the country where he was to operate, with the title of Hauptvertrauensmann (chief confidential agent). His activities were camouflaged by the device of sending him in the guise of a businessman employed by the local branch of a German business establishment.

This method soon became stereotyped, and the usual mistake of always following the same pattern was made here as well as in other German intelligence operations. Thus certain firms which were used for this purpose soon suffered under the reputation of being nothing more than cover agencies of the German secret service. (This disadvantage became especially acute since the Abwehr showed a similar lack of imagination and used the services of the identical enterprises).

Firms, such as the large house of SCHENKER & Co, the German Luftansa, the foreign branch offices of the Reichsbahn, and the offices of certain steamship lines, soon became known all over the world, and especially in the Balkans and the Near East as the centers of the German intelligence service.

(3) Progress to the Half way Mark

The following paragraphs will attempt a rough survey of the state of German foreign intelligence operations as of fall 1941, the date of JOST's removal. These activities had come under Ant VI since 1939 and can only be discussed very incompletely here. Nevertheless a comparison between the work done under JOST and the completely different activities under SCHULLENBERG at a later date might be of certain interest.

(c) SOUTH-EAST

The greatest progress had been made in work in SOUTH-EAST EUROPE where all the prerequisites for successful operations could be found. Of added advantage was the fact that almost all these countries had come under German control or direct German influence and that therefore they proved sufficiently tractable, especially during this period of German military ascendancy.

Among the Balkan countries ROMANIA had risen already to the distinction of providing the most fertile ground for intelligence purposes. Here the very able SS Hauptsturmfuehrer von BOHLSCHWINGH controlled operations in his capacity as Hauptvertrauensmann. He was ably assisted and later succeeded by the equally qualified SS Hauptsturmfuehrer MUNER (now in Allied hands). BOHLSCHWINGH was removed at the instigation of the Foreign Office after the attempted revolt of the Iron Guard. Laboring under the disadvantage of having a mind and opinions of his own he suffered the usual fate, was degraded, and remained incarcerated for several months, as prisoner of the Stapo.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Art VI (Continued)

The Hauptvertrauensleute in the other countries of the European SOUTH-EAST were not of such high caliber. Yet, during this time of easy military victories, even comparative bunglers at the game succeeded in working successfully in the lush field of the German-controlled Balkans.

Many German firms attempted to branch out into the SOUTH-EAST during this period and their activities provided added backdrops for intelligence operations.

A less far-reaching apparatus of high quality had been set up by the SD Leitabschnitt WIEN, which also controlled certain information-gathering activities in SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE in that period.

This uncoordinated and un-authorized activity was looked upon askance by the central office in BERLIN, and after the personnel changes in fall 1941, the net which had been established from WIEN was smashed by the appropriate Leendergruppe.

(b) Near East and RUSSIA

Intelligence operations in the Near East were of minor importance at that time. Only when this region became the focal point of military operational planning and concrete preparations for moves in this area had been made by the General Staff did intelligence activities swing into high gear. Work against SOVIET RUSSIA had top priority.

The Gruppenleiter, Dr GRAEFE, with the RUSSLAND-Referent SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr HENGELHAUPT, had met with good initial successes in his work and had managed to establish several intelligence lines with contacts in the interior of the SOVIET UNION. This constituted a rather remarkable achievement, since only a year previously, at a meeting between SD and Abwehr representatives in PRAGUE, the observation had been made that not a single source of information within the USSR was available to the German intelligence services.

This prompted total intensification of effort, since, at that time (late 1940-early 1941), the military High Command needed certain information for their operational plans which could only be obtained through secret sources. In the SOUTH of the USSR, especially the UKRAINE, the VI Referat of the Leitabschnitt WIEN, had succeeded in establishing certain contact, with HUNGARY and ROMANIA as bases.

(c) FAR EAST

No attempt had been made to prepare the ground for intelligence operations in the Far East while this would have still been possible. Therefore the accomplishment of this task, when required, was faced with insurmountable obstacles. It would have been necessary to operate across a part of the world controlled either by the Russian or the English enemy. To make things even worse the police attache at TOKYO, SS Standartenfuhrer WEISINGER, turned out to be a complete failure.

(d) SOUTH

There were absolutely no operations directed at the South of EUROPE. Here Art VI was strictly limited by an order from HITLER stating that all espionage activity in the country of the Italian Ally was prohibited. This also precluded all chances of penetrating into NORTH AFRICA. Only with the German move into TUNIS was this situation changed and an Einsatzkommando dispatched.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(a) WEST

In the West of EUROPE certain good work had been done. The occupation of FRANCE, HOLLAND, and BELGIUM simplified matters and provided new bases for future operations. This period was, however, comparatively rich in jurisdictional disputes between Ant VI, which insisted on its mission of controlling all political intelligence work, and certain local Sipo agencies which did not wish to cede this prerogative.

Work of very high quality emanated from SPAIN and PORTUGAL, including TANGIER, where opportunities abounded at that time.

(c) NORTH

Results from the Scandinavian countries were not of such high level. Occupation of NORWAY and DENMARK did not bring with it a substantial improvement.

(e) US and UK

Intelligence operations outside of EUROPE had just begun. No results had come from NORTH AMERICA yet, while rather solid spade-work had been done in SOUTH AMERICA. Ant VI never succeeded in penetrating the UK proper.

(h) SWITZERLAND

Due to its unique geographical and political position, SWITZERLAND became a hotbed of intelligence operations. Nevertheless the net established by Ant VI was not of a very good quality. Exceptionally good work and connections were established by SS Hauptsturmfuhrer GROSSEL, then VI Referent at SD Abschnitt INNENBUCK (later Hauptvertrauensmann ITALY). These activities were on his own hook and met with displeasure at the BERLIN office.

(i) Conclusions

In concluding it may be said that as a general political information and intelligence service the SD at that time (approximately two years after the outbreak of the war) was a failure. It did not meet even the minimum requirements of the political or military high command.

On the other hand it must be said that, contrary to popular belief, the German authorities did not then, or at any other time, particularly care for or appreciate the work done by this service. Certain agencies such as the Foreign Office, actually (if usually surreptitiously) sabotaged the intelligence services wherever and whenever possible. A further drawback was the fact that HENDRICH considered evaluation of reports and their final dissemination his exclusive province. He failed to transmit certain important reports if these, for some reason or other, did not agree with his ideas.

(j) JOST and cohorts

Chief of Ant VI at that time, JOST was the personification of the "little man" and did not possess the stature necessary for the execution of the tasks required of him. He was easily influenced and his office was actually run by a small circle of close collaborators, whose prime consideration was their own importance and who were beset by professional jealousy. As a man he was absolutely straight, even probably too decent for a job such as his. Ironically enough, his downfall was caused by an accusation of personal dishonesty.

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

JOST and FILBERT--then Gruppenleiter VI A and JOST's closest collaborator and the most able man in the section--as well as Obersturmbannfuhrer VOLLHEIM, Gruppenleiter VI C, and another SS officer were accused of having accepted bribes. This trumped-up charge was used to remove them from office. JOST, after a long investigation, was found guilty and relieved in October 1941.

b. Ant VI under SCHELLENBERG

(1) SCHELLENBERG Appears

(a) Background

JOST's removal had been planned by HEYDRICH and had been expected for a long time previously. Shortly before, HEYDRICH had placed SS Sturmbannfuhrer SCHELLENBERG, one of his trusted underlings, into Ant VI as JOST's deputy. SCHELLENBERG had come from Ant IV (Stapo), where as Gruppenleiter IV E he had gained quite a reputation. Only thirty years old and of comparatively low rank, he had risen to great prominence and had become MUELLER's unofficial deputy.

This position had been founded on SCHELLENBERG's famous exploit known as the VENLO affair. In the course of this enterprise SCHELLENBERG and some officers of Ant VI had succeeded in kidnapping the two chief agents of the British Secret Service in HOLLAND (BEST and STEVENS) and in abducting them across the border into GERMANY.

(b) Plans and Personality

SCHELLENBERG's posting to Ant VI marked a complete change in direction for this agency and it became obvious that JOST's days as its head were numbered. To fully understand the growth of Ant VI under SCHELLENBERG a comprehension of his personality is necessary.

He did not belong to the alte Kaempfer. He joined the NSDAP and SS at a relatively late date. He received his start as a subordinate NCO in Ant I in the personnel section. With a keen understanding of the potentialities of this section he knew how to place himself in the foreground and soon HEYDRICH's watchful eye had become aware of the young man.

The latter soon accepted SCHELLENBERG into his inner circle, in order to, as he put it, "train the youngster himself." The human relationship between the two became ever closer, SCHELLENBERG became one of HEYDRICH's most trusted confidants.

The boss also introduced his new protege into the circle of his family, where SCHELLENBERG soon so ingratiated himself, that everybody expected him to marry HEYDRICH's widow (after the latter's assassination). But by then SCHELLENBERG had become far too clever. A dead HEYDRICH was no longer of any interest to him.

To fathom SCHELLENBERG's true character is not very easy. It is certain that he was driven by an all-consuming ambition. He did not hesitate to climb over the dead bodies of his adversaries and even of his friends, as long as this way led towards his goal. Concepts such as friendship, honesty, or sincerity were unknown ideals to him. Nor did he expect them from others.

On the other hand, as far as his personal life is concerned, he was utterly beyond reproach. His manner of life was almost that of an ascetic. He neither drank nor smoked, and worked twenty hours straight for days on end.

6. Ant VI (Continued)

SHELLENBERG was beyond any doubt the most capable of all the section chiefs in the RSHA. In some respects, such as his knowledge and appreciation of the human character, he was even the superior of KALTENBRUNNER, his chief.

SHELLENBERG had one goal in mind from the very beginning: he wanted to become the head of the German intelligence service, but of an intelligence service of his own making and one that was to include all ramifications of his own ideas. To further this end he dedicated all his restless energy and sacrificed his health and his private happiness. It was as if he had become the personification of this idea. That in spite of all this he did not succeed can not be blamed on him. He failed because of the human inadequacy of his collaborators and the lack of understanding of his superiors.

(2) Ant VI Before the End

It would be beyond the framework of this report to discuss in detail all the various stages of development which Ant VI was subjected to under SHELLENBERG. Only a survey of the organization immediately before the collapse will be given below. There is only one phase which will be given consideration in detail: the incorporation of the military intelligence service and the role played by SHELLENBERG in this enterprise.

(a) Absorption of Abwehr

It had always been HEYDRICH's great and undying ambition to obtain control over the Abwehr. In the same process he wanted to destroy its chief, Admiral CANARIS, whom he had always regarded as the personification of the military's hate against his person, his SD, and his secret police. SHELLENBERG became his trusted helpmate in these designs. As a matter of fact it can be said that the latter really was the spiritus rector of the scheme, for no one but he could work as unflinchingly and with the steely determination necessary for carrying out this idea.

SHELLENBERG had been collecting damning evidence against the Abwehr and against CANARIS and with HEYDRICH's death he decided to place all this evidence at HEYDRICH's successor's disposal. One can not be sure whether he really believed in this assertion, but he gave KALTENBRUNNER to understand that the British Secret Service had managed to penetrate the highest councils of the Abwehr, supposedly with CANARIS's tacit approval. It now behooved him to back up these accusations with more concrete proof, since only certain circumstantial evidence had come to light so far.

His opportunity came when several Abwehr agents in TURKEY, who had been suborned by the British, officially switched their allegiance in favor of the Allies. With this material KALTENBRUNNER succeeded in forcing CANARIS' removal and the creation of a unified German Secret Service (einheitlicher deutscher geheimer Meldedienst) under his command.

Now SHELLENBERG's hour had struck and he really proved himself adequate for the task of supervising the transfer and unification. He emerged victorious from the fight against MUELLER (head of Ant IV) who claimed large parts of Abwehr for his section. He had to agree to a certain compromise by which a part of III F-the only part of Abwehr so treated - came under the jurisdiction of Ant IV, RSHA.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Art VI (Continued)

But he did succeed in bringing all the other sections of the Abwehr under his control, for the newly-created Art Mil under Oberst HANSEN was practically under his own personal command. It probably would have taken years and not months to weld effectively the Abwehr and the political intelligence service together. The Abwehr had a great deal more personnel, and was disorganized, unwieldy, and difficult to control.

It is to SCHELLENBERG's credit as an executive that he managed to effect what measures of unification and control he did in so short and difficult a period.

(b) Removal of HANSEN

According to his own statement, he never trusted HANSEN. He saw in him an awkward competitor who would interfere with the achievement of his aims sooner or later. It is not so certain, however, that he saw through HANSEN completely.

SCHELLENBERG was certainly beset by suspicions long before 20 July 1944 and stated his opposition and dislike of HANSEN publicly before that time. The latter of course reciprocated these feelings most heartily. He would have certainly delighted in the planned liquidation of SCHELLENBERG in the course of the 20 July Revolt.

But SCHELLENBERG was on his guard, and even during the most critical hours he managed to keep a clear head and turn things to his own advantage. And at that he was anything but heroic. But by playing his cards right, he succeeded in arresting HANSEN (instead of, as it had been planned, the other way around) and to add spice to his triumph he followed this by the arrest of Admiral CANARIS.

(1) SCHELLENBERG in Complete Control

After these experiences he never trusted anybody in Art Mil who could possibly become dangerous to him. Of the old guard he only kept Oberst i G OHLETZ in his position, for he knew that in spite of doubtful ability, the latter would cheerfully do his bidding.

All the other survivors of 20 July, such as Oberstleutnant i G KLEYN-STUEBER, never succeeded in gaining their chief's confidence. He removed them from their posts and dispatched them to agencies in the field. But now SCHELLENBERG had reached the threshold of his power. Now he was chief of the complete political and military foreign intelligence service. It now remained to reorganize this service according to his own plans.

c. Final Organization of Art VI

(1) Gruppe VI A (Administration and Organization)

(a) Functions

The idea of this section originating with Dr FILBERT, who had already prepared the structure in somewhat similar form. After a period of inefficient and incapable management, SCHELLENBERG decided to call in a man who had made a reputation for himself in Art I.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

As an expert for organizational and efficiency problems, SS Standartenfuehrer Dr SANDBERGER had become as famous as he had become feared. After his stay with Amt I he had served as assistant to the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD, ITZLI, and then joined Amt VI. SANDBERGER was certainly very able and exceedingly ambitious but as Gruppenleiter VI A, he continued making his old mistake of over-organizing everything.

Gruppe VI A offered ample opportunity for this weakness. All the organizational plans for Amt VI originated with this Gruppe. Their schematic diagrams always represented some future Utopia and never corresponded to the actual state of affairs. Otherwise SANDBERGER ran his show very efficiently. He managed to have his way in conflicts with other sections about personnel questions. The not inconsiderable foreign and domestic funds under his control (he was also in charge of the Kassenabteilung for the whole of Amt VI) were in tip-top shape at all times.

SCHULLENBERG too took a very personal interest in the financial affairs of his section. He suffered from the fear that one day his position would be compromised by the machinations or even the negligence of one of his subordinates.

(b) Referat VI Kult

After a short spell as an independent Gruppe, VI Kult became a Referat subordinated to Gruppe VI A. The reason for the establishment of VI Kult was to find new sources for Amt VI by the inclusion of persons active in cultural and educational endeavors traveling to and from GERMANY. Some of this personnel was then to be put at the disposal of the sub-sections dealing with the various countries (Laendergruppen).

The creation of such a service had only become necessary because all VI Referate at the various SD Abschnitte had been discontinued in order to make for a more central organization. By gaining in centralization they had lost out on the recruiting of new agents and a distinct group had been created.

VI Kult therefore attempted to bridge this gap by dispatching representatives to the most important Abschnitte. The quality of work done by VI Kult remained sub-standard until the end. The explanation for this is to be found in the inferior leadership at the top.

(c) Mil A

Towards the end of 1944 SANDBERGER also became head of the Gruppe Mil A. The duties of this section in Mil Amt corresponded exactly to those of VI A in Amt VI.

(2) Gruppe VI B (Western EUROPE)

*Italy see VI E*

(1) General

Gruppe VI B which dealt with the countries of Western EUROPE and Western AFRICA, was among the best sections in Amt VI. SS Standartenfuehrer STEINLE, like SANDBERGER a member of the so-called SWABIAN Clique in Amt VI, was an exceptionally gifted section chief. He had an uncanny gift for pure intelligence operations.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

As a Leitabschnittsfuehrer at STUTTGART for many years he and his VI Referent had managed to create a number of information channels to FRANCE and SWITZERLAND. Through this work he had come in actual contact with some of the problems of Western EUROPE and for this reason it did not take him long to grasp the essence of his new position in spite of his late arrival at Ant VI (1943).

(b) FRANCE

Gruppe VI B's intelligence net in FRANCE was excellent, but only prior to and during the German occupation of this country. In VICHY the Gruppe had Dr REICHELT, a very able man, as their representative. The chief agent stationed in PARIS was SS Standartenfuehrer BICKLER. He was very gifted and probably the greatest expert on French affairs in GERMANY. He had been born in ALSACE, had been the lawyer of ROOS, the leader of the Alsatian autonomy movement who had been executed by the French.

After the occupation of FRANCE, HITLER ordered him into the Waffen SS since he had his own opinion about GERMANY's policy towards FRANCE and made no bones about his convictions. He then came to the SD and became a very valuable man, in spite of having no particular ability for pure intelligence work.

But his profound knowledge of French affairs and his clear realization of GERMANY's mistakes in her dealings with FRANCE soon made him the most important expert on FRANCE in all of the RSHA. As could be expected his plans for a more reasonable policy towards FRANCE were not approved and so he found himself more and more in opposition. Exhaustive reports (Grossberichte) prepared by him were forwarded to HITLER, but did not cause any appreciable results.

(c) SPAIN and PORTUGAL

The organization set up by VI B in SPAIN had become static and more or less inactive. A similar state of affairs existed in PORTUGAL. The man entrusted with its operation, a so-called police liaison officer (Polizeiverbindungs-fuehrer) - not a Police Attache since the Portuguese had not accredited such a position at the Embassy - proved completely incapable. He was a pure policeman with no ability or interest in intelligence work.

Furthermore work in all of the Iberian Peninsula, as well as at TANGIER suffered under ever increasing pressure from the side of the Allies. SPAIN and PORTUGAL were asked to expell the German intelligence agents, some of whom had become rather well known through their activities.

STEINLE was also charged with command over Gruppe Mil B. This section controlled the intelligence network of the former Abwehr in SPAIN and PORTUGAL. This net was comparatively large but of poor quality. A reorganization of the KO in both countries had been planned and the first steps had already been taken and new operatives sent to the scene.

(d) SWITZERLAND

Not much progress had been made in SWITZERLAND. The Hauptvertrauensmann, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Hans DAUFELDT (captured), camouflaged as Vice Consul at LAUSANNE, proved to be an absolute nincompoop. The Swiss Referat therefore only continued its existence because of a line operated by SCHELLENBERG himself, which produced excellent results. The Militaerisches Amt had suffered a very serious setback in SWITZERLAND. It had lost (in connection with the 20 July plot) the services of its most capable representative, Prince AUERSPERG. AUERSPERG had been disguised as the assistant air attache at BERNE.

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(3) Gruppe VI C (RUSSIA and NEAR EAST)

(a) SOVIET RUSSIA

As far as inherent importance was concerned, Gruppo VI C was considered the prime concern of Ant VI. Credit for this state of affairs was due largely to its former Leiter, SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr GRAEFE. (GRAEFE and the best Gruppenleiter of Ant III, SS Sturmbannfuhrer Lr GENGENBACH were both killed in an automobile accident).

GRAEFE had built up his section systematically and concentrated his main effort against SOVIET RUSSIA. An organization for the collection of intelligence was created, which went far beyond the customary scope of Ant VI. All conceivable methods were employed to obtain information about the SOVIET UNION. A whole special organization was created which was to achieve these ends through the interrogation of PW and the employment of renegade Russians (Unternehmen Zeppelin). Led by SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr ROEDER, an able and well-trained officer, this operation achieved very good results.

Not content to leave a good thing alone, GRAEFE changed the organization and leadership of Zeppelin constantly, so that finally it had only a fraction of its previous value.

The methodical work of GRAEFE, the long period of training of certain Russians employed by him, and their familiarity with radio operations really paid dividends. A number of successful parachute operations ensued, especially concentrated in the Cauc. S.S. It is believed that radio connection with some of these agents continued until the end.

The Leiter of the Russia Referat, Dr HENGELHAUPT, was an exceedingly quiet and dispassionate man with a scientific turn of mind. He was indubitably the right man for work which had to be planned well in advance and from a long-range point of view. He possessed very good information about the USSR and had given his superiors an unadorned and - for GERMANY - unfavorable picture of the situation from the very beginning.

He was not listened to, of course, and HIMMLER even transferred him once, as punishment for his constant admonitions and destruction of the political leader's fond illusions. It is to be assumed that during the last months of the war the work of the Russia Referat was further intensified.

(b) TURKEY

A similarly successful Referat had been established in TURKEY by the Referent, SS Sturmbannfuhrer SCHUBACK. He was assisted by two extremely able intelligence operatives, SS Sturmbannfuhrer KOZISCH at ANKARA and SS Sturmbannfuhrer WOLF at ISTANBUL. Both had been camouflaged as members of the German diplomatic missions. They had succeeded in establishing an intelligence net which continued in operation even after GERMANY had been forced to withdraw all official connection from TURKEY.

(c) Near East

The Near East never proved to be quite as fertile for German intelligence operations. During 1944 a lot of work was lavished on that sector without achieving commensurate results. The main source of information was a Levantine agent with an extensive organization under his control.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Art VI (Continued)

It is fairly certain, however, that the same agent was employed by the British as well and received his pay from both sides (it is even possible that the Italians employed the identical man). His material is supposed to have been of great value, in spite of or perhaps because of his connections.

Great attention was paid to the emigres in GERMANY, such as the Grand Mufti HUSSEINI and the former Iraq premier, el-GAILANI. Close collaboration existed between these personages and the groups controlled by them in the field of intelligence operations. Whether any active work was done in connection with these groups could not be ascertained (by HOETTL).

(d) IRAN

Art VI succeeded in accomplishing an interesting experiment in IRAN. During 1940 two young SS officers, by the name of GAMOTHA and MAYER, were dispatched to TEHERAN as employees of SCHENKER in order to give them an opportunity to study language and country. This was done with the idea in mind of using these two men as agents at some later date.

But the two young men soon had acclimatized themselves and to do some intelligence work on their own hook. in the collection of pure intelligence but political field. *Esper*

*Gamotha - Nazi agent in Iran  
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He had been dropped by parachute together with a group of agents. The Russians attempted to suborn KURMIS, but he refused their offer. Facing certain arrest he committed suicide.

Part of his group was taken into custody, but the remainder succeeded in evading capture and is thought to be still hiding among the various tribes with whom GAMOTHA worked.

(e) FAR EAST

Similarly the Far East received systematic treatment within Art VI. The Leiter, SS Sturmbannfuhrer WEIRAUCH, now in Allied hands, created a separate institute and staffed it with a number of scientists and politicians who had been working on problems of this region and especially on JAPAN.

There was no direct intelligence connection with either JAPAN or CHINA, however. The only contact was the official one through the police attache at TOKYO, who in turn remained in contact with the police attache accredited to the puppet government at NANKING.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Amt VI (Continued)

WEIRAUCH's most valuable collaborator was the former director of the propaganda office of the State Railway at TOKYO (Leiter der Reichsbahn-Verkehrszentrale TOKYO), SS Obersturmbannführer LEO. LEO was one of the foremost experts on Japanese affairs in GERMANY, perhaps even in EUROPE. He had studied in JAPAN for many years and had received his doctor's degree there, a rare achievement.

WEIRAUCH and LEO always followed a strongly anti-Japanese course. This inclination could also be detected from their reports. A number of memoranda submitted to the highest echelons of the government clearly expressed these leanings and warned the government not to have any illusions about the altruism of their allies.

These reports seem to have had a certain measure of success but caused the displeasure of HIMMLER.

WEIRAUCH and LEO's forte was not so much strict intelligence as it was thorough knowledge of JAPAN and all phases of Japanese life. During the last few months KALTENBRUNNER attempted to put the JAPAN Referat in direct contact with officials of the Japanese embassy. To further this end several meetings were held with both KALTENBRUNNER and OSHIMA in attendance.

(f) RAPP and Mil C

GRAEFE's successor as Leiter of VI C was SS Obersturmbannführer RAPP. Contrary to usual practice he was not put in charge of Abteilung Mil C, since the area of activity of this section did not correspond to that of VI C (Mil C included beside the USSR, the Near East, and the Far East, also South Eastern EUROPE and the Scandinavian countries).

RAPP, who was very ambitious without having any special qualifications, (he was formerly Leitabschnittsführer MÜNCHEN) attempted to gain control over these areas as well. He was stopped short, however, by the determined opposition of SS Obersturmbannführer WANECK (now in allied hands), the Gruppenleiter of VI E.

(4) Gruppe VI D (West)

(c) General

This sub-section was by far the weakest link in Amt VI. Its sphere of operation included ENGLAND and the British Empire as well as the Scandinavian Countries and the Americas. The personnel employed in the Gruppe was mediocre at best. The position of Leiter VI D was held for the first few years by SS Obersturmbannführer DAUFELDT. He was a playboy, whose only qualification for the job consisted of his good knowledge of the English language.

Successes in the two main fields - ENGLAND and the US - were non-existent under DAUFELDT. Not much improvement was noted after SS Obersturmbannführer Dr PAEFFGEN had been appointed as DAUFELDT's successor. PAEFFGEN's qualifications were, if that is possible, even poorer than those of his predecessor.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

To show the state of affairs in the section the following example is indicative: VI D tried for five years to establish an intelligence net in EIRE, in order to use that country as a base for operations against the UK proper. The establishment of this EIRE net was never completed and VI D never had a single wireless connection with ENGLAND or with the UNITED STATES.

(b) SOUTH AMERICA

The picture looked slightly rosier in SOUTH AMERICA. Using SPAIN and PORTUGAL as relay bases, certain rather good connections could be established. The political developments in the countries of SOUTH AMERICA progressively weakened these contacts, however. Similar development ensued in SWEDEN. The government expelled all known German agents (that included operatives of both the Abwehr and the SD).

One contact, probably the best of the lot, was not affected by this order, however. This connection had been established by SCHELLENBERG personally and was through a Swedish newspaper publisher, who at the same was owner of a shipping line. The newspaper was supported financially by both the SD and the Foreign Office.

(5) Gruppe VI E (Southeast EUROPE)

(a) General

As the oldest Gruppe in Ant VI, the section dealing with the countries of Southeastern EUROPE was in possession of a rather efficient intelligence net. These connections could be kept alive, at least partially, even after the Russian occupation of these countries.

Of prime importance in this context was the collaboration between the SD and the conservative and reactionary parties in these countries. Especially after occupation, when these parties were forced to go underground, this collaboration became very intimate and effective.

(b) Post-hostilities Status

The men responsible for the intelligence connections, which in certain countries include ties with personalities in or near the governing circle were usually the Hauptvertrauensleute in the various nations. Several of the intelligence nets, left behind after the German withdrawal, did not succeed in re-establishing radio communications with the central office. The net in BULGARIA, for instance, though still in existence, was no longer in contact with the communications control of VI E.

In other countries as well, only parts of the intelligence net were controlled by the local radio outlet, towards the end. The remainder had to continue operations without either receiving directions or being able to transmit findings and results.

(c) WANECK

The Leiter of Gruppe VI E, SS Obersturmbannführer WANECK, played a disproportionately important role within Ant VI. This was not so much due to his ability as it was to his close connections with Dr KALTENBRUNNER. SCHELLENBERG was afraid of WANECK's influence, especially since the latter had been able to put something over on him on several occasions.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

WNECK was one of the oldest members of the foreign intelligence service, but had no practical experience whatsoever. His activities were limited to executive desk work.

(d) ITALY

Until the end of 1944 the ITALY Referat, including the subsection dealing with the VATICAN, also belonged to Gruppe VI E. (These sub-sections were separated from VI E. when this office moved to WIEN, and were then attached to VI B). Work in ITALY, in spite of great advantages, was handicapped for a very long time because it had to work in an underground fashion.

As has already been mentioned, a strict order by HITLER prohibited all intelligence activities in ITALY. Nevertheless after MUSSOLINI's overthrow several good sources of information were established in ROME. They were of no political consequence, however, since the reports received were completely anti-fascist and opposed MUSSOLINI's restitution.

This stand, of course, was counter to the official German policy and did not meet with approval in the eyes of the mighty. Excellent work was done by the former Hauptvertrauensmann of ITALY, SS Hauptsturmfuehrer I/r GROEBL (later killed by partisans), and by the police attache with the Embassy in ROME, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer KAPPLER.

After the loss of ROME the main effort of intelligence activities was transferred to the North. In this process these activities came under the control of the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in ITALIEN, SS Gruppenfuehrer Dr HARSTER. One of the greatest career men in the SS, HARSTER jealously guarded his rights and powers. But even during this period reports from ITALY were usually rather objective and exposed some illusions.

The time given for the establishment of an intelligence net to the VATICAN was too short to achieve telling results. An added disadvantage was the arrest of SS Obersturmbannfuehrer ELLING by the Americans. He had been slated to become the SD Vertrauensmann at the VATICAN.

In its political ideas the VATICAN Referat represented the opinions voiced by the German Ambassador von WELZSACKER, i.e., sharply opposed to those of the Foreign Office and of HIMMLER and HITLER.

(6) Gruppe VI F

This Gruppe was entrusted with the provision of all technical prerequisites for all other sections of the Amt and was consequently of great importance. Its organization reflects its purely technical nature.

(a) Radio Sections

Referate VI F 1 and VI F 2 were both concerned with the radio receiving and transmitting stations serving the Amt. The former was charged with the operation of these installations, while the latter was entrusted with their construction and research in the field of wireless transmission. They jointly controlled the so-called HAVELINSTITUT, designated VI F (H).

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6. Ant VI (Continued)

The radio section of VI F had always been its greatest concern. Especially during the war it became increasingly more difficult to obtain the proper personnel and material for an efficient operation of these services. The first Gruppenleiter VI F, SS Sturmbannfuhrer MAJOKS (later court-martialed by HEYDRICH), had laid the foundations for an extensive wireless section.

With the great development of the foreign intelligence service the existing installation soon became insufficient and a new and enlarged system of radio transmitting and receiving stations had to be established.

(b) The HAVELINSTITUT

The first step was the creation of the HAVEL INSTITUT, under the direction of SS Sturmbannfuhrer SIEPEL. Later the installations were enlarged even further. Before the collapse the following high-power transmitters, exclusively for intelligence broadcasts, were in operation:

Central Transmitter WAINSEE  
KIRCHSASSEN  
MARIENBAD (MARLINSKE LAZNE)  
GDYNIA  
BABELSBERG  
RIGA - ASSERN  
OSWITZ  
NICKERSBERG  
BALBERG  
KAHLEBERG

Each one of these transmitters was equipped with the latest improvements and could signal on as many as 20 channels simultaneously. Nevertheless this number was still not sufficient. Through the commitment of numerous agents by parachute, new radio nets had to be established almost daily.

(c) New Developments

The Institut was not only concerned with these high-power transmitters. Its construction section (Bauteilung) manufactured radio sets for agents and produced these sets on an assembly line basis. Research was one of the section's prime concerns.

VI F had some of the top experts in the field of communications at its disposal. Certain inventions had been made, especially during the last few months which were really remarkable. An addition for the small (agent's) transmitter had been developed which permitted the transmission of whole pages of text within the space of only a few seconds. This would have revolutionized the whole field of agent's transmissions.

Another apparatus was an automatic scrambler and descrambler for secret transmissions. Great steps forward had been made in voice transmitter and receiver sets, as well. (A new set was developed of great value for the commitment of agents in rugged terrain, mountains etc). With the aid of the new set (range up to 50 km) airplanes could remain in touch with agents dropped over and hiding in this type of terrain. Also the establishment of contact with these agents and the exact location of their position was vastly facilitated.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

The ablest man in this section was Dr SCHAEFFNER (home in HEIDELBERG) who was able to produce amazing results in spite of the inadequate means at his disposal. SIEPEN's successor was SS Sturm-bannfuhrer FAROSS, not quite as efficient a man as his predecessor.

(d) Other Technical Aids

Referat VI F 3 was concerned with the production of all other technical aids, necessary for the operation of an intelligence service. To this field belonged all sabotage devices, such as bombs, infernal machines, etc; also special weapons, devices for obtaining entry and exit, etc.

During the most recent period several new inventions were made: a special pistol with tracer device (Leuchtstrahl) for firing at night, a miniature pistol for assassinations (20 rounds, caliber 6.35 mm), etc. VI F 3 also controlled a chemical sub-section. It was concerned with the manufacture of secret inks, poisons, etc. Referat VI F 3 was SS Sturm-bannfuhrer LASSIG, an old hand with considerable experience.

(e) False Papers

Referat VI F 4 was charged with the manufacture of all false documents, such as passports, etc. The falsification of passports had been developed to a fine art. Upon several occasions agents with counterfeit passports were sent out to foreign police and consular agencies, with the only purpose of testing the quality of their false papers. Not once was suspicion aroused.

The best samples of workmanship were to be found in false Swedish passports, also in the passports of certain South American countries. VI F 4 also contained a photographic laboratory, engaged in the development of miniature cameras, as well as in microphotography.

(f) Signal Intelligence and Cryptanalysis

A separate signal intelligence service under VI F was discontinued in 1943. All long range intercept work was henceforth to be done by the Foreign Office (Sechausdienst). With the discontinuation of signal intercept, the deciphering section as well lost much of its value. This section was staffed by men trained in the tradition of the famed Buero RONGE (RONGE was the celebrated head of espionage in the Austro-Hungarian Empire). His pupil, Oberst FIGL, employed in VI F was known as the best cryptanalyst in GERMANY. The task of this section, after it had been narrowed down considerably was the development of new radio codes, which were of the highest quality.

(g) Mil E and Mil G

After the absorption of the Abwehr, the corresponding apparatus of Amt Mil was combined with that of Amt VI (Abteilungen Mil E and Mil G). The quality of the Abwehr's services in this field was not high. In extent, however, they were much larger, since each Ast had its own technical section.

At the end, Gruppe VI F as well as the Abteilungen Mil F and G were headed by Oberstleutnant BOENING. He was an experienced scientist, with a long but undistinguished record with the technical services of the Abwehr.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(7) Gruppe VI G

(a) Purpose and Commander

Gruppe VI G was one of the most recent innovations in Ant VI. It bore the title of the Scientific Methodical Research Service (wissenschaftlich methodischer Forschungsdienst). Under this imposing title the section attempted to enlist German scientific research for intelligence purposes.

The man who was called upon to head the new section was a young Viennese scientist, SS Sturmbannführer Dr KRALLERT. He brought with him the highest qualifications for the position. As far as background and ability are concerned, KRALLERT indeed held a unique position in Ant VI and the whole RSHA.

In spite of the novel field and the relatively short time at his disposal, KRALLERT succeeded in achieving amazing results. His first job was the coordination of the maze of frequently conflicting research institutes and stations. Towards the end he had achieved complete control.

Simultaneously the SD had founded certain research agencies of its own, such as the already-mentioned Institut fuer Ostasien und Japan, the Forschungsdienst Ost (Danube Institut under Dr ACHMETEELI), another research section for the Near East, one for the Balkans, etc. All these research services were placed at KRALLERT's disposal.

(b) Planned Operations

All this work was just the beginning, the laying of the foundation for the German Intelligence Service of the future. To this end the aid of all scientists and experts who were in any way connected with the study of foreign countries and their peoples was to be enlisted. A certain amount of this work had already been done.

For instance, the Reichsstiftung fuer Laenderkunde (State Endowment for Geographical Science) had been formed to include all societies, institutes, and research agencies for geography, geopolitics, foreign economics, and political science generally. SCHELLENBERG had been appointed Chairman of the Endowment and had named KRALLERT its executive manager. Its implicit purpose was the placing of the combined knowledge of all its experts at the disposal of German intelligence.

The scientists, philosophers, and economists who could not be enlisted immediately were registered and their names placed on file. A similar sifting process was going on in German economic life, so that all experts on foreign politics, geography, history, culture, and economics could be put to use. In the case of East ASIA and JAPAN, for instance, this process had already become fairly well advanced.

At the same time VI G collaborated actively with the few remaining foreign institutes in GERMANY, and those in other countries which could still be contacted. A concrete result of this collaboration was the compilation of a collection of maps which did not have their equal anywhere else in GERMANY. KRALLERT's special maps, collected and surveyed in the USSR and the SOUTH EAST as part of a special military mission, are probably unique.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Part VI (Continued)

(8) Gruppe VI S

(a) General Association

S in this designation is an abbreviation of sabotage and as such defines the functions of this section. The Gruppe had been founded in 1943, and was therefore comparatively undeveloped, but had already reached a position of considerable importance. This can be explained by the fact that VI S had at its disposal a considerably larger and better pool of material and personnel than any other section in the RSHA.

Main credit for the attainment of these lavish appropriations goes to the Gruppenleiter, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer SKORZENY. After the abduction of MUSSOLINI, SKORZENY became one of the most popular men in GERMANY by means of very skillful propaganda. He was shrewd enough to use this popularity for the enlargement of his section. He succeeded in continuously increasing his influence, in drawing on personnel inside and outside of the SS, but failed to give his section a feasible organizational structure.

All the activities of VI S, as well as Mil D, which was added later, gave the impression of utter confusion, where nobody knew what anybody else was doing. Thus VI S never reached that effectiveness, even in its largest enterprises, which might have been expected from the means at its disposal.

(b) VI S and SKORZENY

To make matters even worse, SKORZENY's exploits had made him HITLER's declared favorite and so he continuously received orders from HITLER, over the head of HIMMLER and KALTENBRUNNER, for a veritable stream of operations. These special tasks, of course, drew him away from methodical work and so the disorganization in VI S grew worse and worse.

SKORZENY was entrusted with special military tasks during the desperate offensives in the West and later again in the East, at which time he had whole divisions, with their generals under his command. All this of course was quite conducive to the development of SKORZENY's megalomania, which had already reached dangerous proportions under the influence of GOEBBELS's propaganda after the GRAU SAUSSO operation.

(c) Scope of Operations

The real field of operations, which was to come under control of VI S was of an exceedingly varied nature. Its main task was to be the creation of disturbances and panic in the rear areas of military operations. This was to be achieved by the execution of sabotage actions, as well as by the removal of important personages by assassination.

In addition VI S was called on to furnish personnel and plans for a number of military operations of an especially difficult nature. To give an example, when BUDAPEST was under siege by the Red Army and had become completely encircled, river boats were to break through the blockade and bring ammunition and supplies into the beleaguered city. Incidentally, the operation turned out to be a complete failure.

As far as other commitments behind the lines is concerned, it would be exceedingly difficult to give an exact appreciation. It is even doubtful whether SKORZENY himself would be able to give an account of all operations conducted under the auspices of VI S.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

Not only the already-mentioned disorganization within the central office contributed to this state of affairs, but also the nature of the operations. It frequently happened that subordinate agencies planned and executed an operation completely on their own, without any coordination with other similar agencies or with the central office.

Most of the operations were still in the planning stage and the agents were still being trained in the various sabotage and radio schools at the moment of collapse. Nevertheless it is fairly certain that a number of operations had already started in various countries. All these activities, as far as is known, were purely of a sabotage nature (called Z - Zerstörung, destruction). So far no actions of the other kind (assassinations) have become known.

(d) Materiel at SKORZENY's Disposal

SKORZENY's equipment was fabulous. The most modern weapons, and explosives were at his disposal. What he could not get through channels was got through extra-legal means. His reputation and prestige gave him privileges not accorded to others. Even during the period of acute gasoline shortage, SKORZENY always could call on as many airplanes as he needed for his operations.

The human material which came under SKORZENY's control belonged to the elite units of the German Armed Forces. Hundreds of fanatical veterans from Waffen SS and the Army (Brandenburg Division) belonged to the special organizations of VI S (Jagdverbände, etc). To this pool were added the selected units controlled by MIL D (Fak, etc).

SKORZENY wanted to model his troops on the corresponding institutions of the British Service, completely forgetting, however that these institutions had been the result of an organic development which had lasted for centuries. Modeled along British lines, preparations were also made for so-called commando operations (Kommando Unternehmen). Their purpose was to be the execution of extremely dangerous and difficult tasks, in cooperation with the various services of the armed forces.

(e) SKORZENY and the Werwolf

SKORZENY was also given a special task in the organization of the WERWOLF. It is to be expected that, contrary to his chief in this enterprise, SS Obergruppenführer PRUETZMANN, SKORZENY had managed to make thorough preparations for such activities. His organization would of course have been the most fitted for such activities. In the last analysis their capabilities rest on the establishment of large dumps for weapons and explosives.

It is almost beyond any question that such underground dumps do exist in various parts of GERMANY and in those parts of EUROPE previously occupied by the Germans. With such storage sites at their disposal an organization can put its predetermined plans into operation even without central direction.

(f) SKORZENY's Personality

As far as SKORZENY's personality is concerned, he is a rather primitive type. He has neither exceptional talents, nor unusual political experience or ideals. He is a soldier who is brave to the point of reckless defiance of death and who has succeeded in gathering around himself a group of young and similarly disposed men who blindly followed him in whatever he did.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Part VI (Continued)

(g) Organization

Referat VI S 1 - Administration - was commanded by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer SCHMIDT. He was called on to head the actual commitments in the South Eastern sector.

Referat VI S 2 was headed by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer RADL, who was also SKORZENY's deputy. VI S 2 was charged with the operational planning and actual execution of all operations.

VI S 3 under SS Hauptsturmfuehrer BRAMFELDT was in charge of all schools.

VI S 4 was to be the headquarters for all small operations. Its functions and those of S 2 were combined to an increasing extent. It was commanded by SS Hauptsturmfuehrer BESEKOW.

The most important part of VI S was that commanded by RADL. Central control over all commitments was to be maintained through this section, not always feasible under the existing disorganization. RADL was not only SKORZENY's administrative assistant but also his closest collaborator. He was informed of all the latter's plans and intentions.

He was no great light in his chosen fields, and so sections VI S 2 and VI S 4 lost more and more ground to their competitors, the SS Jagdverbände. RADL did not particularly object to this state of affairs, for although not under command of VI S 2, the Jagdverbände were still SKORZENY's babies and subject to RADL's indirect influence in this manner.

VI S 2's objective was the commitment of small groups behind the Allied lines (either by infiltration or by air drop). These groups were to be coordinated with measures of the Army Command and were thus to be of assistance to military operations. Oddly enough all these operations were planned for some future time when the German armies would once more be on the offensive. The personnel for these sabotage groups was mainly recruited from among nationals of the countries in which the future operations were to take place.

These men were then trained in the special schools of VI C 3 (such as instruction in demolitions, special weapons, radio transmission, etc). No very large commitments had been started by 9 May 1945, but the first phase of operations in various countries commenced by that time.

The system of schools, as has already been mentioned, was rather extensive, but was dwarfed by that of the Jagdverbände. Instruction was usually very short and training was not particularly thorough (especially wireless communications). VI S for instance, gave much more thorough training.

BRAMFELDT, the head of the school system was a conceited ignoramus. He had been chosen by SKORZENY because of his record as having been German pistol and pentathlon champion, and thus a popular figure in GERMANY.

The most efficient section was the small one of VI S 4. BESEKOW was not brilliant, but diligent and energetic and thus had quite a bit of success. His Kleinsätze were generally individual operations, involving one man or very small groups. Their purpose was either operational reconnaissance or sabotage. Acts of terrorism were also primarily controlled by this section. Not much had to be done in this field outside of planning, however.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(h) Jagdverbände

SKORZENY was not particularly interested in the above sections of VI S. His particular fondness was for the Jagdverbände, units organized along military lines. Their origin dates back to 1944, when SKORZENY was ordered by HITLER to establish organs of underground resistance throughout EUROPE.

SKORZENY visualized the Jagdverbände in this role and commenced a large expansion program. Their organization was as follows: immediately below SKORZENY was a Chief of Staff (SS Obersturmführer von FOELKENSAL, killed in action on the Eastern front at the beginning of 1945), with an I-a (G-3), I-b (G-4) and I-c (G-2).

This staff controlled the so-called Jagdkommandos:

Jagdkommando MITTE  
Jagdkommando SUEDEST  
Jagdkommando NORD  
Jagdkommando OST  
Jagdkommando SUEODST  
and the SS-Fallschirmjaeger Btl 500 and 600.

Each Jagdkommando in turn was subdivided into Jagdeinsatz according to geographical subdivisions. Jagdkommando SUEODST, for instance had the following sub-units

Jagdeinsatz UNGARN (HUNGARY)  
Jagdeinsatz SLOWAKEI (SLOVAKIA)  
Jagdeinsatz SERBIEN-KROATIEN (SERBIA-CROATIA)  
Jagdeinsatz BULGARIEN (BULGARIA)  
Jagdeinsatz ALBANIEN (ALBANIA)  
Jagdeinsatz RUMAERIEN (ROMANIA)  
Jagdeinsatz GRIECHENLAND (GREECE)  
Jagdeinsatz TUERKEI (TURKEY)

Commanders of Jagdkommandos were equivalent to battalion commanders.

The extent of the activity of Jagdverbände was larger than that of the regular organizations of VI S. The training of personnel was accomplished by the various Jagdkommandos, frequently even of the smaller Jagdeinsätze on their own responsibility.

The aim of establishing an all-European resistance movement was never fulfilled. Reasons were the insufficient time allotted and the fact that SKORZENY and his officers considered all problems from a purely military angle and showed no understanding or skill in the treatment of the alignment of political forces. This was enhanced by the insistence of the various sub-sections of Ant VI on their exclusive privilege of doing political work in foreign countries.

WANECK succeeded in having KALTENBRUNNER issue a directive instructing VI S and Mil B to come to full agreement with VI E on all operations in South Eastern EUROPE. This was to prevent the Jagdverbände from committing political blunders in this area.

The problem was very acute since all intelligence agencies, that is VI E, VI S, and the Leitstelle II Suedost (the Mil D successor of Abwehr II in the Balkans) had to draw on the same pool of national groups in the Balkans for their operatives.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Part VI (Continued)

In conclusion it can be said that the Jagdverbaende were of no political importance and had only started to emerge in military value. Only preliminary steps, such as the construction of dumps and explosives, had been accomplished. Some of the scattered groups maintained radio communication with their Jagdkommando until the very end.

Within the framework of the Jagdkommando Sucoost work had progressed the furthest in CROATIA. There close ties had been established with the projected underground organizations of USTASCHA. Towards the end relations were no longer quite as cordial. The commander of the Jagdeinsatz was a man without any political acumen and had lost the approval of Col LUBORIC, the Croat representative.

(1) Mil D

The last of SKORZENY's wide-flung activities was his command of Mil D (the successor to Abwehr II). In spite of this identity on the top, relations between the agencies of VI S and Mil D were by no means without friction. SKORZENY appointed Major LOOS as his deputy for Mil D and attempted the complete elimination of all opposition within this agency.

He paid special attention to the technical sub-section of Mil D since he regarded it as the core of the anti-Nazi opposition (this was the agency which had supplied the explosive used in the attempt of 20 July 1944). In spite of his appointment of Major EHMANN, one of his closest confidants, as its commander,, the situation did not change materially until the very end.

(9) Gruppe VI Wi T

In 1942 SCHELLENBERG founded a special Referat - VI Wirtschaft - which was later enlarged to the status of a Gruppe. Called Wirtschaft und Technik (Economics and Technology), this section was under the command of SS Stabsartenfuhrer SCHMIED. The original plan was to utilize German internal economy for intelligence purposes, but later the stress was switched to problems of inventions and technical improvements. Comparatively little is known about these activities.

The original function of VI Wi was a simple one. Under SS Hauptsturnfuhrer hr ZEINLER it consisted in using connections to German business establishments in the placing of members of the SD in foreign countries. Thus camouflaged as German business representatives, the agents would then engage in their intelligence activities.

Abteilung III Wi of the Abwehr was also incorporated into VI Wi T. This was true only for the central office. The IV Wi Referate of the various Asts were absorbed by the appropriate Stabs Stellen.

(10) Referat VI Z

This was a Sonderreferat concerned with those activities of Abteilung III F, Abwehr, not incorporated into Amt IV (Stabs), RSHA. Commanded by Oberstleutnant Milo FREUND, a narrow-minded but ambitious intelligence officer, this section tried to regain part of its lost ground. Its main task was to conduct security checks of the German intelligence services and to counter-act, utilize, and destroy operations of Allied intelligence agencies.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

Although, after the reorganization, all penetration activities and suborning of agents and their utilization (Funkspiele) were to be controlled by Ant IV, VI 2 nevertheless continued certain activities in this connection. In spite of these unauthorized activities, FREUND succeeded in executing his mission to the satisfaction of all concerned.

(11) Gruppe VI H

This Gruppe was very short-lived. It was dissolved in 1942. Its function had been the collection of intelligence through the penetration of political opposition parties and movements. Its head had been SS Standartenfuhrer Dr KNOCHEN.

d. Reports and Conclusions

(1) General Appreciation

There is no doubt that of the reports submitted by the RSHA to the highest German authorities those of Ant VI were the most numerous. These reports were as a rule in a completely objective vein and also succeeded in presenting a thoroughly correct appreciation of the situation in the countries under consideration. Considering this wealth of superior intelligence material it is completely incomprehensible for the uninitiated why the German authorities persisted in committing political and military blunders of a catastrophic variety. A description of the tenor and distribution of Ant VI reports may be of help in the solution of this puzzle.

(2) Lageberichte

Two kinds of reports are of interest in this connection. The first were certain periodic reports of a comprehensive nature concerning events and the situation in their respective countries by the various Referenten. These reports were usually of a routine nature and sent out through channels. From Referent to Gruppenleiter to KALTENBRUNNER to HITLER.

(3) Special Reports

The other, and far more important type of report, were the special reports. These were written by the Referent whenever he considered a political occurrence of sufficient importance to warrant drawing his superior's attention to this happening and its consequences.

Usually these reports were based on the factual material sent in by the agents resident in the country in question. This material was then sifted, collated and edited and usually commented upon by the Referent.

The latter based his comments on his knowledge and experience of the questions and his general background as an expert on the country under consideration. Conclusions reached, lessons to be learned, and future action to be taken generally were part of the Referent's commentary. The special report was addressed to the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (KALTENBRUNNER) through the appropriate Gruppenleiter.

Experienced Referenten, whose work had already endowed them with a certain reputation, marked the so-called action-copy (Verfuegung, the first copy of the original report) with a suggestion as to whom the report was to be distributed to by KALTENBRUNNER.

6. Ant VI (Continued)

It is important to note that there was no standard distribution and that HIMMLER was the final recipient of all reports (every report sent to KALTENBRUNNER had to be transmitted by him to HIMMLER). HIMMLER was under no compunction to re-transmit these reports either up (to HITLER), across (to other Reich Ministers or their equivalents) or down (to other agencies of the SS or the RSHA).

(4) HIMMLER as the final arbiter

From the above it can be seen that HIMMLER was the best and most correctly informed man with regards to the foreign political situation within GERMANY. He rarely made the proper use of this powerful knowledge. This was a question of personal character.

He knew very well that the SD (especially its foreign branch) was exceedingly well informed and that this information had been channeled to him in objective and undisguised fashion. That he did not utilize this information to any great extent is to be explained by HIMMLER's fundamental nature.

His prime objective was the strengthening of his power within GERMANY, without, however, openly interfering with anybody who was in HITLER's good graces.

The classic example of this behavior is the relation between HIMMLER and RIBBENTROP. The latter had come into conflict with HIMMLER on numerous occasions. As SS Obergruppenfuehrer, he was of course subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS, but did not let a single occasion pass without showing open insubordination.

Nevertheless HIMMLER never combated RIBBENTROP openly. The Foreign Minister had HITLER's unqualified support (for reasons unknown to anybody), and that was sufficient for HIMMLER. That does not mean that HIMMLER did not use every method of intrigue and activities behind the scene against his adversary.

(5) SD and Foreign Office

(a) General Atmosphere

Due to HIMMLER's methods, most reports sent to him by Ant VI did not produce any results. A similar situation prevailed with regard to the reports sent to the Foreign Office. Ever since the SD had started to create a foreign intelligence organization, perennial conflict existed between this service and the Foreign Office. This constant state of open warfare was interrupted by occasional periods of external armistice.

Whenever the situation became so acute that no further work could be done by either partner, the two chiefs, - RIBBENTROP and HEYDRICH or KALTENBRUNNER - met in conference and agreed to some sort of temporary cessation of hostilities. Nobody took these agreements very seriously and a short time later merry sniping had again been resumed by all concerned. The basis for these agreements was usually permission by the Foreign Office to install SD agents under the cover of diplomatic immunity, while Ant VI agreed to soft-pedal its criticism of German foreign policy as practiced by RIBBENTROP and his cronies.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

6. Art VI (Continued)

As has already been mentioned these agreements were broken in short order. Very few members of the SD had the advantage of diplomatic immunity, while Art VI found its sweet revenge in further publicizing its opinion of German foreign policy and its representatives.

Here we see one of the weakest points in the whole structure of the German intelligence service. A competent agency, the Foreign Office, was not interested in the information service operated by the SD. And on the other hand HIMMLER operated the SD merely as some kind of personal information bureau.

(b) The Liaison Officers

To counteract these tendencies to a certain extent the Office of Liaison Officers was created. The material collected by the SD was to be presented to SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Geheimrat WAGNER, as representative of the SD with the Foreign Office. His opposite number was SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr ROEDER, as representative of the Foreign Office with the RSHA.

The post of SD Liaison Officer with the Foreign Office had existed for some years, while that of the Foreign Office Liaison Officer with the RSHA was a comparatively new creation. It was an upshot of one of the already mentioned armistice conferences.

This particular conference had been called after a few months of intensive conflict. In the course of the meeting KALTENBRUNNER agreed to ROEDER's appointment and promised better cooperation in the future. WAGNER was one of the most shady and disgusting characters within the SD, while ROEDER on the contrary was a very capable and fair-minded officer.

(c) Subterfuge as Solution

KALTENBRUNNER realized very soon that the regular methods of presenting foreign intelligence material (as described above) would not lead to any concrete results. He therefore decided to use the indirect approach and to contact HITLER (who after all was the only man with sufficient power to order any radical changes).

He ordered that Ambassador HEWEL was to be included in the distribution of all important reports. HEWEL, as the Liaison Officer of the Foreign Office with HITLER's Headquarters, wielded considerable influence, and could usually count on HITLER's listening to what he had to say. KALTENBRUNNER was a personal friend of HEWEL's and all important reports emanating from Art VI now reached the latter with a personal note of his friend. The Ambassador then submitted these reports to HITLER at a propitious moment.

After HEWEL became incapacitated as the result of an automobile accident, KALTENBRUNNER established a new contact. He used SS Gruppenfuhrer FEGELEIN, who as HIMMLER's personal liaison officer with HITLER's Headquarters played a similar role.

Contrary to HEWEL, who was a capable diplomat, however, FEGELEIN was nothing but a good-looking cavalry officer. KALTENBRUNNER flattered his vanity by convincing him that these reports could change GERMANY's fate and that thus the sole responsibility had been placed in his (FEGELEIN's) hands. Followed, FEGELEIN henceforth did KALTENBRUNNER's bidding.

INTERROGATION REPORT NO. 15

6. Ant VI (Continued)

(6) HITLER's Appreciation of Intelligence Reports

In this fashion a true and unvarnished picture of the situation was presented to HITLER occasionally. Nevertheless he rarely took advantage of this opportunity and hardly ever adjusted the conduct of foreign affairs accordingly. The main reason for this behavior was to be found in HITLER's nature. He really believed he was appointed by Fate and did not need the counsel of mere human beings.

Another reason for his disregard of SD reports was his ignorance of the true importance of intelligence work as a whole and his disdain of such activities. On the few occasions when he followed the recommendations made by the SD, things turned out entirely to his advantage. For instance his original plan for the complete occupation of HUNGARY, the action of 19 March 1944, called for active military participation by HUNGARY and SLOVAKIA. Promises to that effect had already been given to ANTONESCU and presumably to TISO. Such action by her arch-enemies would, beyond any doubt, have brought HUNGARY to offer active resistance to this occupation.

The SD submitted a report embodying these considerations, and for once HITLER followed its recommendations. The occupation was carried on by German troops exclusively, and no armed Hungarian resistance was offered.

(7) Distribution to other agencies

A certain number of reports were also submitted to GOERING (their number decreased considerably during the last few months) and to BORMANN. After the increase in GOEBBEL's power after 20 July he too was included in the distribution list. This was also done from considerations of pure expediency. GOEBBELS was known to be ready to join any anti-RIBBENTROP coalition and thus was considered a potential ally in the SD-Foreign Office controversy.

(8) The "EGMONT" Reports

Besides these regular reports, a type of periodic and comprehensive survey had been instituted recently. These surveys, called EGMONT Berichte, went to a very small number of top-echelon personalities. They were written by the well-known journalist SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr Giselher WIRSING (now in allied hands) who had been called to Ant VI by SCHELLENBERG.

In his reports WIRSING used and collated the information obtained from various sources in all countries. The EGMONT reports appeared once a month on the average, and in their clear and objective way of considering world affairs belong among the best material which came from the RSHA.

(9) Speed of Dissemination of Spot Reports

One of the great advantages of Ant VI information was its speed. Since the Referent had radio communication with their chief agents, speedy transmission of important news items was guaranteed. These flash reports were sent by wireless to the Referent, and then immediately handed on to the Gruppenleiter. Thence, flashes were sent on by high-priority teletype (Blitzfernschreiben) to SCHELLENBERG and KALTENBRUNNER. Intelligence transmission was very rapid even during the period of heavy air attacks within GERMANY proper as well (in this case radio and not teletype was used).

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15


6. Ant VI (Continued)

Thus HIMMLER usually was the first man in GERMANY to obtain a complete picture of important developments. His information preceded RIBBENTROP's usually by a matter of hours. HIMMLER used this time lag to his own advantage. Usually he simply handed such sensational news to HITLER in a pointed manner, but without any further remarks.

Ant III had the usual distribution for its reports, but also included in its lists the OKW, the Wehrmachtsfuhrungsstab, the General Staff and the Commanders of Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The following diagram indicates the channels of dissemination for routine Periodic and Special Reports of Ant VI.

Channels of Distribution for Ant VI Reports



———— Regular channel  
 - - - - Special or irregular channel

7. Art Mil

a. Formation

Art Mil was created during the spring and summer of 1944 to absorb those parts of the Abwehr which still retained a semblance of independence (other parts had been annexed outright by already existing agencies of the RSHA). Its formation was the culmination of a campaign which the SD had been waging for years to obtain complete control of all German intelligence agencies.

With the absorption of Abwehr, military intelligence as well as political intelligence had come under control of the RSHA, and shortly thereafter under the direct command of SCHELLENBERG.

Oberst HANSEN, the Chief of Abwehr I, was appointed first Chief of Art Mil. After a few weeks, however, the events of 20 July gave SCHELLENBERG his long expected opportunity. HANSEN was removed and the Leiter of Art VI assumed complete control over all intelligence operations.

b. The Old Abwehr


As long as the Abwehr had been independent under Admiral CANARIS and under the aegis of the OKW it had consisted of two parts. The Amt Ausland Abwehr, an agency of only theoretical importance under Admiral BUERKNER, and the art Abwehr, the real military intelligence branch under Admiral CANARIS.

c. Transformation

The following chart shows the final result of the various reorganizations of abwehr during Spring and Summer of 1944. Wherever possible the original and the final form are indicated.

During this reorganization, the Abwehr (with the exception of Amt Ausland Abwehr, which was transformed into the Amtgruppe Ausland and remained under OKW control) was transferred almost entirely to the RSHA, where an agency was taken over intact, or was split up among several new agencies, or parts of an agency were absorbed by already existing agencies of the RSHA.

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


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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

7. Ant Mil (Continued)

The Reorganization of the Abwehr  
(Line of Reorganization is towards the right)



——— Direction of change, contribution, or absorption  
 [ ] New agency

7. Ant Mil (Continued)(1) Ant Abwehr

The chart shows that in the course of the reorganization, the I and II branches of Ant Abwehr, as well as part of Abwehr III were formed into Mil Ant. The remaining parts of Abwehr III were absorbed by Ant IV and Ant VI.

In detail Abwehr I was transformed into Mil B and Mil C. The administrative branches of Abwehr, called Abwehr Z became Mil A. Abwehr II was made into Mil D. As for Abwehr III, most of it went to Ant IV. Certain parts of Abwehr III F (penetration of Allied intelligence services) were subordinated to VI Z, while Abwehr III W1 was united with Referat VI W1 T. The Frontaufklaerungstruppen were centrally controlled by a section called Gruppe VI F in Ant VI and by Abteilung Mil F of Ant Mil, which were identical agencies.

(2) Abwehr Agencies in the Field

At the next lower level the old Abwehr had controlled the following agencies:

Abwehrstellen (ast) and Abwehrleitstellen (Alst) in occupied territory.  
Abwehrstellen and Abwehrleitstellen in each Wehrkreis  
Abwehrstellen with each Army Group  
Kriegsorganisationen (K O) in neutral countries friendly to or controlled by GERMANY.

The above four types of agencies were all subdivided into sections I, II, and III, called Gruppen. These Gruppen corresponded functionally to those Abteilungen of Ant Abwehr bearing the same Roman numeral. In the reorganization the following changes were made:

(a) In Occupied Territory

Asts and Alsts in occupied countries, where still existing, were dissolved. They were to be reorganized along the lines outlined below for agencies within the Wehrkreis.

(b) At Wehrkreis Headquarters

Asts and Alsts in the various Wehrkreise were dissolved. In their stead a new organization, called Kommandoneidgebiet (KMG) was created. It took over all I-type activities of the old ast or Alst (espionage).

No substitute for Gruppe II was envisaged. Gruppe III was split. Its purely military functions were taken over by the Abwehroffizier (AO, Counter-Intelligence Officer) with Wehrkreis Headquarters. All other functions were transferred to the appropriate Stapo (Leit) Stellen (especially III F - penetration and III W1). Personnel was divided up accordingly.

(c) At Army Group

Abwehrstellen with Army Groups had always carried the designation I, II, or III, according to their function. Reorganization here merely took the form of a change in designation. Abwehrstellen I became Leitstellen fuer Frontaufklaerung I, Abwehrstellen II were called Leitstellen fuer Frontaufklaerung II, and Abwehrstellen III received the designation Leitstellen fuer Frontaufklaerung III.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

7. Ant Mil (Continued)

This organization and designation was mirrored in the Frontaufklarungs-kommandos with Army and the Frontaufklarungstrupps with Corps. All these various Frontaufklarungs units were controlled by the appropriate military echelons, ie, for a frontaufklarungskommando, the I-c with the appropriate Army. At the same time a certain amount of administrative control was exercised by Mil F.

The process of reorganization of these short-range tactical intelligence units had been by no means completed. All sorts of intermediate organizational forms existed. For instance Army Group SOUTH and Army Group E were both served by the same Leitstelle II. Certain divisions controlled Frontaufklarungstrupps, etc.

In the higher echelons there existed disagreements between Mil B and Mil F, between Mil F and VI F and VI S, and between the RSHA and the OKW.

(d) In Neutral Countries

No reorganization took place in the KOs. These Abwehr agencies in countries allied to or controlled by Germany continued in existence in their old form. The only difference was that they now reported to Amt Mil and the RSHA instead of to Amt Abwehr and the OKW.

8. Ant VII

During the past few years Ant VII led such a shadowy life that many people began to doubt its very existence. It did lose a lot of personnel in the course of the war and its dissolution had been planned several times, but was never carried through. Its organization was rather unfortunate. It owed its creation, like many other institutions within the Sipo, to personal considerations.

After the reorganization of the RSHA, the former Artschef of Amt II, SS Oberfuehrer Dr SIX, found himself without a job. The new Inlandsamt (Amt III) was headed by his former subordinate OHLENDORF. Not to offend SIX a new Amt was created, and he was made head of Amt VII, also called Amt Wissenschaft (Science).

Practically, of course, science in GERMANY was represented in III C, and science in foreign countries in VI G. Therefore there never was any real justification for the creation of Amt VII at all, other than to give SIX a proper position.

It is therefore not surprising that SIX, his three Gruppenleiter, and all their personnel (men who had been with SIX in the old Amt II) really had no other job than to take care of the library, the files, and the available maps.

The library was of excellent quality, however, and the files were very comprehensive and useful. They had been compiled from the card-indices of all the various Aemter.

After SIX's transfer to the Foreign Office no successor was appointed. SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr DITTEL was entrusted with the direction of the Amt, as Vertreter.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

9. Ant N

This Ant was a very recent creation. It had been formed during 1944, while previously its tasks had been assigned to a Gruppe in Ant II (II D). With the extension of the communications network of the RSHA, the creation of a special staff section meeting these requirements had become necessary. Ant N had under its control all communications nets used by the RSHA or any of its agencies. The main means used were radio, teletype, and telephone.

During the time of its greatest expansion, the teletype net alone had several hundred extensions. This does not include the numerous Geheimschreiber automatic encoding and decoding teletype machines. The radio net reached its greatest extent with the greatest advance of the German troops. Sipo units were attached to various military echelons and frequently their only means of contact with the central office was by radio communication. The telephone net was also well developed.

An interesting innovation was the so-called Konferenzapparat. KALTENBRUNNER and all his Amtschefs had one of these telephones, as had several ministers and other high functionaries. The number of extensions was very small (maybe about 50). There was only one central, automatic switchboard, and by dialing a two-figure number any of the other subscribers could be contacted, without having to go over the various office switchboards. This ensured both speed and secrecy of the conversations on this net.

The personnel in this section consisted of technical experts. The Amtsleiter, SS Standartenfuehrer SANSONI, was a communications specialist, while two Referenten, WALTHER and MARKS, were experts on teletype and radio, respectively.

10. Ant San

Ant San was of even more recent origin than Ant N. It never had a chance to develop and so no appreciation of the work of the Medical Section, or of its chief, SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr STROHSCHNEIDER, can be given. STROHSCHNEIDER was a close personal friend of KALTENBRUNNER and had come to the RSHA from the Waffen SS.

11. The Staff of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD

The following four institutions were under the direct command of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei:

- The Court (Gericht)
- The Schools (Schulen)
- The Attaches (Attachegruppe)
- The Aides (Adjutantur)

a. Court

The court with jurisdiction over all members of the RSHA and its agencies had been previously under the control of the chief of Ant I. This had given rise to complaints and friction. Due to the great power and legally unrestricted functioning of the court, the Amtschef I had a most potent weapon in his hand. The other section chiefs protested about this inequitable distribution of power and wanted the creation of a court responsible only to KALTENBRUNNER.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

11. The Staff of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Continued)

The latter finally acceded to these requests and appointed his friend, SS Sturmbannfuhrer Dr DILLERSPERGER, a former judge in INNSBRUCK. Though slightly more reasonable than his predecessors, DILLERSPERGER continued their policy of having each small infraction punished by his courts.

The court was very severe. Small misdemeanors, which would have been disregarded by other courts, were punished in the Sipo Court by long prison sentences or by transfer to the so-called rehabilitation units of the Waffen SS. The nature of these organizations is too well known to be discussed here. They were supplied by all organizations within the Police, the SD, and the SS.

Final review of all cases rested with HIMMLER. He made it his policy to review automatically all cases involving SS or police officers. Any mild sentence was changed to a more severe one. He also instituted the nice custom of punishing the judge who had pronounced a mild sentence as well. Thus it has happened that an officer, sentenced to disciplinary action by the RSHA Court had his sentence revoked by HIMMLER, and the accused, judge, and prosecutor sent to the penal unit. It can easily be understood that no SS judge dared to go counter to these clearly-expressed wishes of his lord and master.

b. Schools

The problems of education and of obtaining suitable new blood were considered very important in the Security Police. Only the last few years of the war brought first a reduction and finally a complete stoppage of these endeavors. Plans, however, continued to be worked on.

Planning reached considerable proportions with the reorganization of the various levels (Laufbahn) in Sicherheitspolizei and SD, as propounded in 1943. This reorganization permitted the following four levels:

- The intermediate (Mittlere)
- The intermediate-upper (Mittlere Gehobene)
- The upper (Gehobene)
- The leading (Leitende).

(1) The intermediate

The mittlere Laufbahn included all small officials, as well as the Unterfuhrer (NCOs) in the SD. The last stage of this level was Sturmscharfuhrer, or the corresponding civil-service rank.

(2) The intermediate-upper

The mittlere gehobene Laufbahn included most of the officials with a high-school education, as well as the corresponding SS and SD officers. It corresponded to that of the company officer in the army. The final rank was that of SS Hauptsturmfuhrer or the appropriate civil service position.

(3) The upper

The gehobene Laufbahn had as its prerequisite a certain amount of university education. The highest rank was that of SS Sturmbannfuhrer or the corresponding civil service rank.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

11. The Staff of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Continued)

(4) The leading

For the leitende Laufbahn, an officer had to have finished his university education. Exceptions were made in the case of men, who had already reached the position of Obersturmbannfuhrer prior to the promulgation of this ordinance. The highest possible ranks were those of SS Oberstgruppenfuhrer or Staatssekretaer.

(5) Effects of New Civil Service Ordinance

This new ordinance was of great importance to every member of the Sipo or the SD, since it involved a general readjustment of all salaries. A great many officers in the SD, who had reached high positions because of their long service and high seniority, now saw the road to further advancement blocked by educational requirements.

The members of the police branches received an advantage since their criteria had always been along civil-service lines, which involved educational requirements. A few exceptions were to be made in the case of gross injustices, but generally it can be said that few, if any, SD officers could hope to belong to the gehobenen or leitenden Dienst.

The creation of these new doctrines for appointments presupposed the creation of an extensive educational system. Almost every change of status was to be made possible only after passing the appropriate examinations.

Because of the war, however, few of these examinations could be held. The only kind which was consistently stressed was that necessary to advance to the mittlere gehobene Dienst, i.e. the prerequisite for the appointment of officers.

The plan for the schools designed to prepare its students for the leitende Dienst was a very comprehensive one. These schools were to be the universities for Sipo and SD.

As usual special stress was laid on athletic and military prowess. In examinations, history was the most important topic. An absolute prerequisite was political extremism, including a strong anti-religious bias.

The man charged with the execution of this educational program was SS Oberfuhrer Dr DISCHER. He had formerly been Inspekteur der Sipo und des SD at WIEN, and had later been transferred to the Western Front. He showed no qualifications whatsoever for his new position. He was known as an official of average intelligence with a Sipo background.

c. The Attachegruppe

This Gruppe, formerly under the Adjutantur, was charged with the administrative supervision of the various Police attaches. Their direction, however, was executed by Amt IV. The institution of the police attache was not very widespread, since many otherwise friendly countries refused to accredit them with the German legations or embassies. At the time of the greatest German influence the following attaches had been appointed:

In ROME, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer KAPPLER, a very able and useful man.

In ZAGREB, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer HELM. He was also rather well-informed, but somewhat lazy.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

11. The Staff of the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Continued)

In SOFIA, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr HOFFMANN, an official of average intelligence but with sound political information.

In BUCHAREST, SS Sturmbannfuhrer RICHTER. He had first been adviser for Jewish affairs at the legation. As such he gained the confidence of the German minister, von KILLINGER, and was appointed police attache.

In BRATISLAVA, SS Sturmbannfuhrer GOLTZ, a secret police man, of less than average ability.

The police attaches at TOKYO and NANKING have already been mentioned.

In LISBON, the office of police liaison officer (Verbindungsfuhrer) had been created, since the Portuguese government did not approve of the presence of a police attache. The duties of the liaison officer were equivalent to those of an attache. However, SS Hauptsturmfuhrer WINSER, who had been appointed to the post, proved a total failure and had to be recalled.

All police attaches had been with the Gestapo previously. It proved very difficult therefore to enlist their aid for intelligence purposes. Even if they showed interest and understanding for this field, it was not so easy to receive permission to work for Amt VI, since Amt IV guarded its prerogatives jealously.

Yet, with KALTENBRUNNER's assistance, it was possible to obtain their cooperation for political intelligence work. Since all of them had rather extensive intelligence nets with trusted agents at their disposal, results obtained through this source were usually of good quality.

Leiter of the Attache Gruppe was SS Standartenfuhrer Dr ZINDEL. He was also Secretary General of the Internationale Kriminalpolizeiliche Kommission (IKPA, International Commission for Criminal Police, a non-political, international association for the furthering of methods and operations of the criminal police).

Most European states were members of the association. KALTENBRUNNER was its last president. ZINDEL was a very unimportant person, and had nothing to say either in his position as the head of the Attachegruppe, or - as Secretary General of the IKPA.

d. The Adjutantur des Chefs der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD

HEYDRICH, who was a great lover of pomp, always insisted that he have a large and well staffed section of personal adjutants and aides. These aides all had to resemble him in appearance, ie, they were tall, blond, and handsome. In HEYDRICH's time the adjutants had great influence and power.

With KALTENBRUNNER's advent this situation was changed radically. All the old personnel was removed with the exception of SS Obersturmbannfuhrer SCHEIDLER, previously concerned with the administration of funds. Elevation to the position of adjutant gave no corresponding increase in influence. KALTENBRUNNER's personal aid, SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr MALZ, who had his desk in front of his chief's office also was utterly without power or influence. His main job was to bring various reports to KALTENBRUNNER for his signature.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15III. High Command Echelons of the SD1. First Phase

During the first organizational phase the echelon immediately subordinate to the SD Hauptamt was that of the SD Oberabschnitt., commanded by an SD Oberabschnittsfuehrer. During this stage there was no direct command relationship between such headquarters and the Stapo and Kripo. The Secret Police as well as the Criminal Police received their orders directly from their respective headquarters in BERLIN.

2. Inspektore der Sipo und des SD (IAS)

In the course of the first reorganization and with the creation of the RSHA new agencies were formed to take charge of the coordination between SD and Sipo at the level below that of the national headquarters. These were the offices of the Inspektore der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (Inspectorates of the Security Police and the SD).

The jurisdictional area of such inspectorates corresponded to that of the former Oberabschnitt., which was generally equivalent to that of a Wehrkreis.

Theoretically the Inspekteur had complete control over the Staatspolizei (Leit) Stellen, Kriminalpolizei (Leit) Stellen, as well as the SD (Leit) Abschnitte within his region. Since, however, the unification had been completed only on paper, the various supreme headquarters still continued to exercise their influence on their subordinate agencies directly. (ie, the Stapo Stellen continued to receive their orders directly from Amt IV or its Gruppen, without any regard to the Inspekteur, and Amt III and V continued to control their agencies in a similar fashion).

Thus the Inspekteur was used only as a transmitting agency or message center, without having any powers of command. In this respect their headquarters resembled those of the Hoehere SS- und Polizeifuehrer, which had but an administrative function at that time. (This situation was changed at a later date). The Inspekteur, incidentally, was on the staff of the Hoehere SS - und Polizeifuehrer.

3. Befehlshaber und Kommandeure der Sipo und des SD

In the course of the occupation of foreign countries Einsatzkommandos der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD were put into operation. These Einsatzkommandos were attached to each Army in the form of Einsatzgruppen.

After the consolidation of the military position and the complete occupation of these countries a new agency was created. This was called the Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD (BdS). This was the highest Police and Security Echelon in the country and in turn controlled a number of Kommandeure der Sipo und des SD in various parts of the country (KdS).

The headquarters of these Befehlshaber und Kommandeure were organized along new lines and no longer simply controlled the various Stapo and Kripo Stellen or SD Abschnitte. They were organized along the lines of the RSHA, and were subdivided into so-called Abteilungen, I, II, III, IV, V and VI, with a function similar to those of the respective Aemter within the commanding echelon. The Aemter VII, N, and San had no direct representation with the Befehlshaber und Kommandeure.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

3. Befehlshaber and Kommandeure der Sipo und des SD (Continued)

In certain cases a certain special task could be handled by a special section, especially for distinct military sectors (for instance VI Z). Besides these VI Abteilungen, the office of the Untersuchungsfuhrer (Investigating Officer) was created, who in turn reported to SS Richter DILLERSPELGER.

In this type of organization the Befehlshaber wielded considerable power, since all the Kommandeure were responsible to him and he controlled all field agencies of Stapo, Kripo, and SD through them. This new institution of Befehlshaber was to be organized within GERMANY as well. The organization was completed first in the frontier Wehrkreise and towards the end had been accomplished in the remainder of GERMANY.

At the moment of collapse, therefore, a Befehlshaber had been appointed for each Wehrkreis, who in turn controlled several Kommandeure for the various subdivisions of his region. (The office of Inspekteur had been abolished and replaced by that of Befehlshaber). The Stapo (Leit) Stellen, Kripo (Leit) Stellen, and SD (Leit) Abschnitte were maintained for the time being, but subordinated to the headquarters of the Kommandeure.

4. Hochere SS und Polizei Fuehrer (HSSPF)

As has already been mentioned the Befehlshaber der Sicherheits-polizei und des SD were under control not only of the RSHA, but also of the local Hochere SS-und Polizeifuehrer. (with exception of ITALY where there existed the specially created office of Hochster SS und Polizeifuehrer, held by HIMMLER's long-term Chief of Staff, SS Obergruppenfuehrer WOLFF).

The Hochere SS und Polizeifuehrer in turn controlled, beside the Befehlshaber der Sicherheits-polizei und des SD, a Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei (BdO - controlling Schupo, rural police, fire police and water police, as well as other routine police installations). They were responsible to HIMMLER exclusively and have as a matter of fact been called "little HIMMLERS."

All SS Hauptamtschefs could, however, issue directives. This was of practical importance only in the case of the Chef der Sicherheits-polizei und des SD (RSHA) and of the Chef der Ordnungspolizei (Hauptamt Orpo). Theoretically the other SS Hauptamts, such as Wirtschafts und Verwaltungshauptamt, Hauptamt SS Gericht, and Fuehrungshauptamt, were on the same command level.

5. Subordinate Agencies

a. Types of Agencies

The smallest administrative unit within the Sipo was the Aussenstelle. This terminology was used for Stapo, Kripo, as well as SD. These Aussenstellen were controlled by the already discussed (Leit) Stellen of Kripo and Stapo and (Leit) Abschnitte of the SD.

The border police, which also belonged to the Sipo was organized into Grenzpolizeikommissariate, and at certain border control posts Grenzpolizeistellen. These border police agencies were in turn controlled by the local Stapo (Leit) Stelle. The next higher echelon was known as the Inspekteur der Grenzpolizei, who however was usually identical with the appropriate Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD.

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

5. Subordinate Agencies (Continued)

Collaboration between the various Befehlshaber and their headquarters, the RSHA, was not always of the best. Conflicts of responsibility between the various center were quite common. This led to constant friction.

An added obstacle were those Befehlshaber, who, trusting in their own omnipotence, decided to skip their next echelon and to report directly to KALTENBRUNNER, in order to prove their great ability and knowledge. Others decided to make up to the HSSPF and to conspire against the RSHA. Since HITLER's approval was necessary for appointment or removal of a Befehlshaber, KALTENBRUNNER could not always prevail against his rebellious subordinates.

Similar difficulties arose with various Hoehere SS- und Polizeifuehrer. They reported directly to HITLER, using the material which they had obtained from the Befehlshaber der Sipo und des SD. This parallelism was not abolished by HITLER. On the contrary, he rather furthered this divergence. It was entirely according to his motto Divide et impera.

b. Classification of Officials and Informants

The following categories of collaborators existed in the SD:

- Hauptamtliche SD-Angehoerige (full time members of the SD, including auxiliaries)
- Ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter (part time, non-paid collaborators)
- Vertrauensleute (Operatives)
- Zutraeger (called Agenten in foreign countries) (Agents)

(1) Hauptamtliche Mitarbeiter

The first type included all members of the SD (also members of the SS), while the auxiliaries included men drafted for the duration of the war, so-called SD-Angestellte (employees), who were full time employees of the SD without being members of the SS as well as officials on detached service from other branches. This category also included the few office help.

(2) Ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter

The second type consisted of members of the SS, who had been detached for service with the SD (operationally, but not administratively). They were unpaid, and generally followed a civilian profession. There were also some men in this category who had been retained in their original SS units.

(3) Vertrauensleute

The third category included all those persons who, after a solemn oath, had been accepted into the service of the SD. Their activities resembled those of the ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter, with the exception that they did not belong to the SS. (It did occur however that trusted and successful V-Leute were taken into the SS).

(4) Zutraeger und Agenten

The fourth group was the most numerous one. As a rule it consisted of paid agents, while groups (2) and (3) usually served from idealism. These paid agents were more important in the services of Amt IV and VI, while Amt III usually tended to employ ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter and V-Leute.

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INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

5. Subordinate Agencies (Continued)

The leading personalities within foreign countries were all ehrenantliche Mitarbeiter, or V-Leute.

c. Oath

The so-called Verpflichtungserklärungen (Oaths of Office) were of two kinds. One was for for the use of hauptamtliche or ehrenamtliche Mitarbeiter, while the other was used for V-Leute.

The first part of the oath was identical in both cases. It included a statement that no use whatsoever would be made of information or experience gained while serving with the SD. Then followed the declaration.

In the first case: "If I should commit a treasonable act, either consciously, or unconsciously, in spite of this solemn oath, then I give my superiors the right to punish me in any way (they see fit)"

("Werde ich trotz des Schwures bewusst oder unbewusst zum Verräter, so gebe ich meinen Vorgesetzten das Recht mich in jeder Weise zu bestrafen".)

In the second case: "If I should commit a treasonable act, either consciously, or unconsciously, in spite of this solemn oath, I do so in the knowledge that I should expect measures by the Secret Police."

("Werde ich trotz des Schwures bewusst oder unbewusst zum Verräter, so weis ich, dass ich staatspolizeiliche Massnahmen zu erwarten habe.")

Towards the end a so-called Sonderverpflichtung (Special Contract) was created. It was to be used for persons high in public life. At the end of this declaration the following formula was included: "I furthermore realize that in case I should meet with difficulties because of this activity, the Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD and his subordinate agencies will take me under his protection." ("Weiteres wird mir bekannt gegeben, dass der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD mit seinen Dienststellen mich in Falle von Schwierigkeiten, die ich durch diese Tätigkeit bekomme, in seinen Schutz nimmt.")

Towards the end, these oaths and declarations were no longer taken seriously. Because of the many solemn oaths which every German had been subjected to in the course of existence, even this, unusual one lost its importance.

Generally, it can be said, that obedience depended on the persons in question. Some of the most important agents of the SD had never been asked to sign any declaration of this kind, since their relation was based on a personal one to some member of the SD proper. This was especially true in foreign countries. It was prohibited to take any written declarations whatsoever outside of GERMANY.

For this reason most of the V-Leute had never signed this oath. Here too it was of no importance, for usually the Hauptvertrauensmann had selected his own collaborators and organized his intelligence net with their help.

*King, Major*  
for KOCH  
AG of S, G-2

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ANNEX AINTERROGATION REPORT No 15Organization of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA)Chef des ReichssicherheitshauptamtesAttache Gruppe

SS Sturmartenfuehrer Dr ZINDEL

Gericht

SS Sturmabfuhrer Dr DILLENSPERGER

Schulen

SS Oberfuehrer Dr FISCHER

Adjutantur

SS Sturmabfuhrer SCHEIDLER

Art I

SS Oberfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei EHRLINGER

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Hauptsturmfuehrer ERGENZINGER

Gruppenleiter I A

SS Sturmabfuhrer WANNINGER

Gruppenleiter I B

SS Sturmabfuhrer ZIRPINS

Gruppenleiter I C

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer GSCHEWEND

I Militaerisches Personal

Oberstlt HUEBNER

Art II

SS Oberfuehrer SPACIL

Geschaeftsfuehrer

SS Sturmabfuhrer GRAETZ

Gruppenleiter II A

SS Sturmabfuhrer KREKLOW



ANNEX A

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

Ant: II (Continued)

Gruppenleiter II B

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr BERGMANN

Gruppenleiter II C

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer HAFKE

Ant III

SS Gruppenfuhrer und Genlt der Polizei OHLENDORF

Geschaeftsfuhrer

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer SCHAEFER

Gruppenleiter III A

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer HOEPPNER

Gruppenleiter III B

SS Standartenfuhrer Dr EHLICH

Gruppenleiter III C

SS Standartenfuhrer Dr SPENGLER

Gruppenleiter III D

SS standartenfuhrer SEIBERT

Gruppenleiter III G

SS Sturmbannfuhrer WEGENER

Ant IV

SS Gruppenfuhrer und Genlt der Polizei MUELLER

Geschaeftsfuhrer

SS Sturmbannfuhrer PIEPER

Gruppenleiter IV A

MUELLER

Gruppenleiter IV B

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer LISCHKA

Gruppenleiter IV C

SS Oberfuhrer und Oberst der Polizei SOMANN

ANNEX AINTERROGATION REPORT No 15Ant V

i V SS Oberfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei PANZINGER (i V: in Vertretung or deputy)

Geschäftsfuehrer

SS Sturmbannfuehrer KANT

Gruppenleiter V A

SS Standartenfuehrer und Oberst der Polizei WERNER

Gruppenleiter V B

SS Standartenfuehrer und Oberst WERNER

Gruppenleiter V C

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr SCHULZE

Gruppenleiter V D

SS Standartenfuehrer Dr ing HEES

Gruppenleiter V W1

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr FILBERT

Kriminalpolizei InstitutKriminalbiologisches InstitutAnt VI

SS Brigadefuehrer und Gennaj der Polizei SCHELLENBERG

Geschäftsfuehrer

SS Hauptsturmfuehrer HARTMANN

Gruppenleiter VI A

SS Standartenfuehrer Dr SANDBERGER

Gruppenleiter VI B

SS Standartenfuehrer STEIMLE

Gruppenleiter VI C

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer RAPP

Gruppenleiter VI D

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer Dr PAEFFGEN

Gruppenleiter VI E

SS Obersturmbannfuehrer WANECK

ANNEX A

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

Art VI (Continued)

Gruppenleiter VI F

Oberstlt BOENING

Gruppenleiter VI G

SS Sturmabfuhrer Dr KRALLERT

Gruppenleiter VI S

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer SKORZENY

Gruppenleiter VI VI T

SS Stenartenfuhrer Dr SCHMIED

Art MII

SCHELLENBERG

Geschaeftsfuhrer

HARTMANN

Abteilungschef MII A

SANDBERGER

Abteilungschef MII B

STEMLE

Abteilungschef MII C

Major i G OHLETZ

Abteilungschef MII D

SKORZENY

Abteilungschef MII E

Oberstlt BOENING

Abteilungschef MII F

Oberst i G BUNTROCK (Frontaufklaerungstruppen)

Abteilungschef MII G

BOENING (?)

Lehrregiment Kurfuerst

Major GERICKE

Sonderkommando Dora

Major GERICKE

ANNEX AINTERROGATION REPORT No 15Art VII

1 V SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr DITTEL

Geschäftsfuhrer

SS Untersturmfuhrer BRUEDELE

Gruppenleiter VII A

SS Sturmbannfuhrer BURMESTER

Gruppenleiter VII B

SS Sturmbannfuhrer MUEHLER

Gruppenleiter VII C

SS Sturmbannfuhrer RICHTER

Art N

SS Stenografenfuhrer SANSONI

Geschäftsfuhrer

SS Hauptsturmfuhrer MAUSOLF

Referent N/Fo

SS Sturmbannfuhrer WALTHER

Referent N/Fu

SS Hauptsturmfuhrer MARKS

Art Sanität

SS Obersturmbannfuhrer Dr STROHSCHNEIDER

Geschäftsfuhrer

SS Untersturmfuhrer SCHERZINGER

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ANNEX B

INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

Organization of Sicherheitspolizei and SD

Der Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD  
Adjutantur, Gericht, Attachegruppe, Schulungswesen

Reichssicherheitshauptamt  
Art I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, Mil, N, San

Befehlshaber (Inspekture) der  
Sicherheitspolizei und des SD

Kommandeure der Sicherheitspolizei  
und des SD

Stadtpolizei(leit)stellen  
Kriminalpolizei(leit)stellen  
SD - (Leit) Abschnitte

Aussenstellen der Stadtpolizei  
Aussenstellen der Kriminalpolizei  
Aussenstellen des SD  
Grenzpolizeikommissariate  
Grenzpolizeistellen

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ANNEX C

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Personality Index

- ACHMETELI, 38
- AUERSPERG, 30
- AUNER, 23
  
- BACKE, 17
- BERCHTOLD, 2
- BERGMANN, II
- BESEKOW, 41
- BEST, 5
- BEST (and STEVENS), 26
- BEYER, 20
- BICKLER, 30
- BOENING, 37, IV
- BOHLSCHWINGH, 23
- BORMANN, 15, 20, 47, 48
- BRAMFELDT, 41
- BRAUNE, 8
- BRUEDERLE, V
- BUERKNER, 49
- BUNTROCK, IV
- BURMESTER, V
  
- CANARIS, 27, 28, 49
  
- DAUFELDT, 30, 33
- DILLERSPERGER, 54, 58, I
- DISCHER, 55
- DITTEL, 52, V
  
- EHMANN, 43
- EHLICH, 14, II
- EHLINGER, 8, 9, 10, I
- ELLING, 35
- ERGENZINGER, I
  
- FAROSS, 37
- FEGELEIN, 46, 48
- FIGL, 37
- FILBERT, 22, 26, 28, III
- FISCHER, I
- FOELKERSAM, 42
- FREISLER, 11
- FREUND, 43, 44
- FUNK, 9, 17
  
- GAILANI, 32
- GAMOTHA, 32
- GENGENBACH, 10, 31
- GERN, 18
- GERICKE, IV
- GOEBBELS, 16, 20, 39, 47, 48
- GOERING, 2, 47, 48
- GOLTZ, 56
- GRAEFE, 24, 31, 33
  
- GRAETZ, I
- GROEBL, 25, 35
- GSCHWEND, I
  
- HAFKE, II
- HANSEN, 28, 49
- HARSTER, 35
- HARTMANN, III, IV
- HEESS, III
- HELM, 55
- HENGELHAUPT, 24, 31
- HEWEL, 9, 46, 48
- HEYDRICH, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 36, 45, 56
- HEYLER, 17
- HIMMLER, 2, 5, 6, 10, 11, 19, 21, 22, 30, 31, 33, 35, 39, 44, 45, 46, 48, 54, 58, 59
- HINDENBURG, I
- HITLER, 11, 19, 20, 24, 30, 35, 39, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48
- HOEPPNER, II
- HOETTL, I
- HOFFMANN, 56
- HOHLFELDER, 11
- HUEBNER, 9, I
- HUSSEINI, 32
  
- JOST, 4, 22, 23, 25, 26
  
- KALTENBRUNNER, 1, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 20, 27, 33, 34, 39, 42, 44, 45, 46, 47, 53, 56, 59
- KANT, III
- KAPPLER, 35, 55
- KIPLINSKI, 16
- KILLINGER, 56
- KLEINSTUEBBER, 28
- KNOCHEN, 44
- KRALLERT, 38, IV
- KREKLOW, I
- KRUEGER, 15
- KURATIS, 32
  
- LASSIG, 37
- LEO, 33
- LISCHKA, II
- LOOS, 43
- LUDORIC, 43
  
- MALZ, 56
- MARXS, 53, V
- MAUSOLF, V
- MAYER, 32
- MEHLHORN, 3

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## ANNEX C

## INTERROGATION REPORT No 15

## Personality Index (Continued)

HEISINGER, 24  
 METTERNICH, 1  
 MOLOTOV, 32  
 KOYZISCH, 31  
 MUEHLER, V  
 MUELLER, 21, 26, 27, II  
 MUSSOLINI, 35, 39

NELJOKS, 36

OHLENDORF, 17, 52, II  
 OHLETZ, 28, IV  
 OSHIMA, 33

PAEFFGEN, 33, III  
 PANZINGER, III  
 PARTL, IV  
 PIEPER, II  
 PRUETZMANN, 40

RADL, 41  
 RAPP, 33, III  
 REICHELT, 30  
 RIBBENTROP, 45, 47, 48  
 RICHTER, 56, V  
 ROEDER, 31, 46  
 RONCE, 37  
 ROOS, 30

SANIBENGER, 29, III, IV  
 SANSONI, 53, V  
 SCHAEFFNER, 37  
 SCHAEFER, II  
 SCHNEEL, 15  
 SCHEIDLER, 56, I  
 SCHELLENBERG, 9, 23, 26, 27, 28, 29,  
 30, 34, 38, 43, 47, 48,  
 49, III, IV

SCHENKER, 32  
 SCHERZINGER, V  
 SCHLEICHER, 1  
 SCHMIED, 43, IV  
 SCHMIEL, 41  
 SCHUBACK, 31  
 SCHULZ, 8  
 SCHULZE, III  
 SCHWARZ, 5  
 SCHWERN-KROSICK, 9  
 SEIBERT, 17, II  
 SIEPEN, 36, 37  
 SIX, 4, 8, 52  
 SKORZENY, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, IV

SOLLIN, II  
 SPACIL, 10, I  
 SPEER, 17  
 SPENGLER, 16, II  
 STELLE, 29, 30, III, IV  
 STECKENBACH, 4, 7, 8  
 STROHSCHWEIDER, 53, V

THIERACK, 11  
 TISO, 47

VRESENMAIER, 1  
 VOLLMEIER, 26

WAGNER, 46, 48  
 WALTHER, 53, V  
 WANDER, 1, 33, 34, 35, 42, III  
 WANNINGER, 8, I  
 WEGENER, 18, II  
 WEIRUCH, 32, 33  
 WEISSAECKER, 35  
 WELNER, III  
 WINSER, 56  
 WIRSING, 47  
 WOLF, 31  
 WOLFF, 58

ZEIDLER, 43  
 ZINDEL, 56, I  
 ZIRPINS, I

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THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

To understand the organization, missions, characteristics, operations, and general modus operandi of the Soviet intelligence system is to understand the dangers of the secret war waged against the West by the international Communist forces which seek to completely destroy the existing religious, social, economic, and political order. 50 years have passed since atheistic communism imposed itself on Russia by force, violence, and deceit, and one need only glance at a world map to see the spread of this totalitarian menace.

For over 20 years, this [redacted] has been engaged in positive intelligence or counterintelligence activities spanning four continents and 23 nations as part of a coordinated effort to halt the creeping spread of international Communism. A [redacted] of the U.S. Army's Career Intelligence Officer Course, various other intelligence courses, the U.S. Army Special Warfare School, including the Special Forces Course, Psychological Warfare Course, and the Counter-Insurgency Course, and other service schools, this [redacted] that this Special Study will enhance the reader's understanding of the deadly silent warfare now being increased against the Free World and Christian civilization.

MISSIONS OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

The intelligence and security arms of the Soviet Government are necessarily complicated and complex organizations which basically serve to protect and further the ambitious aims of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Soviet intelligence system is controlled by the CPSU Central Committee and carries out routine missions of overt and covert intelligence collection and processing; counterintelligence; assassination, abduction, terrorism and diversion; physical security of key Communists; population surveillance; and frontier and internal security of the Soviet Union. In addition, it maintains operational control over Satellite intelligence systems and maintains security control over Satellite armed forces.

ORGANIZATION OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM

Soviet intelligence and security agencies are often overlapping and interlocking in order to bring about maximum results and insure uninterrupted functioning. There are two primary organizations responsible for positive intelligence. The larger of these is the Committee for State Security

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(Komitet gosundarstvennoi bezopasnosti) which is commonly termed the KGB. The smaller of these is a component of the Soviet Army General Staff, the Main Intelligence Administration (Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravlenie), and is commonly termed the GRU. Both the KGB and the GRU engage in espionage operations throughout the Free World. The KGB also performs various security functions inside and outside the Soviet Union and is responsible to the Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the CPSU for its functions, which include the supervision and coordination of the 15 Republic Ministries of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del) which are commonly called Republic MVDs. To understand the fundamental operations of these organizations, it is necessary to examine the KGB and GRU in greater detail.

KGB ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

KGB Headquarters are located at Moscow's Dzerzhinsky Square, from where the activities of its 200,000 members are directed. This figure does not include mass-recruited agents serving the KGB in the West nor does it include KGB Border, Interior or Convoy Troops, nor Republic MVD personnel. All KGB cadre personnel are members of the CPSU and are subject to Party discipline.

The KGB "Centre" in Moscow is a multiple facility complex which includes some 8,000 KGB personnel, exclusive of KGB unit personnel of the Guards Directorate stationed in Moscow. It is the nerve centre of global espionage operations and a vast external and internal security apparatus. Here are located the various KGB directorates, special sections and service sections which direct and support its far-flung operations.

Operating under KGB Headquarters, which includes the KGB Chairman and the KGB Central Secretariat, are the Counter-intelligence Administration Directorate (KRU), Foreign Administration Directorate (INU), Main Administration for Military Counterintelligence Directorate (GUKR), Main Political Administration Directorate (GPU), Secret Political Administration Directorate (SPU), Main Economic Administration Directorate (EKU), Protection Directorate, Guards Directorate, Partisan Directorate, Main Administration of Border Troops Directorate (GUPVO), Main Administration of Convoy Troops Directorate (GUKV), Nuclear Security Directorate, Legal Bureau, Administrative Directorate, Operations Files and Archives Special Section, Technical Support Special Section, Illegal Documentation Special Section, Electronic Intercept Special Section, Censorship Special Section, Terror & Diversion Special Section, Communications Service Section, Personnel Service Section, Training Section, Transportation Section, Supply Section, Finance Section, and Administrative Service

- 2 -

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Section. A number of these KGB directorates and special sections warrant closer attention.

KGB COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ADMINISTRATION

Often referred to as the First Directorate of the KGB, the Counterintelligence Administration (Kontrrazvedyvatel'noye upravleniye) or KRU has as its mission the complete surveillance of Soviet society and Soviet personnel serving abroad. This directorate is subdivided into various functional sections which include the following: Foreigner surveillance Section (responsible for the surveillance of foreigners residing within the Soviet Union); Foreign Intelligence Agency Section (responsible for the study of every known foreign intelligence agency, including its modus operandi, organization, intelligence targets, and organizational strength and disposition); Provocations Operations Section (responsible for specific operations of provocation and confusion among counterintelligence services of non-Soviet bloc nations and for secretly financing various foreign Communist Parties and Communist sympathizer organizations for various associated agitprop activities); Background Investigations Section; and various other functional sections for the domestic surveillance of Soviet society. The KRU operates an efficient secret political police system throughout the Soviet Union. Mobile KRU teams often travel abroad to investigate foreign Communist Party security procedures and have, in many instances, dealt out punishment to erring Communist officials. X

KGB FOREIGN ADMINISTRATION

Often referred to as the Second Directorate of the KGB, the Foreign Administration (Inostrannoye upravleniye) or INU has as its mission the collection of foreign information of intelligence value, and has been active in foreign espionage since 1921 when it was initially organized as the Foreign Section of the CHEKA and took over certain foreign activities of the Comintern, which was organized in March, 1919.

Today, the INU gathers political, economic, scientific, transportation and telecommunications, sociological, military, naval and air intelligence in every single country in the world, including Soviet bloc nations. There is an intentional overlap in this collection effort with Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) of the Soviet Defence Ministry, which is responsible for the collection of foreign strategic military (including air and naval) intelligence. In order to carry out its many tasks, the INU in itself is a complex organization within the framework of the KGB.

The INU periodically undergoes minor organizational

changes. However, the basic structure has remained unchanged over the years. The INU is composed of two principal branches or "directions" (napravleniya). These are the Operations Branch and the Informations Branch. The Operations Branch is in charge of the collection aspect of the intelligence operations, whereas the Informations Branch is responsible for the production of intelligence from the information collected.

The INU Operations Branch includes the following sections:

- Western Hemisphere Section
- United Kingdom Section
- Austro-German Section
- Western European Section
- African Section
- Far, Middle, & Near Eastern Section
- Advisory Section
- Administration Section
- Émigré Section
- Delegations Section
- Merchant Marine Section
- Illegal Section
- Special Operations Section (Spatsburo)
- Scientific and Technical Intelligence Section
- Foreign Language Training Section
- Training Section

Each INU Operations Branch section is subdivided according to specific functions, with each subdivision having from 10 to 20 case officers plus administrative or clerical assistants. These subdivisions or departments undergo frequent organizational changes as missions or emphasis change. Of the above sections, the Western Hemisphere Section is the largest and consists of nearly 50% of INU Operations Branch personnel. The geographical sections are broken down into departments or "desks" for each nation within the region.

The African Section has undergone the greatest change and increase as Russia attempts to fill the power vacuum created by the voluntary termination of the colonial system. Personnel in this section are reported as follows:

- Section Director: S. P. Kozzarev
- Deputy Director: Colonel Beck Dumbadze
- Chief of Operations: Lt. Col. Karald Muut
- First Deputy: E. F. Podvigin
- Second Deputy: Major V. I. Strashev
- Staff Officers: V. Kumanov and V. Bank
- Director, Northwest Africa Department: J.A. Klimentov
- First Deputy: A. N. Brovkin
- Second Deputy: E. Kallos

Director, East Africa Department: V. A. Kiriev  
Director, Sudan Department: Y. Iakhim  
Deputy Director: Y. Siedliaczek.

(The above list may be slightly out of date.)

In recent months, the departments for Egypt, Algeria and Somalia have been enlarged. The Ghana Department has been reorganized. Also named in the African Section is A. I. Chukov, liaison officer with the Arab League, and V. Kozarev, another liaison officer. Legal or illegal resident agents are now positioned in most of the African nations. Ignaz Feld, a former German intelligence officer who entered Russian service following World War II, is reported to be a resident agent in the Congo (Leopoldville). The African Section is not only responsible for directing the collection of information, but is also responsible for the dissemination of current propaganda themes and for certain special operations.

The Informations Branch of the INU has been computerized. This INU Branch collates information from the INU collection media and produces from it useable intelligence which is published to using agencies. It produces special studies, and if any of its specialists need specific information from a particular nation these needs are forwarded from the Informations Branch to the Operations Branch as essential elements of information (EBI) and are put into the collection plan of the concerned department for dissemination to its agents abroad. The Informations Branch also provides the Operations Branch with background data, libraries, files etc. Soviet intelligence has placed great emphasis on its cybernetics system for processing data from all over the world. X

Missions of the INU include the following:

- (1) Collection of intelligence at the highest level;
- (2) Manufacture and dissemination of long-range propaganda;
- (3) Surveillance of Soviet citizens abroad (an overlap responsibility of the KRU);
- (4) Penetration with the intent to neutralize all anti-Soviet organizations (This mission dates from 1927 when Stalin launched a campaign against Trotskyite organizations abroad. Since 1956, however, most Trotskyite groups have rejoined the Soviet fold);
- (5) Coordinating intelligence efforts of other Soviet intelligence organizations.

In performing its fourth mission, the INU relies heavily upon its Emigré Section for infiltrating and disrupting anti-

Soviet émigré groups - primarily the ABN (Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations with headquarters in Munich) and the NTS (Union of Russian Solidarists with headquarters at Frankfurt-on-Main). Agents working for the KGB Special Section for Terror and Subversion have frequently worked on behalf of the Émigré Section in carrying out assassination, abduction, and other terror missions against the ABN and NTS. Resident KGB agents have been placed in the NTS and most components of the ABN for surveillance. As a consequence, the American CIA has counter-infiltrated those anti-Communist groups to ferret out the KGB agents.

Also in performing its further mission, the KGB has financed local Communist Parties and Front groups to assist in destroying the effectiveness of anti-Communist organizations and personalities through constant slander and defamation. Other organizations and publications sympathetic to Communism have received covert KGB funds to assist in silencing anti-Communist organizations.

Ironically, one American left wing organization which received covert KGB funds was also subsidized by the American CIA. This organization was the "Young People's Socialist League" (YPSL), which is a component of the International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY), which is the official youth group of the Socialist and Labour International (the Second International). Since the Socialist Party and its youth group, the YPSL, have joined forces with the Communist Party to demand an American capitulation in Vietnam, etc., it appears that the CIA plan to fight Communism with Socialism simply assisted the KGB plan to fight capitalism with socialism.

#### THE KGB MAIN ADMINISTRATION FOR MILITARY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Often referred to as the Third Directorate of the KGB, the Main Administration for Military Counterintelligence (Glavnoe Upravlenie Kontrrazvedki) or GUKR is responsible for maintaining the CPSU hold over the Soviet armed forces. The missions of the GUKR are the surveillance of the military establishment and military counterintelligence. GUKR personnel wear Soviet armed forces uniforms and have military rank, but they are KGB personnel. The GUKR is echeloned with the command and organizational system of the Soviet armed forces from the Soviet Defence Ministry down to company level, where a covert GUKR informer is maintained in every company or battery. At division and higher level, GUKR staff sections maintain unit surveillance, counterespionage, countersabotage, and counter-subversion groups. Complaint investigations in the Soviet

armed forces are carried out GUKR personnel. There is close cooperation between the KRU and GUKR. Both serve as effective tools for the CPSU Central Committee. The GUKR's World War II predecessor was SMERSH (Smert shpionan) - "Death to Spies."

#### THE MAIN POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

The Main Political Administration (Glavnoye Politicheskoye Upravleniye) or GPU is the political control arm of the CPSU within the Soviet armed forces. CPSU branches are organized in every company or squadron-strength unit within the Soviet armed forces. 90% of all officers and 82% of all members of the Soviet armed forces are members of the CPSU or the Komsomol - the Communist Youth League. At last count, there were 610,000 CPSU members and 90,000 CPSU candidates within the Soviet armed forces. Director of the GPU is Colonel General A. A. Yepishov.

A special corps of political officers exists under the control of the GPU, responsible for carrying out GPU objectives. These are known as zampolits and serve on the various military staffs as deputy commanders for political affairs. This system is the successor of the commissar system where the unit commissar had the final say over the unit commander. Most GPU officers are graduates of the Leningrad Military Political Academy.

The duty of the zampolit at regimental and battalion level is governed by regulations which put him subordinate to the unit commander but provide him with a separate political chain-of-command up the political hierarchy. His main task is directing the political education of all personnel of his unit. He reports not only to his unit commander but also to the chief of the higher echelon political section "on the political and moral conditions of the personnel, on measures carried out in the Party and political fields, and on the political and educational work effected in the unit." The Soviet Army training schedule calls for 90 minutes of political indoctrination per day. Off duty relaxation includes further indoctrination by indirect methods in unit "Lenin Rooms" where selected books and magazines disseminate anti-West propaganda and glorify Communism and the Soviet Union. A weekly armed forces television programme has now been added to the GPU indoctrination effort. Party branch reports within the unit are submitted to the next higher zampolit.

Political control in the Soviet armed forces is exercised through such posts with dual subordination to the military



commander and the main political directorate. Chiefs of the political administrations of the 18 military districts within the Soviet Union and the Groups of Soviet Forces abroad are directly subordinate to the GPU and are listed as agencies of the CPSU functioning in the Soviet armed forces.

THE KGB SECRET POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION

The Secret Political Administration performs a super surveillance function. This KGB directorate is commonly called the SPU (Secretno-Politicheskoe Upravleniye) and is organized into various functional sections which include the following:

- (1) The Clergy Section
- (2) The Intelligentsia Section
- (3) Government Employees Section
- (4) The Militia (Police) Section
- (5) The CPSU Membership Section
- (6) The KGB Section

These are surveillance sections and most can trace their origins back to the CHEKA. The SPU is the directorate which polices the KGB and carries out investigations for the Communist Party Control Commission.

The Clergy Section is directed by KGB Major General G. G. Karpov. Karpov is the "Chairman of the Council of Russian Orthodox Church Affairs in the USSR." His principal assistant is a KGB agent of long standing - the Metropolitan Nikolay. In Soviet Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church is a convenient tool of the KGB. No person in the USSR under the age of 16 is permitted to receive religious instruction, and religious instruction is permitted only in locations registered by the State and by priests registered by the State. All other religious instruction is prohibited by the Soviet Constitution and is considered as counterrevolutionary by the SPU. The most devout religious offenders are committed to mental institutions while others are sent to corrective labour camps.

THE KGB MAIN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION

The Main Economic Administration (Ekonomicheskoe Upravleniye) or EKA works closely with the State Planning Commission and performs the following tasks:

- (1) Study the key personnel of various economic enterprises and cause background investigations to be performed on them.
- (2) Inspect operations of the national economy at all levels to determine that the State plan is

being complied with.

- (3) Implementing various security surveys at industrial plants, communications facilities and research projects.
- (4) An assessment of Soviet economy from several viewpoints, including strategic vulnerabilities of the U.S.S.R. and the recommendation of compensating countermeasures.

#### THE KGB PROTECTION DIRECTORATE

The KGB Protection Directorate is also known as the Directorate for the Protection of Government Leaders and was founded in 1919 by Leon Trotsky as an aftermath of the attempted assassination of Lenin by Dora Kaplan. This Directorate is not only responsible for the physical security of key Soviet leaders, but is also responsible for surveillance to insure that they do not misbehave. This function is an overlap with the SPU. The surveillants are generally assigned as minor members of the entourage of the dignitary and from this position maintain observation. This Directorate also operates close with the CPSU Control Commission.

#### THE KGB GUARDS DIRECTORATE

The Guards Directorate is responsible for operating and safeguarding the buildings, houses, offices, commissaries, and the transportation used by key Soviet officials. It is also responsible for guarding meetings of the Central Committee CPSU, the Supreme Soviet, etc.

Headquarters of the Guards Directorate is at No. 2 Dzerzhinsky Square in Moscow. This is the KGB Headquarters Building - better known as Lubyanka Prison, which has a capacity for 200 prisoners in its basement cells. The last Guards Directorate commandant was KGB General Lenev, who was appointed by Khrushchev.

Total strength of the Guards Directorate is 16,170 officers and men. 2,350 of these are assigned to Kremlin duty in either a uniformed or plain clothes capacity. The Guards Directorate includes a uniformed Guard Battalion, a Special Service Regiment for various Kremlin duties, a service company, the Kremlin Pass Control and Communications Section, and separate Guards detachments for various duties, including escort protection.

In addition to operating the Lubyanka Prison, the Guards Directorate also has at its disposal the Lefortovo Prison and the Butyrskaya Prison, which are both in Moscow and which serve

the KGB. A special medical section operated a medical experimentation chamber at Lubyanka for testing drugs and poisons on humans, condemned to death sentences. Bodies were driven to a nearby crematorium also operated by the KGB. This chamber was ordered to be closed by Khrushchev.

THE KGB PARTISAN DIRECTORATE

The Partisan Directorate has existed since 1933 and came into prominence during World War II when the Partisan Command Headquarters in Moscow directed an elaborate and massive guerilla warfare effort behind German lines. Many of the wartime partisan leaders had been trained by the Partisan Directorate prior to the German invasion.

The Soviet interpretation of the word "partisan" includes all worldwide subversive activity throughout the non-Soviet world which furthers the goals of the Soviet-directed international Communist movement. A Communist Party member anywhere in the world is considered a partisan and may at any time be called upon to participate in some form of unconventional warfare. Special training in underground operations, guerilla warfare, psychological warfare, and escape and evasion is often given, or supervised, by the KGB Partisan Directorate. This Directorate plans for projected sabotage operations to be implemented in time of war.

A Partisan Directorate liaison group is stationed in Cuba to assist in special operations of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) which is active in training and dispatching Communist guerillas to Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and elsewhere.

Soviet General Jaroslav Valenkesky has been active in training Communist guerillas in Cuba and in Soviet technical assistance. General Alberto Bayo, recruited by the NKVD in 1940, has supervised much of this guerilla training and organized the primary guerilla warfare training school in Cuba. Bayo was a former officer of the regular Spanish Army who joined the Red cause during the Spanish civil war. During the later phases of that war, Bayo directed guerilla activities behind Nationalist lines and established a guerilla warfare school. Among his students was young Major Ramon Mercador, a member of the Spanish Communist Party, who joined the NKVD Special Section for Terror and Diversion at the end of that conflict. In 1940, Mercador (using the alias of Jacques Monard) assassinated Leon Trotsky in his villa outside Mexico City. Today, Mercador serves the KGB as an instructor.

Albert Bayo also went to Mexico on NKVD operations. He served as military adviser to the "Caribbean Legion" from 1947

to 1949. The Caribbean Legion was a Communist-controlled revolutionary armed organization which engaged in insurgency activities in several locations in Latin America. Its last furtive mission was launched against the Dominican Republic and ended in failure. In this operation, Fidel Castro served as a platoon leader.

In 1956, Albert Bayo was in charge of the Communist guerrilla warfare school outside Mexico City which trained Castro and "Che" Guevara and other Castro followers for the Cuban operation. Bayo was in covert communication with the KGB resident director in Mexico City during this time. After the Communist seizure of Cuba, Bayo joined Castro in Havana to form a new insurgent force known as CRAL - Revolutionary Commandos for Latin America.

The Partisan Directorate had hoped to utilize the services of Robert F. Williams for preparing insurgency operations in the Black Belt of America. However, the Negro renegade has remained stranded in Peking by the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" following his last visit to Red China.

New weapons in the form of partisan rucksack atomic demolitions (ADMs) have vastly increased the potential danger of the Partisan Directorate. The smallest of these comes in a single package 18" in length, weighing 70 lbs., with a nuclear yield of .10-KT (equivalent of 100 tons of TNT). Another standard partisan ADM comes in two packages with each weighing approximately 80-lbs. This larger partisan ADM is assembled in 25 minutes and has a yield of .5-KT (equivalent of 500 tons of TNT). Partisan ADMs are stored in Cuba.

Partisan ADMs can be carried through diplomatic pouches to Soviet or Satellite embassies and consulates throughout the world. They can also be smuggled ashore by small boats and carried in motor vehicles. Ports, harbours, airfields, large bridges, factories and military installations are especially vulnerable to partisan ADM placement.

Two World War II Soviet partisan leaders are still active in this field. One of these is General Kovpak - Russia's most successful partisan commander in the Second World War. The other is Lt. General Ponomarenko, who headed the Partisan Command from Moscow. Although Ponomarenko is listed as a "Lieutenant General of the Reserve" he wrote two articles on partisan warfare in 1966 for the Soviet Military Review.

Ironically, Intelligence  warned of the employment of Soviet ADMs 16 years ago when it warned of a secret Soviet plan to transport atomic bombs from Leningrad, Archangel, and

Odessa by submarines and merchant ships to places near their ultimate objectives in the U.S. and other countries, where they would be taken care of by special agencies. (Refer to Intelligence [redacted], May, 1951, p.p.15 & 16, "Secret News From the Soviet Union.")

Chemical and biological agents have also been prepared for employment by the Partisan Directorate in the event of a general war between the Warsaw Pact and the Free World. Since 1960, the KGB has placed an increased interest in the Communist Parties of the world in furthering its various covert operations.

KGB MAIN ADMINISTRATION FOR BORDER TROOPS

The Main Administration for Border Troops (Glavnoye Upravleniye Pogranichnykh Voysk), also known by its initials as the GUPV, has its headquarters in Moscow and is under the operational control of the KGB. This Directorate is considered extremely vital to Soviet security and it controls 200,000 border troops which patrol the lengthy frontier of the U.S.S.R. Assisting the KGB Border Troops are the Port Security sections and Coastal Troops, who together attempt to secure the 37,000 miles of Soviet frontiers, which include the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Arctic Ocean, and Soviet Pacific Ocean coastlines.

The border of the Soviet Union is divided into 17 border districts where the GUPV troop units are located. Assigned to these border districts are some 110 border detachments. Each border detachment numbers approximately 1,200 officers and men and is responsible for an area which extends from 60 to 300 miles, with a depth of from 30 to 90 miles back from the frontier. Each border detachment includes three border commands of about 350 troops each. The border command is subdivided into 5 line outposts (postavy), a reserve outpost, command headquarters and service and supply troops.

The line outpost may patrol an area from 3 to 13 miles in width and from 1 to 9 miles in depth. The line outpost numbers approximately 50 men organized into three rifle squads, a machinegun squad, a 4-man dog section, a 3-man signal group, a small service section, and the outpost command group. Patrolling may be done on foot, on horse, by motor vehicles, or by helicopters, depending on the terrain.

In the zone adjacent to the state frontier, various border defences are installed at the discretion of the border troop commanders. These defences differ in various locations, but all share certain similarities. Inside and along the frontier, one or two "control-tracking strips" are kept freshly ploughed and raked so that footprints of anyone

attempting to cross the border will be visible. Along the side of each strip is a narrow path for the border patrols. In terrain which favours illegal border crossings, various barriers are erected. These may include several rows of barbed wire, concealed pitfalls and traps, antipersonnel mines and trip flares and various alarm systems.

Border command and border detachment headquarters include mobile manoeuvre groups for use in emergencies. The border detachments attempt to maintain an informant system on both sides of the border, and when an illegal crossing is expected ambushes are established. At authorized border crossing points, the border troops are assigned to check identity documents and baggage of people crossing the Soviet borders legally.

The GUPV maintains its own schools for NCOs and officer candidates. GUPV officers receive advanced training at the Moscow Border School for Improvement of Officer Personnel. The activities of the legendary Lt. Colonel Frederick Bailey of British MI6, who operated in Tashkent, are used as a case study for border security at this school. Enlisted men of the Border Troops are conscripted and demobilized through the channels of the Ministry of Defence on the same basis as personnel of the Soviet armed forces. At the annual call up, GUPV representatives assigned to military commissariats select individual conscripts for the Border Troops. These conscripts are selected from the interior areas of the U.S.S.R. for security reasons.

#### KGB SPECIAL SECTION FOR TERROR & DIVERSION

This section has been known at various times and by various translations as "Special Bureau No. 1," "Special Section No.1," "Special Section No. 9," "Spetsburo," and as the "Executive Action Branch." It is a highly sensitive tool of Soviet state policy and is employed for assassinations, abductions, provocations, blackmail, and various other special KGB operations. The long arm of this Section has, at times, reached out into practically every nation in the West. The Special Section for Terror & Diversion is often employed to carry out death sentences against defecting KGB or GRU personnel.

KGB General Nikolay B. Rodin is the present Chief of the Special Section for Terror and Diversion. From 1953 to 1961, he served as a counsellor in the Soviet Embassy in London under the alias of Korovin and acted as the KGB case officer in handling George Blake and William John Vassall.

Operations of this Section date back to 1926 when the OGPU assassinated Symon Petlura - exiled President of the Ukraine National Republic and Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army. It continued operations against Leon Trotsky and his followers until Trotsky was finally assassinated by NKVD "Spetsburo" agent Ramon Mercador. The following year, General Walter Krivitsky was thrown from a window in a staged suicide by NKVD "Spetsburo" agents. In 1959, Stepan Bandera, leader of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), was murdered by a KGB Special Section agent who used a cyanide pistol. Two years earlier, this same KGB agent murdered Lev Rebet, a leading anti-Communist Ukrainian writer, using the same type of weapon, which left the victim appearing as have suffered from a fatal heart attack. Possibly 150 other deaths in West Germany were a result of other KGB Special Section agents using this same weapon.

Assassination is a delicate instrument of the highest level of Soviet foreign policy, and once decided upon is carefully planned, rehearsed, and executed through the KGB Special Section for Terror and Diversion or through a Soviet Satellite Security Service Special Section. Prior to Bandera's assassination by the KGB, the Czech STB Special Section had earlier attempted to kill him but failed.

This KGB Section uses a "camouflage technique" which is specifically calculated not only to kill its victim but also shift the blame for the killing to an individual or group hostile to the Soviet Union. This tactic is part of the old "divide-and-conquer" strategy.

The directed reaction of a KGB Special Section assassination is planned to neutralize another KGB target. This "blame shift" or "provocation" succeeded for two years in the case of Bandera. Some of his followers believed his murder was the act of West German intelligence, headed by General Gehlen, because Bandera refused to cooperate with the Bonn Administration. It was not confirmed as a KGB act until the defection of KGB Special Section agent Bohdan Stashynsky in 1961. After the assassination, KGB Chairman Sholepin (since succeeded by Semichastny) personally awarded Stashynsky the "Order of the Red Banner."

The Special Section "camouflage technique" uses careful "cover stories," "cover story documents," "cover story witness corroboration," environmental blending of the assassination plan, including the choice of weapon to fit the cover story, "blame shift" factors, contingency plans, and an elaborate escape plan. Normally the assassination is carried out as "the act of a single individual." This modus operandi was exemplified by the assassination of Trotsky.

The assassination of President Kennedy by Lee Harvey Oswald and Oswald's death at the hands of Jack Ruby, the man who later died from "quick-spreading cancer", fits into the KGB Special Section modus operandi quite well, although there is no concrete evidence yet available to support the theory of a KGB or Cuban GDI involvement. Both Khrushchev and Castro held grievances against the American President. Castro believed that Kennedy desired his (Castro's) assassination and Khrushchev was bitter over a worldwide loss of face due to his October, 1962, missile backdown in Cuba. Both Castro and Khrushchev gave in easily to fits of temper and either could have ordered his respective execution branch into action.

When possible, the Special Section for Terror and Diversion prefers abductions to outright assassination. When possible, the killings are made to appear as accidental deaths, suicides or natural deaths.

SOVIET REPUBLIC MINISTRIES OF THE INTERIOR

In March, 1960, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh Del) or MVD was dissolved as a union-republic type ministry. Today it exists as a series of ministries, one for each of the Soviet Socialist Republics. These republic MVDs are under KGB supervision and perform important internal security functions.

As of July 1, 1966, the population in the U.S.S.R. listed at 233,200,000. Of these people, 126,300,000 lived in urban areas and 106,900,000 lived in rural areas. 75% of the population has been born since October, 1917. The 15 republic MVDs have as their principal tasks the responsibility of keeping these people under the control of the CPSU.

The Soviet Union is the largest country in the world by area and the third largest by population. Its population consists of approximately 180 distinct ethnic groups, speaking 125 different languages and dialects, and worshipping in 40 different religions. This is a major control problem for the one-party dictatorship which has existed for the past 50 years.

The republic MVD plays a vital role in domestic intelligence and security for the KGB and CPSU. Components of republic MVDs include the following:

Main Administration of Militia (Glavnoye upravleniye militsii) or GUM, which administrates the urban and rural police throughout the republic. The GUM is the local muscle of the Soviet police state.

Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps and Labour Settlements (Glavnoye upravleniye ispravitel'no-trudovykh



lagerei i truposelenii) or GULAG still plays an important part in Soviet life, and over 5,000,000 Soviet citizens plus hundreds of foreigners are inmates of GULAG doing hard labour on an official daily ration of 2,600 calories. Although Soviet concentration camps are not as crowded today as in Stalin's time, they are just as numerous. In war situations, the KGB handle prisoners-of-war and many of these end up in the GULAG system. Of the 250,000 Germans who surrendered at Stalingrad, only 5,000 have returned to Germany as of January, 1967.

Main Administration for Internal Troops (Glavnoye upravleniye vnutrennykh voisk) or the GUVV direct the various MVD internal troops to maintain the internal stability of the régime and to put down local uprisings or mass strikes or riots which GUM cannot handle. Interior troops are organized into divisions and regiments somewhat similar to those of the Soviet Army. Various specialized interior troops perform the following special functions:

- (1) Convoy Troops: Convoy Troops are responsible for guarding prisoners in transit between prisons and labour camps, for deportees, and for shipments of strategic materials, such as uranium ore and gold. Certain Convoy Troop operations are controlled at KGB level by the GUKV.
- (2) Special Guard Troops: These troops guard corrective labour camps and various strategic industrial and transport facilities.

Main Administration of Fire Protection (Glavnoye upravleniye pozharnoi okhrany) or GUPO is responsible for fire protection and firefighting throughout the republic.

Russian colonialism had been unpopular with many of the states now encompassed in the USSR. Even before the Communist takeover in November, 1917, many of the peoples within the official Russian boundary were demanding self-determination and decried the Russian expansionism which had taken their lands by force. Now, with 50 years of Communism added to this, there is considerable dissatisfaction within the vast boundaries of the U.S.S.R. The sparks of freedom still burn strongly. It is for this reason that the CPSU must maintain a tight grip on its subjects and that the KGB attempts to silence anti-Communist émigré groups such as the NTS and ABN.

Massive Communist indoctrination over the past fifty years has eradicated much of the religious life which once engulfed Russian society; but yet Soviet security officials are constantly plagued by clandestine or covert religious groups and publications which circulate readily throughout the USSR. Economically, Communism has proved to be a failure and

Socialism, as practised, has taken on capitalistic features. Politically, more people within the USSR are growing restless with the one-party system. The cracks are growing.

GRU ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS

The GRU is the Main Intelligence Administration of the Soviet Army General Staff and is responsible for the collection, processing and dissemination of strategic, operational and tactical intelligence for the Soviet armed forces. At the strategic level, the GRU maintains a vast intelligence network around the globe which involves a high percentage of espionage activities.

Chief of the GRU is General Ivan A. Serov, who has been in this position since January, 1959. Prior to his assignment to this position, Serov was Chairman of the KGB from 1956 through 1958 when he was replaced by Shelopin. General Serov was a Deputy Director of the MVD under Beria until Beria's liquidation. He then served as a deputy under Kruglov until he replaced him as Chairman of the KGB. There are a number of indications that Serov will soon be replaced as Chief of the GRU.

GRU organization is as follows:

1st Directorate - Illegals; Directorate Chief was reported to be Rear Admiral L. K. Bekrenov by Colonel Oleg Penkovsky in 1961. In 1962, Bekrenov was assigned to the U.S.A. as the Soviet Naval Attache. After Penkovsky was arrested in 1963, Bekrenov was recalled to Moscow. A single communications room of this directorate is assigned to the U.S.A. where three radio operators are employed 24 hours per day. The 1st Directorate coordinates and directs GRU illegal nets around the world.

2nd Directorate - Strategic Intelligence for European Countries; Chief, Major General Aleksey A. Konovalov. A separate section or desk exists for each country.

3rd Directorate - Strategic Intelligence for Anglo-American Countries; Chief, Major General V. S. Sokolov. A separate desk or section exists for each country of North and South America and for Great Britain.

4th Directorate - Strategic Intelligence for Middle East and Far East Countries; Chief, Major General P. P. Melkisev.

Directorate for Strategic Intelligence for African Countries Chief, Naval Captain Ivliyev. This is a comparatively recent directorate.

25-429/2-90

5th Directorate - Diversion and Sabotage; Chief, Major General Mikhail A. Kochetkov. Although other directorates of the GRU have undergone numerical redesignation from time to time, the 5th Directorate has maintained its functional identity for over 30 years. Many of its duties overlap those of the KGB Special Section for Terror and Diversion.

6th Directorate - Operations Directorate for Military District Intelligence Posts. This directorate coordinates and supervises intelligence posts (RPs) in Soviet military districts bordering on foreign countries. These posts operate external type illegal nets in adjacent countries.

Information Directorate - This computerized directorate evaluates, interprets, publishes, and disseminates intelligence received from abroad, from Satellite agencies, and from Soviet armed forces component subdivisions of the GRU. It also maintains an intelligence library. Major General N. A. Korenevsky is Directorate Chief.

The next organizational level below the GRU directorates comprises the GRU operations sections. These operations sections include the following:

Scientific-Technical Intelligence Section; Chief, Major General Sheliganov.

Section for the Countries of the People's Democracies.

Communications Section; Chief, Major Serobryakov.

Foreign Relations Section; Chief, Major General Mikhail S. Maslov.

GRU service sections include the following: Communications and Radio Intelligence; Organizational Section (Deception); Archives Section; Personnel Section; Administration & Supply Section; and the Training School Section.

Below the GRU General Staff level are the Soviet armed forces component staff intelligence sections of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army, Strategic Rocket Forces, Anti-air Defense Forces, Naval Forces, and the Soviet Army Ground Forces. Below this level are the intelligence staff sections of Groups of Soviet Forces, military districts, and armies.

#### BACAGROUND OF THE GRU

Dating back to February 23, 1918, when Leon Trotsky created the Red Army, the GRU has had a stormy career in which it has undergone many changes. Originally, it was termed the Registration Department of the Red Army. It next became the Second Bureau of the General Staff. Then another reorganization followed and it became the Fourth Department

of the General Staff. Following this, it was later re-designated the Seventh Department. Finally, it was designated the Main Intelligence Administration of the General Staff.

Soviet Naval Intelligence became a separate intelligence agency in 1940, however, after World War II, it again merged with the GRU. Today, the component intelligence sections of the Soviet armed forces carry out wide-scale strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence activities for their own needs. These activities are, of course, supervised and coordinated by the GRU as part of its normal general staff function. The vast number of Soviet trawlers on intelligence assignments are controlled by the Soviet Naval Forces Intelligence Section. Soviet surveillance satellites which circle the globe for photo reconnaissance are handled by the Strategic Rocket Forces Staff Intelligence Section and resulting intelligence is disseminated to the staff intelligence section of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army for use in its missile-armed strategic bomber force, and to other sections.

The "Father" of the GRU is General Jan Berzin, who organized this section into an efficient intelligence organization and headed it for 15 years until he fell before an NKVD firing squad during the Great Purge of the thirties. In its early period, the GRU had to rely on intelligence agents of the Third Communist International who often performed their espionage assignments in an unsatisfactory manner. By the late twenties, however, the GRU produced its own well trained agents for assignment abroad.

Considerable rivalry has always existed between the GRU and the KGB in the execution of strategic intelligence assignments abroad. The GRU main area of interest in strategic intelligence is armed forces intelligence and related fields, whereas the KGB strategic intelligence interest is generally centred on political and economic intelligence fields. There is an overlap between the two services in their respective collection effort. Both services engage in espionage. In the field of scientific and technical intelligence, the KGB and GRU intentionally overlap their respective intelligence targeting and penetration. In one official Soviet agency, the State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research Work, officers of both the KGB and GRU jointly staff its key positions. Of the two services, however, the KGB has the upper hand, since it maintains the security of the GRU through its GUKR, and all personnel of the GRU must receive a background investigation by the KGB before they are assigned to General Staff or intelligence functions.

GRU DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES

Approximately 95% of the strategic intelligence gathered abroad by the GRU is collected by overt means by Soviet and Satellite military, naval, and air attachés working through the diplomatic corps. Soviet attaché personnel are trained at the Military Diplomatic Academy in Moscow, which is headed by Major General V. Y. Khlopov. These personnel are also required to attend the GRU Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages. Communist military attachés and their assistants are trained in the techniques of field and static strategic intelligence collection and in methods of agent handling. Soviet Naval Captain Yevgeni Ivanof, Naval Attaché to Britain and GRU officer, was a graduate of this Academy. He arranged the affair involving War Minister John Profumo and Christine Keeler.

The GRU "Centre" in Moscow provides guidance in the collection of strategic information to its attachés abroad. These collection operations are normally legal in nature. The remaining 5% of strategic intelligence gathered abroad by the GRU is obtained by overt or clandestine means through various guises which normally avoid entangling Soviet military, naval, or air attachés, per se. There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule. It is standard procedure, however, for attaché personnel to obtain the necessary information for the efficient operations of covert information collection carried out illegally by the GRU and KGB.

SOVIET SATELLITE INTELLIGENCE

The intelligence services of Satellite countries are organized and function along the same pattern as the Soviet intelligence system. Again, parallel collection agencies are directed by both the respective state security organ and the Defence Ministry general staff. The Satellite intelligence services work in close liaison with the KGB and GRU and are under the security surveillance of the KGB. Often when a productive espionage network is developed by Satellite intelligence, the KGB or GRU moves in and takes over. Many of the key officials of the Satellite intelligence agencies had earlier been employed by the MVD or NKVD and still maintain Soviet citizenship. Intelligence training schools are similar in doctrine and subject matter to the Soviet system and often employ Soviet instructors.

Polish intelligence maintains both legal and illegal nets in Britain, Germany, and France and operates a legal net in New York and another legal net in Washington, D.C. It constantly seeks recruits from émigré Poles. 400,000

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Polish émigrés live in France and Poland maintains a rather extensive network in that nation. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Polish intelligence operates an external network from an intelligence post in Berlin. Recently, Polish Border Troops have been transferred from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defence.

Czech intelligence carries out active intelligence operations in West Germany from an external net with headquarters at Prague. It also is active in Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium. The overall direction of Czech intelligence is from STB (Ministry of the Interior) headquarters in Prague where all espionage operations of Czech intelligence are coordinated and supervised.

East Germany maintains espionage activities in West Germany, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Africa, where it has intelligence posts and covert training schools in several countries. It employs thousands of mass-recruited agents in espionage operations directed against American and other NATO forces stationed in West Germany. It is estimated that the SSD employs 8,000 agents against the West in Berlin alone. The ADN (Allgemeine Deutsche Nachrichten Agentur) Press Agency serves as a secret espionage agency which serves both the SSD and GRU. East German Border Troops have also been transferred to the Army.

Rumanian and Bulgarian intelligence agencies are active in the Balkans, with Greece being the key area of interest. Turkey is also within their area of activity.

#### SOVIET ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Espionage operations, in Soviet terminology, are of two types - legal and illegal. A legal operation is one in which the net director has diplomatic immunity. Espionage operations carried out by such a net are, of course, a violation of the law. A legal net provides protection from arrest to the director in the event of compromise, and its communications are relatively secure since the diplomatic pouch may be used. An illegal net is one in which the net director does not have diplomatic immunity. He is subject to arrest and prosecution for his espionage activities. An illegal net operates clandestinely and has its own communications with the KGB or GRU "Centre" in Moscow. An illegal net is less vulnerable to surveillance and can function in wartime or when the USSR has no diplomatic recognition in a country.

From the standpoint of geographic control, nets are classified as internal or external. An internal net is one in which the net director and his sources are residents in

the target country. In an external net, the net director resides outside the target country but his sources are inside. Because the director is beyond the legal jurisdiction of the target country, such a net is generally more secure and less vulnerable to complete compromise. The GRU has placed heavy emphasis on developing external nets and internal illegal nets so that it can continue its primary mission of strategic intelligence production in time of war.

#### SOVIET AGENT SYSTEMS

Agent systems used by the GRU and KGB include the individual agent, echelon, and cell systems. An individual agent usually operates alone, although he may have a courier or "cut-out" or a radio operator to service him. Individual agent classification includes the following types:

- (1) Penetration agents who reside in a target country and have access to information of value to the USSR. Such agents are often recruited in place through various methods.
- (2) Mass-recruited agents who are low-level, poorly trained, and who collect low-level information - usually unclassified. This type of agent does not normally operate as an individual agent, more often as a member of a cell type or echelon type legal or illegal net.
- (3) Provocation agents are used to provoke Western intelligence agencies into courses of action which will benefit the Communist cause, such as defaming key anti-Communist officials. They may also serve to confuse Western agencies.
- (4) Sleeper agents are individuals recruited for espionage, sabotage, or provocation who are usually not used for a long period of time after recruitment.

Individual agent systems are often handled by Soviet case officers with diplomatic immunity who conceal their KGB or GRU status under the cover of a menial diplomatic assignment. Penetration agents in key scientific positions or military staff positions are the most valuable individual agents.

An echelon net system may vary considerably in structure. Only the director and the superiors in Moscow know the identity of all the members. Code names are used by all members, and contact is made by the person above with the person or persons below. Net members are not aware of the identity of other members of the same echelon. This type of net is preferred

for both legal and illegal operations by the KGB and GRU.

In the cell net system most members know one another and are able to communicate freely among themselves. Contact from the members to the net leader is permitted. This type of net organization facilitates speed in operation, but it is extremely vulnerable to complete compromise. Nets, just as agents, may be placed on a "sleeper" basis.

The Soviet intelligence system employs the principle of multiple penetration against intelligence targets by using two or more separate nets against the same target. For vital targets, both the KGB and GRU may employ a variety of legal and illegal nets to secure a common objective.

Nets and individual agents may be used for area coverage or general surveillance or they may be used for specific target coverage or penetration. The guidance and centralized control comes from Moscow. Recruitment of an espionage agent must first be approved by the Moscow "Centre." This is also true with adoption of communications methods, informant meeting systems, financial disbursements, contacts with legal representations in a target nation, training of informants, meetings with couriers, methods of accomplishing espionage, and disposal of informants or other agents. Target coverage is outlined at the Moscow level and the curtailment of target coverage or selection of new targets must be approved by the respective KGB or GRU "Centre" in Moscow.

#### SOVIET INTELLIGENCE METHODS OF OPERATION

Both legal and illegal Soviet espionage operations require high-level access to classified information guarded by the West. To achieve this, the KGB or GRU resident agent or case officer has been well trained in the special techniques for "in place" recruitment of nationals who have access to such information. This recruitment is done on the basis of either greed, fear, or Communist ideology. Once such recruitment is approved by Moscow and carried out, the new recruit is inculcated with the principle of security and is thoroughly trained in various security methods. As many levers as possible are used to keep the agent under the complete control of his case officer or net leader. This is usually done through both the principle of fear and the "incentive system" of payments.

Illegal net operations are especially hazardous. Colonel Rudolf Abel operated an illegal internal echelon-type KGB net in America from 1948 to June, 1957, when he was arrested. Richard Sorge operated an illegal internal cell type GRU net in China and later in Japan until he was arrested and executed.



These cases made headlines. In reality, less than 10% of Soviet illegal espionage operations have ever been compromised.

Legal type operations by the Communists have a much worse record of compromise. For a period of time, there were so many legal KGB espionage operations being uncovered by the FBI and other security agencies, which were directed from United Nations headquarters in New York under Soviet diplomatic immunity, that former CIA Director Allen Dulles made an off-the-cuff remark that the "Soviets are using the United Nations as a training school for KGB espionage agents." Such operations do, however, pay excellent results, as exemplified by the recent arrest and sentencing of Lt. Colonel Jack Whalen, who passed top secret information to a GRU case officer in Washington, D.C. Whalen was recruited "in place" while he was serving as an intelligence officer on the U.S. Joint Chiefs-of-Staff in the Pentagon.

#### SOVIET ESPIONAGE NET COMMUNICATIONS

Couriers are important in both legal and illegal operations. Diplomatic couriers are vital to legal operations. Illegal operations make use of two types of radio communications to supplement courier systems. One involves the familiar clandestine type radio transmitter and receiver which is commonly used by GRU illegal nets. These are subject to interception and location by radio direction finders. The other type radio system is called the "one way radio" and is simply the use of an ordinary short-wave radio through which the agent receives instructions from Moscow or his control headquarters in ciphered texts, ordinary song broadcasts, or announcements with a veiled meaning known only to Moscow and the recipient. Colonel Abel tape-recorded the messages he received from Moscow for easier deciphering. Messages from the agent to his handlers are sent through a system of couriers, dead letter drops or mail, either in secret writing or in microdots.

#### A TYPICAL MOSCOW ESPIONAGE DIRECTIVE

KGB and GRU agents enter their target country through a wide variety of means, including diplomatic cover assignments, TASS, Aeroflot, Amtorg, student exchanges, cultural exchanges, trade delegations, United Nations cover assignments, forged papers, passing as refugees, immigrants, illegal border crossing, clandestine sea or air infiltration and by other means. Once their arrival is safely made, the agents carefully go about their business under the direction of the Moscow "Centre."

Typical of the directives sent out from Moscow to various KGB legal nets was the following guidance which pertained to American intelligence and counterintelligence in general terms. A portion of the directive read as follows:

"In order to expose and suppress the subversive activities of the American intelligence and counterintelligence organizations against the Soviet, we request you to begin the systematic collection of information in accordance with the following questionnaire.

1. Location and the names of the intelligence or counterintelligence organizations of the American intelligence and schools, their functions, structure, personnel, and practical activities.
2. Form and methods of work of the intelligence organization (agent cadres, methods of recruitment and training of agents, equipment, cover stories, tasks, documentation of cover stories, places and means of transferring of agents, channels of penetration into the Soviet and Peoples Democracies, methods of contacts with agents, etc.)
3. Coordination of activities of the intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, names and functions of the coordinating organization; and its personnel.
4. Training of agent cadres in America and in other capitalist countries, the availability of schools for training saboteurs and terrorists, methods of transferring agents into the Soviet and the Peoples Democracies.
5. Training of cadre intelligence workers (schools, their names, addresses, procedure for enrolment, training programme).
6. Data about the use made by the American intelligence of refugees, émigré organizations, former cadres of German and Japanese intelligence services in intelligence work against the Soviet and the Peoples Democracies.
7. Data concerning official collaborators and technical workers of intelligence and counterintelligence organizations and schools (the position occupied, the nature of the work carried out, nationality, citizenship, family status, financial standing, home address, way of life, personal qualities and inclinations, traits of character, political views, connections, distinguishing marks, etc.).

8. Locations of intelligence organizations and schools (exact address and description of location), layout of rooms, entrances, windows, tables, safes and other depositories of secret documents in buildings occupied by an intelligence organization. (It is desirable for a plan to be drawn.)
9. The security system of the buildings of the intelligence organization (plan of disposition of guard posts), means of communication of the intelligence organization (numbers and disposition of telephones, presence of special signalling apparatus, radio stations, etc.), types and numbers of motor cars used by intelligence workers.
10. Data concerning secret meeting houses (addresses, description of location, internal layout) and their proprietors.
11. Data concerning drivers, boilermen, office cleaners, waiters, and other staff serving the intelligence organization and its employees.
12. Data concerning the principal foreign centres and secret sections of intelligence organizations of America, names and personality details of their chiefs, staff and personnel of these intelligence centres.
13. Data concerning the organization of contacts with intelligence sections and agents (mail, storage, use of agent ciphers, methods of protection, personal and impersonal contact, secret hiding places for documents, etc.).
14. Data concerning tasks set by American intelligence organizations to their secret sections and agents abroad as regards the acquisition of information concerning the Soviet and Peoples Democracies.
15. Data concerning the coordination of the activities of the American intelligence with the intelligence organizations of other countries. Notify us about the information acquired by you."

This directive was sent by couriers in diplomatic pouches. Other directives are sent by the KGB communications section. This Section has also been referred to as the Special Radio Section (Osobyi Radio Division) or ORD. It operates a number of short-wave transmitters near Moscow. One is located on the Leninskiye Gory and the local ORD office was camouflaged as a gold research institute.

## OTHER DIRECTIVES

This ~~document~~ has in ~~its~~ possession and available to ~~Intelligence~~ Service, photostat copies of secret transmissions from the intelligence section (Second Division) of the Polish Army General Staff to the Polish Military Attaché in Washington, D.C., in which guidance was issued for the collection of strategic information by covert means and for the formation of a clandestine intelligence network involving echelon type nets. This particular Attaché held certain hostilities to Communism and was persuaded to defect to the West. It is assumed that his successor complied in varying degrees with the original directives. These directives emphasized security in recruiting informants and in the necessity of testing the new recruits as to accuracy and as to reliability before employing them in actual collection operations. Above all, it was emphasized that all forms of haste should be avoided in conducting covert espionage operations.

ASSISTANCE FROM THE  
COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE WORLD

The Soviet intelligence system and those of its satellites are aided in many ways by the various Communist Parties of the world. Although Soviet espionage agents normally avoid all overt Communist organizations and known Communist, the Communist Party and its members are useful in many ways to Soviet intelligence. The spotting of potential agents, collection of unclassified information, providing legal assistance and evasion means, carrying out pro-Soviet agitation and propaganda assignments, and engaging in acts of provocation to discredit opponents are some of the contributions to Soviet intelligence by Communist Party members. Underground or covert members of the Communist Party are of still greater value. Those in key political or economic positions can sway policies to pro-Soviet courses of action or they can deliberately sabotage anti-Communist policies. Communist sympathizers in labour, government, religion, industry, communications, or entertainment fields are often used as propaganda key communicators to transmit Communist propaganda to the masses in a less odious form. It is from the Communist sympathizer element that Soviet bloc intelligence draws most of its mass-recruited agents.

Where one finds the Communist Party, illegal Soviet espionage operations are usually in motion along its periphery. The following table illustrates the hard core strength of the global Communist movement.

## MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THE WORLD

## Communist Countries

Red China	...	...	...	17,600,000
Soviet Union	...	...	...	12,300,000
Czechoslovakia	...	...	...	1,580,000
Soviet Zone of Germany	...	...	...	1,610,000
North Korea	...	...	...	1,311,500
Poland	...	...	...	1,123,000
Yugoslavia	...	...	...	1,000,000
Rumania	...	...	...	875,000
Bulgaria	...	...	...	506,000
Hungary	...	...	...	511,565
North Vietnam	...	...	...	600,000
Albania	...	...	...	53,000
Mongolia	...	...	...	46,000
Cuba	...	...	...	60,000

## Countries of Europe

Austria	...	...	...	50,000
Belgium	...	...	...	11,000
Denmark	...	...	...	5,000
Finland	...	...	...	45,000
France	...	...	...	240,000
West Germany (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	50,000
Britain	...	...	...	33,000
Greece (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	20,000
Iceland	...	...	...	950
Italy	...	...	...	1,791,000
Luxembourg	...	...	...	500
Netherlands	...	...	...	12,000
Norway	...	...	...	4,700
Portugal (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	2,000
Spain (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	5,000
Sweden	...	...	...	25,000
Switzerland	...	...	...	6,000
Ireland	...	...	...	100

## Countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia

Burma	...	...	...	5,000
Cambodia	...	...	...	1,000
Ceylon	...	...	...	3,500
India	...	...	...	150,000
Indonesia (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	2,000,000
Japan	...	...	...	100,000
Laos	...	...	...	100
Malaysia (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	400

Nepal	...	...	...	3,000
Pakistan (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	3,500
Philippines (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	1,500
Thailand (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	5,000

Countries of North America

United States	...	...	...	12,600
Canada	...	...	...	3,700

Countries of Australasia

Australia	...	...	...	5,800
New Zealand	...	...	...	500

Countries of Latin America

Argentina	...	...	...	45,000
Bolivia	...	...	...	6,000
Brazil	...	...	...	30,000
Guiana	...	...	...	11,000
Chile	...	...	...	22,000
Colombia	...	...	...	9,000
Costa Rica (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	300
Ecuador	...	...	...	2,500
Venezuela	...	...	...	30,000
Guadeloupe & Martinique	...	...	...	1,700
Guatemala (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	1,000
Honduras (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	1,500
Mexico	...	...	...	5,000
Nicaragua (CP is outlawed)	...	...	...	200
Panama	...	...	...	350
Peru	...	...	...	9,000
Uruguay	...	...	...	4,500

Countries of Africa

Algeria	...	...	...	5,000
Morocco	...	...	...	1,000
Tunisia	...	...	...	1,000
Sudan	...	...	...	1,500

Countries not listed have no organized formal Communist Party or have Party membership (overt) of less than 100.

COMMUNIST PARTY COORDINATION

Soviet control and coordination of foreign Communist Parties are achieved through a complex system which includes

both overt and covert means. Soviet Embassies are known to have arranged for the travel and training of Free World Communists inside the Soviet Bloc and to have investigated security and other problems in the local Communist Party, primarily for the benefit of Moscow. Both KGB and GRU representatives under diplomatic cover are known to have contacted local Communist Party officials for the coordination of intelligence collection activities. In Prague, Czechoslovakia, liaison groups from more than 20 Communist parties from the Free World form part of the headquarters staff of the pro-Soviet international Communist movement which receives directives and guidelines from the Central Committee of the CPSU. It is in Prague where the Soviet-controlled publication "Problems of Peace and Socialism" is published monthly in 19 different languages. Trainees from over 25 Communist Parties in the Free World are now undergoing training in Russia. Many of these will provide important services for the KGB, GRU, and Satellite intelligence services.

COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

International and national Communist front organizations perform a vital role for the Soviet intelligence system. Front organizations provide the power to implement Party objectives. These groups have been effectively used to stage massive "peace" demonstrations, engage in racial agitation and propaganda, ferment strikes and riots, and to undermine the Free World's social, economic, and political structure. Communist-dominated labour unions have engaged in economic sabotage and industrial espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. Through Communist or Communist-controlled organizations, the hands of the KGB now reach into 137 countries.

SOVIET BLOC INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

Intelligence training of KGB and GRU personnel is a vast undertaking which involves considerable time and numerous schools. The KGB and republic MVDs operate over 200 schools for intelligence, security and specialist training. Similar training is undertaken by the Warsaw Pact nations and is supervised by KGB personnel.

GRU agent and specialist training is conducted under the auspices of the Soviet Ministry of Defence. GRU staff officers are normally graduates of the Frunze Military Academy and sometimes graduates of the Voroshilov Higher Military Academy. Intelligence specialist training is given at several different schools. Training in operational and tactical intelligence is given at the various echelon levels of the Soviet armed forces. Troop training schools

at division and regimental level are conducted on tactical intelligence and reconnaissance.

This [redacted] expresses his thanks to Major General Richard Hilton, D.S.O., M.C., D.F.C., for some of the information related herein regarding Soviet intelligence training. General Hilton was former British Military Attaché in Moscow and has served as a consultant for Intelligence [redacted]. The following list of schools indicates the scope of training undertaken by the Soviet intelligence system.

COMMUNIST TRAINING SCHOOLS

KGB Higher School, on Bolshoy Kiseelny Street in Moscow, trains career KGB officers;

GUKR Training School, on Stanislavskaya Street in Moscow, trains counterintelligence officers and NCOs for duty with the Soviet armed forces. Upon graduation, these men will be assigned to Soviet Army units but remain an integral component of the KGB;

Kuchino KGB Training School, outside Moscow, has trained members assigned to the Terror and Diversion Special Section of the KGB;

Tugachev GRU Special Section Training School, near Kiev, has trained selected GRU special agents in the techniques of assassination, abduction, and other specialized liquidation;

Leningrad Espionage School conducts an 18-month course for 30 students per class for foreign espionage assignments;

Moscow Espionage School conducts a 36-month course for 50 students per class for foreign espionage assignments;

OBZ School (Obranne Zpravodajstvi), in Prague, Czechoslovakia, trains both O.B.Z. personnel and Soviet GRU agents. This school includes Soviet instructor personnel and KGB security agents;

Prague S.T.B. School is modelled after the KGB Higher School and trains personnel in the service of the KGB as well as Czech S.T.B. personnel;

Warsaw Intelligence School conducts a two-year course in positive and security intelligence along KGB lines for Polish intelligence specialists;

Berlin-Kaulsdorf Special School for Women Agents conducts courses lasting 12 weeks for mass-recruited female agents of the SSD, KGB, and GRU. Frequently these women do not know the exact agency they are working for. Some graduates have been quite successful.



Ladebow Maritime Sabotage School, in East Berlin, specializes in maritime espionage and sabotage;

Marin Sabotage School, in East Germany, trains 120 students per class for a three-month period. Courses include shipping sabotage, aircraft sabotage, and radar systems sabotage;

Sonderschule Gross-Dolln, in East Germany, trains 40 young students per class for political and intelligence work in West Germany for the East German SSD;

Sonderschulungsstätte Hartenstein, in Saxony, East Germany, is operated jointly by the KGB and SSD to train 100 students per class in espionage, sabotage, and partisan warfare. Most of these low-level, mass-recruited East German agents have a Frei Deutsches Jugend (FDJ) background.

Jugendhochschule Wilhelm Pieck, in East Germany, is a basic intelligence school operated jointly by the KGB and SSD for training intelligence and security service candidates.

GRU Moscow Sabotage School is located in a Moscow suburb. Courses last three months and each class numbers 200 students. The school was organized by General Shtemenko, former Chief of the GRU.

There are still in the service of the KGB and GRU today many agents who graduated from the older courses at the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, the Lenin School of Political Warfare, the Moscow University or the Far Eastern University before the newer intelligence schools were created.

#### TYPICAL INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL CURRICULUM

An Intelligence ~~observer~~ observer has ~~possession~~ possession secret student notes from the Leninrad Espionage School which provide interesting information on Soviet espionage training. The 18-month course includes 2,913 hours of instruction subdivided into general subjects (697 hours), military science (392 hours), and special subjects (1,824 hours).

General subjects include: mathematics, chemistry, physics, drawing and sketching (55 hours), geography (45 hours), refresher foreign language course (103 hours), foreign economy (49 hours), political education (200 hours), and foreign literature (75 hours).

Military science instruction pertains primarily to foreign armed forces-organization, armament, equipment, miscellaneous data, doctrine, and biographical information of key leaders.

Special subjects include: topography, terrain intelligence, map reading and sketching (300 hours); intelligence photography (70 hours); radio procedure; demolitions training; intelligence training, including collection of information, press surveillance, visual recognition and identification of armed forces elements, methods of observation, intelligence surveillance, radio intelligence, and intelligence processing (280 hours); use of women, alcohol and drugs; cartographic and photostatic intelligence; communications transmission including secret notes and signs on maps, invisible inks, and invisible notes on plain glass (57 hours); document security (35 hours); overseas intelligence communications, including use of consulates and diplomatic missions, etc. (37 hours); memory training (75 hours); agent recruiting and training (70 hours); counterespionage, including security procedures, trial conduct, and prison escape methods (150 hours); organization and conduct of espionage rings (85 hours); agitation and propaganda operations (40 hours); evasion and survival (30 hours); parachute training (40 hours); target country customs and environment (375 hours); medical training (65 hours), which includes the use of drugs and poisons; and "How to Return" including both legal and illegal methods of returning to Soviet territory (45 hours).

Students and instructors use cover names during the training to prevent possible future compromise. The mission of this training is to provide professional agents capable of performing as efficient "legal" or "illegal" net resident directors. A large percentage of the Moscow and Leningrad graduates replace key agents who have been in position for considerable time.

LANGUAGE TRAINING

Soviet-born KGB or GRU officials being assigned outside Soviet Union borders are required to have completed courses in the language of their assigned nation. These lengthy courses are taken either at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages or at the KGB-operated Leningrad Institute of Foreign Languages.

TRAINING MANUALS

Numerous classified training manuals and instruction booklets are produced for Soviet intelligence and security training. Two standard KGB manuals for training GUKR and GRU personnel are entitled "Orientation on Central Intelligence Organs of the U.S.A." and "Concerning the Activities of U.S. Intelligence Services in Western Europe."

For combined language and intelligence training of the GRU, the Soviet Defence Ministry's Military Publishing House prints numerous technical manuals on various aspects of foreign armed forces in Russian, English, French, German, Spanish and other languages. It also produces the monthly periodical "Military Notes From Around the World" in several languages.

SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ABBREVIATIONS

- CHEKA ..... Chrezvychainaya komissiya po bor'be s kontrrevolyutsiei i sabotazhen (Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage)
- EKU ..... Glavnoye ekonomicheskoye upravleniye (Main Economic Administration)
- GUM ..... Glavnoye upravleniye militsii (Main Administration of Militia)
- GPU ..... Gosudarstvennoye politicheskoye upravleniye (State Political Administration)
- GUGB ..... Glavnoye upravleniye gosudarstvennoye bezopasnosti (Main Administration for State Security)
- GULAG ..... Glavnoye upravleniye ispravitel-no-trudorvykh lagerei i trudposelenii (Main Administration of Corrective Labour Camps and Labour Settlements)
- GUKR ..... Glavnoye upravleniye kontrrazvedyvatel'noye upravleniye (Main Administration for Military Counterintelligence)
- GRU ..... Glavnoye razvedyvatel'noye upravleniye (Main Intelligence Administration)
- GUPO ..... Glavnoye upravleniye pozharnoi okhrany (Main Administration of Fire Protection)
- INU ..... Inostrannoye upravleniye (Foreign Administration)
- KGB ..... Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti (Committee for State Security)
- KRU ..... Kontrrazvedyvatel'noye upravleniye (Counter-intelligence Administration)
- MGB ..... Ministerstvo gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti (Ministry for State Security)
- MPVO ..... Glavnoye upravleniye mestnoi protivovozdushnoi oborony (Main Administration of Local Air Defence)

25-429/2-107

MVD	.....	Ministerstvo vnutrennykh del (Ministry of Internal Affairs)
NKGB	.....	Narodnyy komissariat gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti (People's Commissariat of State Security)
NKVD	.....	Narodnyy komissariat vnutrennykh del (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs)
OO	.....	Osobye otdely (Special Sections)
PS	.....	Pervoye spetsupravleniye (Special Administration of the KGB)
SMERSH	.....	Smert shpionam ("Death to Spies")
SPU	.....	Glavnoye sekretno-politicheskoye upravleniye (Secret Political Administration)
UKV	.....	Upravleniye konvoynykh voisk (Administration of Convoy Troops)
UPV	.....	Upravleniye pogranichnykh voisk (Administration of Border Troops)
VVO	.....	Voiska vnutrennei okhrany (Interior Troops)

#### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

The Oprichina: The first secret police recorded in Russian history, the society of secret guards, was formed by Ivan the Terrible to consolidate his power over the boyars of Moscow between 1565 and 1572.

The Okhrana: The second Russian secret police organization was created by Czar Nicholas the First in 1830 and lasted until the fall of the Romanov dynasty in March 1917.

The CHEKA: Formed by the direction of Lenin on December 20, 1917, and headed by Felix Dzerzhinsky, the CHEKA changed its name in March, 1921.

The GPU: In March, 1921, Lenin declared the establishment of the New Economic Policy and the old CHEKA merely changed names to help rid itself of a bloody and terroristic reputation.

The OGPU: In 1923, in connection with the ratification of the Stalin Constitution of 1924, and the formation of the USSR out of the four constituent Soviet Socialist Republics of that time, the GPU became the OGPU (Ob'edinyonnoe Gosudarstvennoe Politicheskoe Upravleniye - United State Political Administration). In 1926, Dzerzhinsky died and was replaced by V.R.Menzhinski. In 1934, the functions of the OGPU were transferred to the newly created Soviet

government's NKVD and continued to function as the Main Administration for State Security - GUGB.

The NKVD: After being accepted into the League of Nations, Stalin created the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) and the ill-famed OGPU underwent a name change to improve the image of the Soviet Union. Menzhinski died in May, 1934, and was succeeded by his deputy, Genrikh Yagoda.

NKVD - NKGB: Yagoda was replaced by Yezhov in 1936 and the mass liquidations of the Great Purge were set into motion. In February, 1941, the NKVD was split into two independent and distinct organizations with the forming of the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB). With the invasion of Russia by Germany in June, 1941, the NKGB was incorporated into the NKVD.

NKVD: From June, 1941, until the Spring of 1943, the NKVD functioned as a single organization and the NKGB again became known as the GUGB.

The NKVD - NKGB: With the war becoming more favourable, Stalin again split the NKVD. The NKGB became responsible for high-level state security and intelligence, with the exception of military intelligence. The NKVD remained responsible for low-level security functions, specifically those associated with police work and concentration camp administration.

The MVD - MGB: In March, 1946, the Soviet government changed names of its security and intelligence organs. The term "People's Commissariat" became "Ministry" and the NKVD was now the MVD and the NKGB became the MGB. All functions remained the same. This name change occurred in order to once again psychologically improve the image of the Soviet Union - particularly among the "United Nations."

The MVD: In March, 1953, the MVD - MGB were merged into one Ministry - the MVD, as a result of Stalin's death. Lavrenti P. Beria headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). Also at the time, the Ministry of the Army and the Ministry of the Navy, with their two separate intelligence agencies, were merged into the Ministry of National Defence (MO) with a consolidated Main Intelligence Administration (GRU) responsible for military and naval intelligence. Beria was soon liquidated. Colonel-General Sergei Kruglov replaced Beria as the new MVD head.

The MVD - KGB: On April 27, 1954, the MVD was split into the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The functions of the two agencies were generally similar to those of the old MVD and MGB. In 1956, Kruglov was succeeded by Serov.

The KGB: On March 2, 1960, Khrushchev announced the

liquidation of the MVD at the Council of Ministers level. There no longer existed an All Union Ministry of Internal Affairs. There still exist, however, fifteen republic Ministries of Internal Affairs which function as internal security organs, for each of the fifteen so-called republics. These fifteen republic ministries perform normal police (GUM) functions, fire defence (GUPO), forced labour camp administration (GULAG), and suppress all riots, demonstrations, or disorders. All fifteen groups are under the jurisdictional control of the KGB. Shelepin replaced Serov as chairman of the KGB and was, in turn, succeeded by Senichastny. KGB personnel are considered "civilians", although they have military rank and often wear uniforms while engaged in non-covert duties.


The GRU: Completely separate from the KGB, the GRU provides military, air, and naval intelligence for the Soviet Defence Ministry. The KGB, however, provides for military counter-intelligence throughout the various echelons of the Soviet Armed Forces through its GUKR. General Ivan Serov, a former NKVD and MVD career officer, is director of the GRU. He was given this position as a reward for his part in the ouster of Beria.




ORGANIZATION CHART OF THE KGB

Chairman & Central Secretariat


KGB DIRECTORATES




KGB DIRECTORATES (Continued)




KGB DIRECTORATES (Continued)



KGB SPECIAL SECTIONS




KGB SERVICE SECTIONS



UGB's - Regional or Soviet Socialist Republic level KGB echelon

OGB's - Local level or state security sections of the KGB Oblasts, Krays, urban and rural Rayons

MVD'S of the 15 Soviet Socialist Republics under KGB operational control



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8990 BAD AUSSEE, den 25. Juli 1972

DIE ENTZIEHUNG DES JUDISCHEN VERMÖGENS IN UNGARN IN DER ZEIT VOM 19. MÄRZ 1944 BIS ZUR BESETZUNG UNGARNS DURCH DIE ROTE ARMEE.

Die Massnahmen zur Entziehung des jüdischen Vermögens in Ungarn nach dem 19. März 1944 erscheinen nur verständlich, wenn man die deutsche aber auch die ungarische Situation vor diesem Zeitpunkt kennt. Eine entscheidende Rolle spielte dabei, wie auch sonst, die persönliche Einstellung Hitlers zur gesamten Frage. Dieser hatte ursprünglich grosse Sympathien für Ungarn. Für ihn waren sie die Nachfahren jenes asiatischen Reitervolkes, das einst Mitteleuropa in Angst und Schrecken versetzt hatte, um später selbst zu einem Vorkämpfer des Abendlandes aus dem Osten zu werden. Auch durch seine extreme Abneigung gegen die Habsburger fühlte sich Hitler mit dem Magyarentum verbunden, das er, sehr zu Unrecht, noch immer von dem antihabsburgischen Ressentiment der Revolution des Jahres 1848 beseelt glaubte. Der konsequente Kurs der ungarischen Aussenpolitik seit 1918, der dem Friedensvertrag von Trianon die Formel "Nem, nem soha" ("Nein, nein niemals") entgegensetzte und immer danach handelte, erregte Hitlers Bewunderung, ebenso wie der Sturz der kommunistischen Räteregierung 1919 und die scharfe antibolschewistische Politik der Rassenschützbewegung des Ministerpräsidenten Gyula von Gömbös, dem er nie vergessen hatte, dass es der erste Staatsmann war, der 1934 die anfängliche aussenpolitische Isolierung des nationalsozialistischen Regimes durchbrochen hatte. Dagegen empfand Hitler von Anfang an tiefstes Misstrauen gegen den ungarischen Reichsverweser Nikolaus von Horthy, den er wegen seiner Vergangenheit als österreichisch-ungarischer Admiral, seiner anglophilen Haltung und seiner angeblichen judenfreundlichen Einstellung ablehnte. Wenn Hitler also den Gebietsvergrösserungen Ungarns 1939 und 1940, sowie 1941 zustimmte, so geschah dies ausschliesslich aus Erwägungen taktischer Natur, für die führenden ungarischen Staatsmänner nach dem Tode Gömbös' hatte er keinerlei Sympathien. So muss also die Lage zu Jahresbeginn 1944 gesehen werden.

Hitler war weit misstrauischer als das Deutsche Auswärtige Amt, dessen Vertreter in Budapest weitgehend dem Charme dieser Stadt und seiner Menschen erlegen waren und dementsprechend positiv berichteten, was die ungarische Führung anlangt. Auch der deutsche militärische Geheimdienst berichtete eher positiv, wiewohl es klar war, dass das ungarische Heer nach der Katastrophe der 1. Ungarischen Armee am Don nicht nur schwer angeschlagen, sondern ausgesprochen kriegsmüde war. Die Ausrüstung war einfach nicht entsprechend, zweifellos auch nicht der Nachschub aus Deutschland. So ist es zu verstehen, dass sich in der ungarischen Bevölkerung sehr rasch der Wunsch nach einem Frieden breit machte, notfalls auch nach einem Frieden um jeden Preis. Die Verhandlungen um einen solchen begannen schon Anfang 1943, die wichtigsten Kontaktstellen waren die ungarischen diplomatischen Vertretungen in Stockholm, Bern, Lissabon und Ankara. Es handelte sich dabei aber nicht etwa um Einzelaktionen gegen die offizielle Regierungspolitik. Die treibende Kraft war vielmehr der damalige ungarische Ministerpräsident Mi-

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klós von Kállay, aber eine ganz entscheidende Rolle spielte als dessen Berater der ehemalige langjährige Ministerpräsident Graf István Bethlen. Auch Horthy wusste von diesen Anknüpfungsversuchen und deckte sie. Er wurde ständig über die Lage unterrichtet. Der technische Teil lag beim ungarischen Geheimdienst, der naturgemäss die besten Möglichkeiten hatte, derartige Verbindungen zur Feindseite zu halten. Daran waren sowohl der Chef der Staatssicherheitszentrale, also der politischen Geheimpolizei, Generalmajor István Ujszászy als auch der Chef des militärischen Geheimdienstes (Abteilung II im Honvedgeneralstab) Oberst Gyula Kádár beteiligt. Sämtliche dieser Persönlichkeiten waren auf Grund ihrer Abstammung und ihrer ganzen Einstellung nach auf einen Sonderfrieden mit den Westmächten eingestellt; Äusserungen von Persönlichkeiten, wie Churchill und Eden, die ja von der Adria her über Ungarn einen Riegel gegen das Vordringen der Roten Armee nach Mitteleuropa schaffen wollten, ermunterten sie in ihren Bestrebungen.

Über alle diese Verhandlungen war der deutsche politische Geheimdienst von Anfang an weitgehend unterrichtet, teilweise durch befreundete Offiziere im ungarischen Geheimdienst, teilweise durch Funküberwachung. Die Berichte der zuständigen Stellen dieses Amtes fanden bei Hitler volles Verständnis, ja noch mehr, er hielt diese Berichte eher für zurückhaltend und beauftragte sofort den deutschen Generalstab alle erforderlichen Massnahmen für den Fall eines Kriegsaustrittes Ungarns zu treffen. Dieser Plan erhielt den Decknamen "Unternehmen Margarete I" (Eine ähnliche Aktion wurde unter dem Decknamen Margarete II für den Fall eines Kriegsaustrittes Rumaniens vorbereitet). Bestärkt wurde Hitler in seinem Misstrauen durch Berichte eines Sonderbeauftragten des Auswärtigen Amtes, Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer - des nachmaligen Gesandten nach dem 19.3.1944 - der auch schon 1943 zu ähnlichen Ergebnissen wie der deutsche politische Auslandsgeheimdienst gekommen war, d.h. dass Ungarn alles versuchen würde, um einen Sonderfrieden zu erreichen.

Als dann im März 1944 ein Oberst des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes OSS (Office of Strategic Services) Florimond Duke über Ungarn mit dem Fallschirm absprang, um Verhandlungen mit Beauftragten der Regierung aufzunehmen, schlug der deutsche Geheimdienst, der von Anfang an über diese Kontakte unterrichtet war, zu. Die amerikanische Delegation wurde festgenommen, und Hitler hatte endlich den Anlass einzugreifen. Im letzten Augenblick gelang es dem Unterzeichneten eine Abmilderung des ursprünglichen Planes "Margarete I" zu erreichen, obwohl Himmler die Weiterreichung des diesbezüglichen Memorandums an Hitler mit der Begründung abgelehnt hatte, dass schon alle Befehle erteilt worden seien. Hitler entzog sich aber nicht dem Argument, dass die vorgesehene Beteiligung von rumänischen und slowakischen Truppen bei einer Besetzung Ungarns durch die deutsche Wehrmacht eine Katastrophe und zweifellos den sofortigen Kriegsaustritt Ungarns bedeuten würde. Unterlagen über diese Planänderung sind in den historischen Archiven vorhanden und wurden erstmals durch den Krumej-Hunscheprozess in Frankfurt bekannt. So kam es dann zu dem "Blumenfeldzug vom 19. März 1944". Die einmarschierenden deutschen Truppen wurden von der ungarischen Bevölkerung begeistert empfangen, in der Hoffnung, dass damit die Gefahr einer russischen Besetzung gebannt wäre. Diese Abänderung des ursprünglichen Planes "Margarete I" zu einer abgemilderten Form ist für die

Entziehung des jüdischen Vermögens in Ungarn von entscheidender Bedeutung, denn die Scheinsouveränität, die von deutscher Seite Ungarn zugestanden wurde - statt der ursprünglich geplanten Besetzung - verleitet häufig zu der Auffassung, dass es sich bei Ungarn in der Zeit vom 19. März 1944 bis Kriegsende um einen wirklich souveränen Staat gehandelt habe, was vielleicht formell völkerrechtlich, jedoch tatsächlich innenpolitisch in keiner Weise zutrif. Bezeichnenderweise wurden die ursprünglichen Pläne, was den deutschen Polizeieinsatz anlangt, im Gegensatz zu den militärischen und verwaltungsmässigen überhaupt nicht geändert. Wiewohl keine Militärverwaltung, gab es also in Ungarn vom 19. März 1944 an einen "Höheren SS- u. Polizeiführer", einen "Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD" und einen "Befehlshaber der Ordnungspolizei" mit ihren nachgeordneten Dienststellen (Kommandeure der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD bzw. der Ordnungspolizei) genau so wie im Reichsgebiet oder in den besetzten Gebieten, während man in den verbündeten Ländern, wie in Rumänien und in Italien (bis zum Kriegsausritt durch die Badoglio-Regierung) lediglich Polizeiattachés hatte. Die neue faschistische Regierung von Saló könnte am ehesten als Parallelfall zu Ungarn herangezogen werden. Wiewohl offiziell Verbündeter und Achsenpartner Deutschlands, noch dazu mit der Hypothek der persönlichen Freundschaft Hitlers zu Mussolini belastet - also ganz im Gegensatz zu dem Misstrauensverhältnis Hitlers gegenüber Horthy - gab es ab September 1944 in Italien gleichfalls einen "Höchsten SS- und Polizeiführer" (der "Höchste" war nur eine Konzession an Himmlers langjährigen Chef des persönlichen Stabes, Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff) mit den nachgeordneten Polizeidienststellen, also Befehlshaber und Kommandeure der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD bzw. der Ordnungspolizei, aber auch Vertretungen anderer SS-Hauptämter. Trotzdem existierte auch weiterhin die deutsche Gesandtschaft, noch dazu mit einem sehr bedeutenden und starken Missionschef, dem Botschafter Dr. Rudolf Rahn. Ein Unterschied in der Behandlung Italiens und Ungarns durch Deutschland in dieser Zeit bestand allerdings darin, dass die Judenfrage in Italien kaum eine Rolle spielte, da dieser Bevölkerungsteil ganz unbedeutend war und auch weitgehend den Schutz der übrigen Italiener und der einflussreichen katholischen Kirche genoss. Selbstverständlich waren aber auch die Vertreter dieses "souveränen Staates" und "Achsenpartners" Italien genau so wenig wie jene Ungarns in der Lage, antijüdische Massnahmen, einschliesslich von Beschlagnahmeaktionen jüdischen Vermögens, durch deutsche SS- und Polizeidienststellen zu verhindern.

Nun soll das aber nicht bedeuten, dass die ungarische Regierung zu allen antijüdischen Massnahmen gezwungen wurde - ganz im Gegenteil gab es in diesem Lande Kräfte, die noch radikaler in ihrer Einstellung gegen die Juden waren als in Deutschland. Was die Ungarn aber nicht wollten, war die Beschlagnahme jüdischen Eigentums durch deutsche Dienststellen und eben zugunsten Deutschlands. Ihre Zustimmung erfolgte daher meist nur unter Druck, vielfach auch nur stillschweigend, also als ob davon keine Kenntnis bestanden hätte. Auch diese ungarische Haltung war sehr differenziert und lässt sich nur aus der Sicht von damals verstehen.

Wie so häufig in der Aussenpolitik des Dritten Reiches, gab es auch damals die verschiedensten Auffassungen über die einzuschlagende Politik in Ungarn, was schon bei der Personalpolitik begann. Der designierte Gesandte in Budapest, Dr. Edmund Veessenmayer, schlug Béla von Imrédy als neuen Regierungschef vor, der wenige Jahre vorher bereits Ministerpräsident gewesen war. Dieser jedoch lehnte ab, weil er wusste, dass Horthy seiner Kandidatur niemals zustimmen würde. Dass Hitler nicht auf Imrédy bestand, ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass die Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP inzwischen festgestellt hatte, dass dieser ein Vierteljude war. Die eigentlichen Parteikreise schlugen den Führer der ideologisch verwandten Pfeilkreuzlerpartei, Ferenc Szálasi, vor und der deutsche politische Auslandsgeheimdienst schliesslich den angesehenen Generalobersten Jenő Rátz, der im Hinblick auf die schwierige militärische Lage ein Kabinett der "nationalen Einigung" mit allen Kräften von der Mitte bis zur Rechten bilden sollte, auch mit Imrédy, aber ohne Szálasi, von dem bekannt war, dass er geistig nicht normal war. Hitler entschied sich aber ganz anders. Durch den Einfluss des Chefs des Reichssicherheitshauptamtes, Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunners, wurde der ungarische Gesandte in Berlin, General Döme Sztójay, Horthy als neuer Regierungschef aufgezwungen, den dieser naturgemäss noch lieber ernannte als Imrédy und Rátz, mit denen er seit langer Zeit restlos verfeindet war. Sztójay - und damit Ungarn - mussten diese von deutscher Seite erzwungene Ministerpräsidentenschaft in verschiedener Hinsicht schwer bezahlen, nicht zuletzt auch durch die antijüdischen Massnahmen und im Rahmen dieser auch in der Entziehung des jüdischen Vermögens durch deutsche Dienststellen. Selbst die zuständigen ungarischen Staatssekretäre im Innenministerium (László Baký für die Polizei, László Endre für jüdische Angelegenheiten) waren mit den deutschen Massnahmen bei der Entziehung des jüdischen Vermögens zugunsten Deutschlands nicht einverstanden, konnten sich aber dagegen nicht wehren, da sie ihre Posten ausschliesslich der deutschen Intervention bei Horthy verdankten. Auch bei Sztójay fanden sie keine Unterstützung, da dieser gleichermassen seine Stelle als Regierungschef einer deutschen Intervention verdankte und sich darüber hinaus auch Kaltenbrunner persönlich verpflichtet hatte, die antijüdischen deutschen Massnahmen nicht zu stören. Man kann die Regierungszeit Sztójay als erste Etappe in den antijüdischen Massnahmen, und damit eingeschlossen der Entziehung jüdischen Vermögens in Ungarn, durch deutsche - vornehmlich SS - Dienststellen bezeichnen.

Die zweite Etappe war die Regierungszeit des Generalobersten Géza Lakatos. Dieser hatte Sztójay abgelöst, als Horthy durch die Ereignisse in Rumänien (Absetzung des Staatsoberhaupts Marschall Antonescu und Kriegsausritt) und seine Friedensfühler zur Überzeugung gekommen war, dass auch Ungarn sich schleunigst von Deutschland trennen müsste. In der Regierungszeit von Lakatos (vom 26. August bis zum 16. Oktober 1944) gab es keine "stillschweigende Duldung" von Entziehungsmassnahmen ungarischen jüdischen Vermögens durch deutsche Dienststellen, was aber nicht bedeutet, dass alle diese plötzlich eingestellt worden wären. Manche liefen noch eine zeitlang weiter, es gab auch richtiggehende deutsche Übergriffe, d.h. dass man sich über ausdrückliche ungarische Wünsche und Verbote hinwegsetzte.

Die Etappe 3 begann mit der Machtübernahme von Szálasi und seiner

extrem nationalistischen Pfeilkreuzlerpartei und dem - erzwungenen - Rücktritt von Horthy am 16. Oktober 1944. Szálasi war praktisch durch einen Putsch mit deutscher Hilfe an die Macht gekommen. (Gegen den Willen und Widerstand des Vertreters des deutschen Geheimdienstes in Ungarn!) Szálasi befand sich praktisch in der gleichen Lage wie Sztójay, nur dass er noch stärker in der deutschen Abhängigkeit war, insonderheit von der SS und Polizei. Der Putsch vom 16. Oktober 1944 war ja von Szálasi in Zusammenarbeit mit Vertretern der deutschen Gesandtschaft, des Höheren SS- und Polizeiführers (Schutzpolizeimajor Kurt Krumholz) und anderer SS- und Polizeidienststellen in Ungarn vorbereitet worden, wobei der eigentliche ungarische Einsatzleiter, der ehemalige Major Emil Kowarcz, der SS bzw. dem SD besonders verpflichtet war, da er als Flüchtling vor dem 19.3.1944 in Wien, deren Gastfreundschaft genossen hatte. An sich waren Szálasi, Kowarcz und die anderen höheren Pfeilkreuzlerführer in der Judenfrage weit radikaler als Sztójay und seine Minister, aber sie wollten, wie diese, nicht zusehen, dass die ungarischen jüdischen Vermögenswerte durch die deutschen SS- und Polizeidienststellen beschlagnahmt und ausser Landes geschafft wurden. Durch ihre Abhängigkeit gerade aber von jenen SS- und Polizeidienststellen, denen sie ihre Macht verdankten, waren sie noch weit abhängiger als Sztójay. Diese Abhängigkeit wurde ihnen von deutscher Seite häufig sehr drastisch vor Augen geführt, ganz besonders vom Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Ungarn, Dr. Geschke, der aus dem "Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren" kam und die dortigen Verhältnisse automatisch mit den ungarischen gleichsetzte. Erst nach der Absetzung Geschkes durch den Chef des RSHA Dr. Kaltenbrunner, die der Unterzeichnete viel zu spät durchsetzen konnte, hörte dieses Willkürregime einigermaßen auf, dafür gab es aber auch keine zentrale Gewalt mehr, so dass der Nachfolger Geschkes, der frühere Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei und des SD in Frankreich, SS-Standartenführer Dr. Helmut Knochen, sein Amt praktisch gar nicht mehr antreten konnte.

Die sogenannte Räumungsaktion, festgelegt in dem Veessenmayer-Szakvary-Abkommen vom 14. November 1944, hat die Beschlagnahmeaktionen der SS- und Polizeidienststellen praktisch kaum beeinflusst. Die wichtigsten Punkte dieses Vertrages waren, dass jede Evakuierung des Beschlusses und der Zustimmung des ungarischen Industrieministeriums bedurfte, die Eigentumsverhältnisse durch die Übersiedlung nicht verändert werden und schliesslich die Räumung nur mit Zustimmung des Eigentümers erfolgen sollte. Nun waren aber diese Eigentümer, soweit es sich um Juden handelte, entweder bereits in einem deutschen Vernichtungslager gestorben bzw. in einem KZ eventuell noch am Leben, oder aber "untergetaucht" und damit natürlich nicht handlungsfähig. Für die Beschlagnahmeaktionen jüdischen Vermögens durch die SS hatte also dieses Räumungsabkommen keine Relevanz. Ähnliches gilt für die ungarische "Verfallsverordnung" vom 3.11.1944, mit der das Verfügungsrecht über ungarisches jüdisches Vermögen auf den ungarischen Staat übergegangen war. Diese Verordnung kam auf Betreiben von einigen Personen aus der Umgebung von Szálasi zustande, die damit ihre Parteigänger wegen der allgemein kritisierten Beschlagnahmeaktionen - und vor allem den sofortigen Abtransport nach Deutschland - durch die "verbündete" SS be-

ruhigen wollten. (Bezeichnenderweise hielten sich z.B. Minister Kowarcz und Innenminister Gábor Vajna, die die eigentlichen Machtverhältnisse der SS und Polizei gegenüber am besten einschätzen konnten, aus dieser Auseinandersetzung innerhalb der Pfeilkreuzlerpartei gänzlich heraus.)


Um das deutsch-ungarische Verhältnis vom März 1944 bis Kriegsende verstehen zu können, muss man die Entwicklung an Ort und Stelle miterlebt haben, einschliesslich auch der Vorgeschichte der Ereignisse, die zur Regierungsübernahme von Sztójay geführt hatten. Durch die Abmilderung des Planes "Margarete I", der für die militärische Besetzung Ungarns vorbereitet worden war, wurde die Fiktion einer ungarischen Souveränität geschaffen, einer Souveränität, die es aber auf den meisten Gebieten in Wirklichkeit gar nicht gab, keinesfalls innenpolitisch. Die Vertreter der deutschen SS- und Polizei in Ungarn benahmen sich oft in ausgesprochenem "Kolonialherrenstil". Niedrigste Dienstgrade sprangen mit hohen ungarischen Beamten und Offizieren herum, wie das früher sonst nur bei der englischen Kolonialverwaltung in Indien oder ähnlichen Ländern üblich war. Diese, häufig etwas grössenwahnsinnigen SS- und Polizeifunktionäre in Ungarn, die sich ja als Angehörige einer Besatzungsmacht fühlten, etwa als "Erfüllungsgehilfen" der theoretisch zuständigen ungarischen Behörden anzusehen, wäre historisch völlig falsch und hält einer Überprüfung durch wirklich eingeweihte Kenner der damaligen Verhältnisse nicht stand.

Ich lege dieser Darstellung ein Schema der SS- und Polizeiorganisationen in Ungarn bei, das von General Winkelmann während seiner Haft in Ungarn im Jahre 1946 handschriftlich angefertigt wurde und seitdem in diversen, sogenannten Kriegsverbrecherprozessen verwendet wurde. Auch aus diesem Schema geht hervor wieviele SS-Dienststellen in Ungarn tätig waren, wobei häufig eine von der anderen nichts wusste.

*M. Winkelmann*

25.7.72

Schemata  
 der Organisation des Reichsfiskus II und Chef der deutschen Polizei  
 (Es sind nur die für Bayern in Betracht kommenden Ämter angegeben.)



Das Archiv  
 10. Mai 1946

Institut für...

- Eintragung
- unbestimmte
- Befehlshaber
- Kommando
- als Sonderamt
- (Nicht in Bayern)
- (Nicht in Ungarn)
- (Eintragung des vorbestehenden Befehlshabers)
- (Nicht in Bayern)