

Interrogation Nr. 935

High Command
Mr. FENSTERMACHERInstitut f. Zeitgeschichte
München
ARCHIV

1948/56

Interrogation of Konstantin KAMMERHOFER
on 12 March 1947 from 14,50 to 17 o'clock

by Mr. Otto KREILISHEIM

Stenographer: Lilly Daniel.

1. Q. What is your name?

A. Konstantin KAMMERHOFER.

2. Q. Where are you from?

A. From Styria.

3. Q. Are you prepared to make a statement upon oath?

A. Yes.

(The oath is taken.)

4. Q. When were you born?

A. On 23.1.1899.

5. Q. Would you describe your life to me?

A. I am the son of a farmer. I attended the elementary school, the secondary school and the commercial school. When I was 17 years old I entered the Army in the first World War. At the collapse I became a prisoner of war in Italy until the late summer of 1919. After my return home I became a merchant. In 1924 I married Viktoria nee Zescher. From 1924 until 1934 I worked for my own account and had my own business. In 1934 after the July-uprising of the National-Socialists I fled to Germany via Yugoslavia. From January 1935 until March 1935 I was a civilian employee with the Refugee Relief Work in Berlin. Subsequently I became SS-Fuehrer; SS-Obergruppenfuehrer from March 1935 until April 1936, from April 1936 until September/October 1937 leader of the 25th SS-Standarte in Essen (in the capacity of an SS-Oberfuehrer), then from October 1937 until March 1938 leader of the SS-section XIV in Bochum (SS-Oberfuehrer), from March 1938 until March 1941 leader of the SS-section XXXI in Vienna.

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(SS-Oberfuehrer/SS-Brigadefuehrer), from March 1941 until June 1941 SS-Division Viking (SS-Untersturmfuehrer of the reserve) troop-training-camp Neuberg, June 1941 to April or May 1942 adviser of the Flemish SS in Brussels, May 1942 until July 1942 police training course in Berlin, July 1942 until September 1942 journey to the Ukraine for the purpose of securing information.

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September 1942 until March 1943 organization and training of a special fighting unit at Hindenburg (Upper Silesia). During that time I was appointed to the rank of a brigadier general of the police. From March 1943 until the collapse on 6 May 1945 Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer SS for Croatia.

6. Q. Where were you captured?
 - A. At Materndorf, (Damsweg) Salzburg on 11 May 1945. I was a member of the Reichstag and a Town Councillor of Vienna, the latter for a period of approximately 3 years. Before I joined the NSDAP I was a leader in the Styrian "Home Protection" (Heimatschutz).
7. Q. With what commissions were you sent to Croatia in March 1943?
 - A. I went to Croatia in March 1943 with instructions to establish there mixed-Croatian police units, to establish welfare services for the dependents of the members of the SS and Police originating from Croatia, to take care of the German folk-group in Croatia and to support the SS replacement unit Croatia.
8. Q. From whom did you receive these orders?
 - A. From the Reichsfuehrer SS personally.
9. Q. To whom did you report in Croatia?
 - A. The office was called "Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer SS with the commander of the German troops in Croatia".
10. Q. To whom did you report in Agram?
 - A. I got the order to report immediately to GLAISE-HORSTENAU. According to instructions I reported to the German authorized general in Agram, where it turned out that my authority was incorrect. The Commander of the

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German troops was only responsible for the Croatian area south of the Save, whilst I was commissioned to establish the police units in the area north of the Save. Therefore my authority was altered afterwards and was then called "Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer SS with the German authorized General in Agram, later it was called for short: Commissioner of the Reichsfuehrer SS for Croatia, because police units were to be set up in other districts of Croatia.

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11. Q. Was there any other office in Croatia which you came under?
A. I myself came under the German authorized general, the organizations under me South of the Save came under the respective local German Military District Commanders.
12. Q. Are you sure that you came under GLAISE-HORSTENAU?
A. I am.
13. Q. I ask this question because representatives of HIMMLER gave us the assurance at the time that you were subordinate to nobody but HIMMLER.
A. No, that is wrong. I was subordinated to two: first to GLAISE-HORSTENAU, later to the 2nd armored army.
14. Q. In accordance with what service instructions did you come under GLAISE-HORSTENAU and RENDULIC?
A. I came under General GLAISE-HORSTENAU according to the personal order of the Reichsfuehrer SS. Then the subordination was ordered by the Reichsfuehrer SS' headquarters. A further subordination took place later under the 2nd armored army and then under the army group South East.
15. Q. You mean the army group F?
A. The commander in chief South-East, Field Marshal WEICHS, and then general LOHR.
16. Q. Was that a personal subordination or a kind of subordination which would have enabled General GLAISE-HORSTENAU or RENDULIC or WEICHS to give you official instructions?

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- A. My subordination was personal as well as official.
17. Q. Did you receive instructions in the course of your time in office?
A. Yes.
18. Q. When you received these instructions did you execute them in each case in the manner in which this is done by a subordinate office towards the superior?

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A. Yes. May I add in order to clarify the position that my units were almost only subordinated to the army units and were only for a short time under my command.

19. Q. We shall revert to it.

A. I have a written statement on my attitude such which the Yugoslavs demanded...

20. Q. At what time did the Yugoslavs demand it from you?

A. I was interrogated by them on 3 May.

21. Q. Do they have among their documents a copy of your statement?

A. I gave a copy of my statement to the English Secret Service. I have part of the copy in my own possession.

22. Q. Perhaps you can bring it next time.

A. I got the order from the Reichsfuehrer-SS HIMMLER to gather further information about the situation in Croatia: a) from several offices in the Reich before I left for Croatia:
Reichssicherheitshauptamt Department VI...

23. Q. VI.1?

A. That I don't know...
and, also from a department to which the Police Attaché was subordinated; at the Racial German Intermediate Agency, (volksdeutsche Mittelstelle);
at the Main Office SS; at the Main Office Constabulary;

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b) in Croatia: at
the German authorized General,
at the Commander-in-chief of the 2nd armored army and
at the then commander of the SS-Division "Prinz Eugen",
at the German Legation, from PHILIPS and KASCHER, as well as
from the leader of the racial German group in Croatia
ADIGER.

24. Q. Therefore you visited general GLAISE-HORSTENAU; did you visit the other gentlemen too?

A. I met general RENDULIC in Agram.

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25. Q. Did you speak to RENDULIC, and also to KASCHE and ALTGEIER?
- A. Yes.
26. Q. Did you at this time take up contact with PAVELIC's people?
- A. No, not yet. I was introduced to the former Minister LOKOVIC and then as well to PAVELIC 10 days after my arrival.
27. Q. You then established these units. At what date did you have the first units ready?
- A. The first 6 to 8 weeks of my activity in Croatia were taken up by gathering information and with preparation for recruiting. An agreement was reached between the German authorized General and the Croatian government whereby the latter put at first for the recruiting of police units approximately 7000 (?) volunteers at disposal.
28. Q. How were these volunteers put at disposal?
- A. After this agreement had been approved they were recruited by the SS command Croatia.
29. Q. Under whom did this command come? Was that a staff in Agram?
- A. That was a small agency which had the task,

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of collecting the volunteers.

The SS-replacement unit had the task of picking out the racial Germans who were liable for war service and to assign them to the individual units according to the orders of the SS replacement inspection South-East in Vienna (agency of the Main Office SS). Furthermore, the SS-replacement unit had the task of recruiting volunteers from the rest of the population and to enlist men who were put at the disposal of the replacement unit by the Croatian Government. Contingents of racial Germans and of the other inhabitants were according to their fitness and age assigned to the Waffen-SS or to the police, whereby Catholic and pravoslavie men were in large numbers recruited in police units.

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30. Q. What men belonged to your own staff?

A. For the execution of my task the following establishments were at my disposal:

Commander of the Constabulary Colonel WANDEL, later General JILKI,

SS-economist (Wirtschaftler) Croatia; Standartenfuehrer BONES, later Obersturmbannfuehrer BERGER,

welfare Officer Croatia: I cannot recollect the first one, later it was Obersturmbannfuehrer DICKMANN,

Operations Staff for Combat Against Partisans (temporary organization), Chief, Lieutenant Colonel KORN, later Colonel WOLTER,

SS-Police-Court Hr.? (Croatia) Obersturmbannfuehrer...

-I shall remember the name later,

a directing physician:

Major Dr. FUCHS,

for rendering reports the following were subordinated to me:

Operational Command Security Police and SD Croatia.

31. Q. Did this Operational Command have a number?

A. No.

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32. Q. Was there an operational group B which again was subdivided in 5 subordinated groups?

A. The number is not known to me - 5 operational groups, yes.

33. Q. Do you know Dr. TUENNELER?

A. No.

34. Q. Who was the leader of the operational group?

A. Obersturmbannfuehrer HERRMANN.-

The SS-replacement command Croatia was also subordinated to me for rendering reports.

35. Q. What else?

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A. Furthermore it was planned to appoint 5 police regional leaders who were placed as follows: I in Esseg, II in Serrajewo, III in Banja Luka and V in Agram. The Police Regional Leader planned for IV Gajen was not appointed.

36.Q. What office assisted you with the recruiting of the units? Was it this SS-replacement command?

A. The SS replacement command was recruited from the inhabitants who were then enlisted, trained etc. by the staff of my commander of the constabulary.

37.Q. Describe to me what you considered as your main task and by what methods you performed it?

A. At first the organization was planned in such a way that the whole country was divided in the above mentioned police districts and these were subdivided in rural police captaincies, rural police districts and rural police posts. These individual offices were to be filled by rural police and police units according to their position, namely, rural police posts consisting of 20 to 50 men; for each rural police district a reserve rural police company; for each rural police captaincy also 1 to 2 additional companies, and for each police regional leader one police battalion which was intended as an emergency reserve.

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In the second half of 1943 it turned out already that this planned police organization was absolutely inexpedient, in view of the development of the situation in Croatia, and these individual groups were united to battalions and regiments.

38.Q. Just with regard to the numbers: what was in your opinion the strength of the police in the year 1943?

A. The first volunteers arrived approximately at the end of May/beginning of June and reached together with the German cadre personnel a strength of 6000 to 10 000 men at the end of April 1943; at the end of 1944 the number reached 30 000 to 32 000 men of whom approximately 20 000 still existed after the collapse; arranged into 6 regiments and 11 battalions, besides several smaller supply units and trainings units.

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39. Q. Will you describe to me now the more important duties you carried out in the course of the years 1943 to 1945?

A. That I have explained in my report.
But I can repeat it in short.

40. Q. Make it short, we can discuss it in more detail later on.

A. Against my suggestions, the headquarters staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS or the Chief of units to combat partisans...

41. Q. In Berlin? Are you thinking of BACH-ZELEWSKI?

A. Yes.

v...ordered an operation for safeguarding the harvest in Syria which was estimated to take 4 to 6 weeks, but was interrupted after approx. 14 days, because larger Army units (1st Cossack Division FASHEWITZ) were transferred to this area. As a further action, in February 1944, a mopping-up operation was planned in the district of Virovitica in which the army and Croatian units also participated...

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42. Q. Which were under whose command?

A. This operation was also interrupted, because the whole of the police force was placed under the Army; as it turned out later on account of the development of the situation in Hungary. The first part of this operation (approx. 8 to 10 days) was directed by my Operations Staff for Combat against Partisans.

43. Q. In this operation did the units of the Wehrmacht which participated in these operations come under you?

A. Yes, they were subordinate to my Operations Staff.

44. Q. Who was that in person?

A. Lieutenant Colonel KORN and Colonel WALTER.

45. Q. From what military units did you receive these troops? Were they units of the 2nd armored army?

A. The Wehrmacht units which participated in this operation were put at my disposal through the German authorized General. General BRAUNER was the man who carried out these matters for GLAISER-HORSTENAU. After my subordination to the Wehrmacht had been cancelled (May/June 1944) a further mopping-up operation was ordered in Syrian in the Bosut district.

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It was intended, in order to safeguard the harvest, to stay a longer time with stronger units in the above mentioned area. This operation, however, was also interrupted untimely, because the Russian advance troops were already pressing towards Belgrade, and all my police units were finally subordinated to the Wehrmacht, so that later on independent police actions were no longer possible. The Operations Staff for Combat against Partisans which had been allotted to me in the autumn of 1943 by the chief of Combat units against Partisans of the Reichsfuehrer SS was dissolved again as from this time. The assignment of an Operations Staff for Combat against Partisans was based upon an erroneous opinion of the chief

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of the Combat Units against Partisans who was also competent for the Balkans region. But the competence, however, was never recognized by the Commander-in-Chief South East, and therefore, it was in practice only expressed in that way that the momentary enemy position was reported to the Reichsfuehrer SS.

46. Q. Now please come to the terms of subordination and the cancelling of the terms of subordination. Please describe that clearly.

A. As may be seen from the designation of my office, ^{I was} after my appointment personally subordinated to the German authorized General in Agram. My units south of the Sava were subordinated to the commander of the German troops in Croatia, General LUTTERS with head quarters in Brut, and in the sphere of command of the commander of the SS-Division "Prinz Eugen" the then Brigade Commander PHLEPS.

North of the Sava the police units were subordinated to me and/or to the local police regional leaders, in-so-far as they were not for special reasons subordinated to Wehrmacht commanders. On the occasion of special operations of the Wehrmacht the police units were tactically subordinated to the Wehrmacht.

47. Q. Was for this subordination an arrangement with you necessary?

A. That could be decided by the local police regional leader. From the moment when the German authorized General in Agram (GLAISE-HORSTENAU) handed over his territorial powers as commander of the troops, I myself was for the

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tactical operation subordinated to the chief commander of the 2nd armored army and, after their leaving Croatia, to the commander South-East.

48. Q. Is it right to say that the maintenance of peace and order in Croatia was one

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of your tasks in so far as it was not a question of more important tactical operations against larger units of hostile forces?

A. No.

My orders were to cooperate in the maintenance of public order and peace. In principle it was the task of the independent Croatian State.

49. Q. You know as well as I do in what condition the Croatian State was under Pavelic, so that this basic principle could not become important. For this reason I want to repeat my previous question: On the German side there must have been an office which had the responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order towards the German authorities. Without regard to the difficulties which could arise in the cooperation with the organizations of the Croatian State. For this reason I asked you whether the maintenance of peace and order was your task without regard to the tactical operations?

A. No. For the maintenance of peace and order I did not have the necessary means of power and the necessary authority and powers.

50. Q. Who was, in your opinion, responsible from the German side for maintaining peace and order?

A. In the territory north of the Sava it was the German authorized general with the forces at his disposal to which the police also belonged; south of the Sava: at first LUTTERS, Commander of the German troops, later the local competent corps headquarters.

51. Q. On what assumption do you base your statement that General LUTTERS was the man who had this task?

A. Because he was the only responsible higher German commander in the area south of the Sava.

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52. Q. Were there any police troops south of the Save?

A. At the end of 1943 there were altogether 800 to 1000 police troops south of the Save.

53. Q. Would you say that these police troops south of the Save were subordinated to General LUSTERS as well?

A. Yes, to the local commander. The regional police leader in Syrmien came under PHILIPS, who was subordinate to LUSTERS; the regional police leader of Banja Luka, who had 400 men approximately, was subordinate to a division there.

54. Q. That is regarding the tactical commitment. There are however, quite a number of police measures which have nothing to do with tactical commitment; I am referring to the independent actions of the police which occur during contacts with the civilian population, especially with an obstinate civilian population. I am not sure if LUSTERS would be prepared to take the responsibility for police actions in this sense! The same applies to General GLAISE-HORSTENAU.

A. The police forces in this region were too weak to carry out independent police actions. Therefore they had to be content with guarding their post, guarding the streets and lines of communications, bridges etc., and this mostly in cooperation with the Wehrmacht.

55. Q. We shall come back to this theme. Before that there is a question regarding the cooperation with the Croate police, that is with all branches of the Croate police.

A. The rules for cooperation with the Croate Executive were laid down in an verbal agreement and record between the German authorized general and the then Croate minister of the Interior, Dr. LOKOVITSCH, in such a way that German police activities of any kind could only be carried out

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with the assistance of Croate police forces.

56. Q. Did you have Croate liaison officers with in your staff?

A. I had one.

57. Q. Did you have police directorates?

A. No.

58. Q. Was it possible for you to employ purely Croate police forces at any time?

A. No. I have to add that the Croate police came under the Italian Protectorate up to the time of Italy's separation from the Axis.

59. Q. Until autumn 43.

A. Until autumn 1943.

After 1943 a German colonel of the rural police, Col. GAISER, was assigned to the Croate rural police commander for guidance. It was his task to assist with the forming of a plan for training at the rural police school of Bjelovar. The carrying out of reprisals was left exclusively to the Croate police, and if the occasion arose, the Wehrmacht commanders as well as my district police leader had to apply for them at the Croate Ministry of the Interior (police directorate).

60. Q. I would like to clarify the question of subordination. At first you were under GLAISE-HORSTENAU, personally and officially?

A. Yes.

61. Q. From the time when GLAISE-HORSTENAU's territorial power ceased, RENDULIC, later WEIGHS and LOHR?

A. Yes.

That was the Wehrmacht subordination; at the same time I was also subordinate to the Reichsfuehrer SS.

62. Q. Can you recall from what date you were subordinate to RENDULIC?

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A. From spring 1945 - roughly.

63. Q. You were talking of a double subordination: i.e. once RENDULIC, once Reichsfuehrer SS.

If RENDULIC would enter now and would say: You have never been subordinate to me. The only office you were subordinate to was the Reichsfuehrer SS!

A. I would reply: Herr RENDULIC that is not quite correct. You know very well that you were in a position to give orders to me and my units!

It was he who effected my subordination at the Reichsfuehrer SS, at first temporarily and later finally.

64. Q. Do you mean to say that at first things were vague but that they were cleared up in the course of time?

A. Yes.

65. Q. Whereby it seems rather peculiar to us that the Reichsfuehrer SS should deprive himself and give up his influence over an office subordinate to him. That did not happen as a rule.

A. I was surprised myself.

66. Q. That such a decision had been taken in favor of the armored army?

A. Yes.

67. Q. You think that this decision was made in spring of 1945?

A. Yes.

68. Q. Can you recall the discussions you had with GLAISE-HORSTENAU, later RENDULIC on the question of fighting the partisans? Did you receive certain instructions or certain directives for the carrying out of your task from GLAISE-HORSTENAU at that time when he still held territorial power?

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Perhaps you were told something by GLAISE-HORSTENAU?

A. Upon my arrival in Croatia I was obliged to find out from the German authorized general about the situation in the country and about the legal position of the Wehrmacht in each case. I had to turn to him in all these questions and to ask for his directives and orders. Actually the German offices gave at that time the greatest consideration to the Croat rights of sovereignty, yes, the very greatest consideration.

69. Q. Is it correct that the representative of the Foreign Office, KASCHKE, was a great exponent in this direction?

A. The German envoy KASCHKE was, one can say, enviously watching that the sovereignty and independence of the Croat state was regarded with minute exactness.

70. Q. What had GLAISE-HORSTENAU to tell you to the question of fighting the partisans?

A. GLAISE-HORSTENAU, who in my opinion effected the formation of the German-Croatian police units at the Reichsfuehrer SS, was of the opinion that fighting the partisans in the area north of the Sava (not state of emergency) was fundamentally the task of the Croatian government. Wherever the forces of the Croatian government were insufficient, German forces of the Wehrmacht had to be put at disposal. According to General GLAISE-HORSTENAU's opinion the new German-Croatian police to be formed was more or less only to assist the Croatian police in carrying out its administrative tasks and was not to be used for any kind of major actions. Very soon however, it became apparent that this

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intention could not be realized, because an organized Croatian rural police system did not exist at that time in the open country, or existed insufficiently only, so that administrative tasks could not be carried out at all, but that the situation called for security measures, guarding of villages, roads and railroads.

71. Q. Did the question of reprisals already come up in conversations with GLAISE-HORSTENAU, or did it only come up in directives coming from RENDULIC?

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A. In questions of reprisals, RENDULIC did not approve at all of the tactics of the Croatian Ustascha government to restore peace by means of carrying out many executions. General GLAISE-HORSTENAU's personal opinion was that the attitude of the Ustascha towards the other population of the country, was after all not the last cause for the civil-war-like situation in Croatia. General GLAISE-HORSTENAU was in all his measures a true friend of reconciliation.

72. Q. Would you say the same of RENDULIC? If you don't like to answer this question because of his person, you can tell me so.

A. General RENDULIC was aware of it that the civil war in Croatia could more or less be forced down or terminated by reconciliation, even if he was forced in the course of later developments to issue stricter orders in fighting the enemy in order to keep up his communications in the rear.

73. Q. When did you carry out reprisals for the first time?

A. I never carried out any reprisals.

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74. Q. When did the police troops under you carry out reprisals?

A. The police troops did not carry out any reprisals. According to my knowledge, police leaders applied to the Croatian Government for reprisals for the first time around the turning of 1943/44, at the occasion of riots in Banja Luka, and then in the spring of 1944 2 or three times after attacks had been made on railroad transports and on the road to Eastern Croatia.

75. Q. Through which official channels did these applications go?

A. The applications went via the Croatian Ministry of the Interior. They went from the districts police leaders via the competent Croatian 'Gross-Gespan' to the Croatian Ministry of the Interior in Agram.

76. Q. Did the applications go through your office?

A. No.

77. Q. Did you get reports on these applications?

A. Yes.

78. Q. Did these applications need your approval, before they reached the Croatian agencies?

A. No.

79. Q. Are you sure?

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A. Yes, I am.

80. Q. Did you have the opportunity to intercept such applications or to change their contents?

A. Of course I had that opportunity.

81. Q. What was the contents of these applications?

A. Well, in the case of Banja-Luka a state of emergency was proclaimed by the competent Wehrmacht commander on account of riots or attacks - it was around the end of the year. If it came nevertheless to clashes and attacks,

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then the local district police leader applied to the Croatian Ministry of the Interior for the carrying out of reprisals.

82. Q. Have suggestions been made regarding the figure?

A. The local 'Gross-Gespan' organization had to suggest the figure.

83. Q. Were suggestions submitted by German agencies?

A. Not from the German side, - later there came a REINHOLD order...

84. Q. Would you say the development was in such a way that originally the request for reprisals came from the German side but that the number of persons to be executed was determined by the Croatian side, and that later, numbers were also determined by the German side.

A. Later, I know that from hear-say, certain figures were determined by the 2nd Armored (panzer) army.

85. Q. What kind of figures were those?

A. That I don't know. I don't know whether it was a general order. It did not come within my sphere.

86. Q. How did you hear about it?

A. I learned of an alleged order regarding reprisals from one of my district police leaders, I believe it was the one from Sarajevo, who in turn had the information from the commanding general of the 5th SS mountain corps to whom he was subordinate.

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87. Q. What figures were you told? Were they 1 in 50 or 1 in 25?

A. I cannot recall either the one or the other; they seem to be too high after what I heard at the time. I can tell you something else too: When I was told about it, I discussed it regarding the police units with the chief of the SD operational command (HERRMANN), and we both

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agreed on it that this order could not apply to the police units, because after the agreement mentioned the reprisals rested with the Croatian Executive. There has also later not been a single case of this agreement not being kept. I did not learn either that after June 1944, when I had no longer our influence on the tactical commitment of the police units, reprisals were carried out by police units by order of the Wehrmacht.

88. Q. I do not know whether you are aware that in view of the fact that the police troops did not come under Wehrmacht discipline, the Wehrmacht is inclined to blame the responsible SS- and police units for certain things which happened on the part of police troops.

A. Yes, I know about this fact; it will be simple, however, to find out in each case who is the one responsible, because I assume that it is not a question of a large number of objectionable actions. At any rate, no Wehrmacht commander was restricted in reporting abuses, non-soldierly actions or even crimes in a short way. Besides, in severe cases any tactical superior had the right to intervene himself. If any denunciation, offence or crime has not been expiated, then the fault would be mine, because I was the competent authority for the police.

89. Q. Did you learn in the course of time that reprisals were carried out very frequently in the territories of Croatia, Montenegro and Albania - the sector of the second armored army

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i.e. executions as well as punitive destructions of villages. Destructions which have been carried out because the population of these villages allegedly or actually had given shelter to the partisans.

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A. I am not informed about the warfare and measures in the territories of Montenegro and Albania. It seems that only in the Croatian sector, especially in the area of South East Bosnia, there was extensive destruction of villages in the course of prolonged fighting, and due to the complete confusion at the front.

90. Q. I am not talking of destructions during combat, I am talking of destructions which have been carried out after combat!

A. The question as to how far these destructions were carried out during combat, or afterwards, was brought up frequently at that time already, but could never or very seldom be cleared up. The same applies to the reports of the alleged executions.

91. Q. Herr KAMMERHOFER, up to now I have given you ample opportunity to talk and I will continue to do so. But I am not talking out of the blue! In our documents reports are accumulating -and these are original German orders- in which it says word for word that the following reprisals were carried out by this and that unit on this and that day. Then either destructions of villages or shootings of hostages are listed. These orders are at hand here. I should like to remind you before we continue that we are not at the start of the investigations, but that these are investigations which have reached a certain stage.

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The reprisals which have been carried out are far beyond the stage admissible according to the rules of International Law. I am mentioning this because we know that you were informed, that you must have been informed, because you dealt with high authorities. Also these things did not happen secretly. I should like to remind you of these things, in order that you may check your own evidence accordingly. Reprisals have been carried out; many of them; i.e. reprisals on human beings and on objects. I should like you to check your experiences in this respect, so that you will be able to answer my questions when we come to discussing these things today or tomorrow.

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(page 21 of original cont'd)

Do not tell me these things were done by the Ustascha, neither should you say it was the Serbian Ozetniks. We know there was resistance. But you should not say that the villages were destroyed in combat!- I want to ask you now what directives you received from RENDULIC?

A. I received no orders whatsoever from RENDULIC, neither did I discuss the matter with him.

92. Q. Did you talk to WEICHS?

A. Not to WEICHS, -to FOERTSCH and later to WINTER.

93. Q. What did these two gentlemen tell you regarding reprisals in fighting the partisans?

A. They did not say anything.

94. Q. Was the these hostages or reprisals touched on?

A. No.

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95. Q. Are you sure?

A. I am quite sure.

96. Q. Did you discuss it with LOEHR?

A. LOEHR became commander-in-chief Southeast in February 1945 - no, there was no reason for it.

97. Q. We shall close for today.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

9 April 1947

I, E.J. HINCHLIFFE, 026 034, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of a copy of the original document.

E.J. HINCHLIFFE
026 034

Inkovo, v. 13 3 47

25-248-20

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INTERROGATION OF KONSTANTIN KAMMERHOFFER, 13 MARCH
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

Interrogation No. 935a

High Command
Mr. FRIESTENMANN.

Interrogation of Konstantin KAMMERHOFFER
on 13 March 1947 from 10.30 hrs to 12.00 hrs
by Mr. Otto KNEILISSEK.

Stenographer: Lilly DANIEL.



- 1.Q. Today I wish to remind you once more of the statements you made yesterday referring to the responsibility for the actions of the Police in Croatia. You stated that originally the final responsibility in the area north of the Sava rested with GLAISE-HORSTENAU, later with RENDULIC, whilst General LUTWENS was responsible for the district south of the Sava. I should like what Generaloberst RENDULIC himself stated in connection with this question to be read out to you.

(The first answer from the interrogation of Generaloberst RENDULIC on 13 March 1947 is read out to KAMMERHOFFER).

- 2.Q. Have you anything to say to this?

A. I never was plenipotentiary attached to the Croatian Government, but I was the delegate of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, to the Commander in Chief of the German troops in Croatia, later on altered to "The German Commanding General in Agram", that actually was General GLAISE-HORSTENAU, succeeded by SS-Obergruppenfuehrer FRIESTENMANN.

- 3.Q. And after FRIESTENMANN?

A. To the Commander in Chief, South-East.

- 4.Q. Then never to the 2nd Tank Army itself?

A. I was attached to the 2nd Tank Army for the first time about February/March 1944.

- 5.Q. In person or from a service point of view?

A. From a service point of view at first, in person not until middle of June 1944.

(page 2 of original)

- 6.Q. Let us get this quite clear: you were first attached to the German Commanding General GLAISE-HORSTENAU - would you state the exact time for that?

A. From the time of my arrival until the time of the interruption resulting from my being attached to a higher command of the Armed Forces.

- 7.Q. Then there was the short period with FRIESTENMANN and after that you were attached directly to the Commander in Chief South-East, Field Marshal WRIGHT and LOHMEYER?

A. Yes.

- 8.Q. So that the period during which you were with the 2nd Tank Army was comparatively short?

(page 2 of original cont'd)

- A. Comparatively very short; the first time was 4 to 5 weeks and the other time it lasted from the date of my being attached there until the withdrawal of the 2nd Tank Army. After that there ceased to be any Command Headquarters subordinate to the Commander in Chief South-East.
- 9.Q. Were you attached there temporarily for tactical reasons or did your transfer have any bearing on the entire activity of the fighting force?
- A. That applies in the first case, whereas in the second I was attached permanently.
- 10.Q. Try to remember for what period you were permanently attached.
- A. I was permanently attached in the 2nd half of June 1944.
- 11.Q. You told me that you were transferred after - as far as you remember - RENDULIC had prevailed upon MINNLER to sanction this matter.
- A. I was told so expressly by the Chief of the Field Head-Quarters of the Reichsfuehrer SS when I was attached there for the first time.

(page 3 of original)

- I was told that during a discussion over the telephone.
I received the order to be attached
a) from the German Commanding General
b) from the Field Head-Quarters.
- 12.Q. Was that an office in Berlin?
- A. Wherever the Reichsfuehrer SS had his office at the time.
(Question 2 and the answer to question 2 from RENDULIC's interrogation is read out to KAMMERHOFER).
- 13.Q. Have you anything to add to this statement of RENDULIC?
- A. RENDULIC's opinion regarding the training and strength of my forces is absolutely correct. In spite of that, I remember distinctly, that I was informed by the Field Head-Quarters that my transfer had been requested by the Commander in Chief of the 2nd Tank Army.
- 14.Q. What is the Operation KAMMERHOFER?
- A. There never was an Operation KAMMERHOFER.
- 15.Q. Are you sure?
- A. Yes, I am sure of that.
- 16.Q. At which time were you attached to RENDULIC?
- A. For the first time in February/March, and finally in the second half of June until the end.
- 17.Q. Do you remember what instructions you received during the time you were under RENDULIC's command?
- A. I personally did not receive any instructions from RENDULIC; however, my subordinate units did.
- 18.Q. What instructions did your subordinate units receive from RENDULIC?

(page 3 of original cont'd)

A. Regarding assemblies and tactical operations.

19.Q. Did you receive instructions from HEINRICH with regard to the treatment of Prisoners of War?

(page 4 of original)

A. With regard to the treatment of Prisoners of War I was guided by the instructions issued to me by the German Commanding General. From about the time of my final transfer to the Armed Forces a liaison officer (Verbindungsfuehrer), by the name of SS-Standartenfuehrer CANARIS, was also transferred by the Commander in Chief South-East.

20.Q. Yesterday we began to talk about the seizure and execution of hostages, and we spoke first about the things with which your Police troops were concerned. You gave me your answer in that connection. Towards the end of our conversation we also alluded to the attitude taken by HEINRICH (2nd Tank Army) towards this problem. I then intimated to you, quite at the end of our conversation, that, as I said, we are not at the beginning of our interrogation but that we had reached the end. I made this remark because for a little while I was under the impression that for reasons of consideration and loyalty you did not speak of certain things as frankly as is necessary for us in order to clear up these things. You have very probably thought about these matters last night and today, in consideration of your oath, I should like to ask you once more and very clearly, what you remember in this connection: orders, directives, etc.

A. To the best of my knowledge I do not remember ever receiving a written order from the 2nd Tank Army regarding the seizure or treatment of hostages. I repeat the statement which I made yesterday, that once an order, which was supposed to refer to these matters, issued by the 2nd Tank Army, came to my knowledge during a conversation with one of my subordinate District Police Commanders (Polizeigebietsfuehrer).

(page 5 of original)

As far as I can remember, I discussed the effect this order would have on my units with General CLAUSE-HORSTENAU, as well as with the Chief of the SD Operational Command, HEINEMANN. We came to the conclusion that this order to the 2nd Tank Army did not concern the agreement which the Police had made with the Croatian Government with regard to reprisals, and that that would continue to exist as before.

21.Q. Well, this order, the existence of which was known to you, did have its effects, and that in the aforementioned Croatian area, effects of which you must know. Did you see reports which were submitted by the 2nd Tank Army?

A. No.

22.Q. Did you ever read reports which went to the various Head-Quarters?

A. No.

23.Q. A considerable number of these reports are in our hands.
(Mr. KREILISHEIM reads to KAMMERHOFFER from documents).

24.Q. Have you ever heard of "Operation Panther"?

A. I hardly think so, however, there were so many of these code names - may I know the date please?

25.Q. November 1943, 15th Mountain Corps.

A. 15th Mountain Corps? - That was not operating in my area.

(page 5 of original cont'd)

26.Q. Do you remember of conferences in which KERNULIC and you also took part?

A. I saw Generaloberst KERNULIC twice during his stay in Croatia; once during my presentation in Agram and once when he passed through Trut. I never took part in conferences.

27.Q. Do you remember the time after fall 1943, when Italian troops refused to surrender their arms? During that time it happened that Italians were captured and also shot. Tell me what you remember in this connection.

(page 6 of original)

A. I myself witnessed in Agram the falling off of our Italian allies. The surrender of arms by the Italians stationed there took place without a shot being fired. The entire disarmament operation in the large area of Agram lasted from 23 to 24.

28.Q. Do you know that there were Italian units who did not obey the order to surrender their arms?

A. There were rumors that in the area of Kalovac there had been a unit which did not surrender its arms until the following day.

29.Q. Do you remember any fights with Italian troops after this time?

A. Nor fighting or the employment of force came to my knowledge.

30.Q. Do you know that Italian troops went over to Tito?

A. Yes. I know that from intelligence reports. Later on I got to know that in the neighborhood of Ragusa as well as in the area of Split-Gnis, major contingents - among them also tank units - went over to Tito's army.

31.Q. Are you aware of the existence of certain directives concerning the treatment of these Italians in the case of their giving themselves up as Prisoners of War?

A. No.

32.Q. Do you know how the Italians were treated who later became Prisoners of War?

A. No, I had nothing to do with Prisoners of War matters.

33.Q. Have you ever heard of the Order from Head-Quarters (Kommando-Befehl)?
(page 7 of original)

A. At that time?

34.Q. Yes, at that time.

A. No - only now after the war.

35.Q. Which German units were stationed in your area, which units of the German Armed Forces?

A. How am I to understand this question?

36.Q. With which German units, stationed in Croatia were you in touch?

A. Croatia was decidedly a transit area.

37.Q. Nevertheless, there were certain corps which were stationed in Croatia for longer periods.

(page 7 of original cont'd)

- A. They were the 5th SS Mountain Corps
the 69th Special Service Corps (z.b.V.)
the SS Moslem Corps
the 15th Mountain Corps
the 3rd SS Armored Corps

Later, there was a lively transit traffic of general commandos (General Kommandos) which were being withdrawn from the Balkan area and from Greece. (KAMMERHOFFER is shown a document which he reads and then several other documents are read to him).

- 38.Q. Mr. KAMMERHOFFER, I have shown you these papers in order to make this clear to you: we fail to understand that you, having stayed in that region for so long, do not know anything either about hostages being taken or about their being shot. You are here as a witness, and we want to know the truth: these happenings were known: the men under your command knew it. Now is it possible that some subordinate in Sarajevo knows about these matters, about which his superior knows nothing?

- A. There is the possibility that some subordinate in Sarajevo has heard of certain occurrences

(page 8 of original)

- 39.Q. No, we cannot go on in this way! You must know about these things! This man has not just heard about it - he knows which corps, which regiment, took retaliatory measures, and how the execution detachments worked. These things are known!

- A. Please understand this. He has not reported anything to me. I ought to know it, I ought to be told about it! I was in Sarajevo only once.

- 40.Q. According to RENNELIC and others, you held quite a prominent position. We are prepared to assume that you were responsible to other authorities. Nevertheless, you were so placed, that the way in which matters were conducted must have been known to you. It does not sound very plausible if you say you do not know of anything at all!

- A. Please understand me rightly - how should I know about it? I had no department in that area - how should I come to know about it? The army did not broadcast such things!

- 41.Q. You kept in touch with the Croats, did you not? These things matter a great deal to the people. The people wanted to know where their brothers and fathers were. You knew what was going on among the population. It was your duty to be informed about the mood of the people.

- A. Yes.

- 42.Q. It happened frequently that executions were made public on notice boards, stating names etc.

- A. Yes - would you like to know something about that? I remember that well. I know of the reprisals taken by the Croats

- 43.Q. I want to know about German reprisals. The reprisals of the Croats we know about!

(page 9 of original)

- A. I cannot give evidence about a single German reprisal, as I simply do not know of any!

- 44.Q. Were there any cases of desertion from German and Croat mixed units?

- A. Yes.

(page 9 of original cont'd)

45.Q. What measures did you take to prevent such desertions? Did it ever happen that next of kin of deserters were arrested?

A. They were detained temporarily in order to find out the whereabouts of deserters.

46.Q. Were there any desertions from your own units?

A. Yes, on a large scale.

47.Q. Were relatives of such deserters detained?

A. Yes. They were asked to divulge the hiding places of the deserters. There was not a single instance of the death sentence being carried out!

48.Q. Describe to me the work of the Assignment Command at Sarajewo. What was the task of these assignment commands or assignment command units?

A. The task of the 3D Assignment Commands in Croatia was to reconnoitre, and establish the position of the enemy, in co-operation with the Field Intelligence General Staff Officer (I C) of the army, i.e. to gather information about the enemy.

49.Q. Did you receive copies of the reports of the Field Intelligence Officer of the Division to the Corps? Not, perhaps addressed to you personally, but to the Assignment Commands.

A. I do not know of any particular instance; there might have been an agreement with the individual army commands.

50.Q. Were the Assignment Commands self-contained, or were they under the command of the Army? Let us take for instance the Assignment Command at Sarajewo!

(page 10 of original)

A. The Assignment Group and the Assignment Commands were under the authority of the Armed Forces to the same extent as were my Police units.

51.Q. What does that mean: to the same extent?

A. When they were employed in action they fought side by side with the troops and were thus practically under the command of the Army.

52.Q. And when they were employed otherwise, not in action?

A. Then they were "somewhat free" but had to adhere to general regulations.

53.Q. Are you familiar with the names: HEIZER, HAASE, FRICK, BRABIS?

A. No.

54.Q. Did it sometimes happen that prisoners were handed over to the Assignment Commands by Army units?

A. That may have happened in individual cases. In general the troops delivered prisoners to the appropriate prisoner assembly points.

55.Q. Are you familiar with the term "Execution Command"?

A. Yes.

Translator's note: * * The German in this case is not intelligible.

(page 10 of original cont'd)

56.Q. Who detailed the Execution Commands?

A. The Police detailed the Execution on Commands for the infliction of death sentences imposed by me on behalf of the SS and Police Courts. In no instance has the Police detailed Execution Commands to the Army.

57.Q. Did the Army have its own Execution Commands?

A. When the Army carried out death sentences it ^{then} must have carried out in its own sphere of authority.

58.Q. Was the Assignment Command authorized to take hostages?

A. I do not know of any such instance.

59.Q. Did it have the right and the opportunity to take hostages?

A. Assignment Commands had the opportunity as well as the right to take hostages.

60.Q. Did the Assignment Commands make use of these rights and opportunities?

(page 11 of original)

A. I know of a case where, in the region of Essegg, 500 persons were arrested as hostages for a kidnapped group of youths attached to the Labor-Service.

61.Q. What happened to these 500 persons?

It was possible to dismiss them
A. They could be ~~dismissed~~ after about 10 or 12 hours, because the kidnapped persons were brought back.

62.Q. Were the Assignment Commands entitled to carry out executions?

A. No.

63.Q. Did the Assignment Commands carry out executions?

A. No.

64.Q. Would affected executions have had to be reported to you?

A. Yes.

65.Q. Which was the official channel for such reports? Was the report addressed to you directly or did HERRMANN get it first?

A. HERRMANN got it first. The District Chiefs of the Police were also obliged, in case they heard of such incidents, to report them to me.

66.Q. Would you say that the Local Head-Quarters and the Field Head-Quarters were kept informed about the executions?

A. In my opinion the Local Head-Quarters and Field Head-Quarters must have been informed.

67.Q. So that in case executions were carried out by Assignment Commands, the Local Head-Quarters and Field Head-Quarters must have known about them.

A. Yes.

68.Q. That does not apply to the same extent to commanders of divisions and other commanding officers?

A. No.

(page 11 of original cont'd)

69.Q. Were there concentration camps in Croatia?

A. Yes.

(page 12 of original)

70.Q. Would you enumerate the names?

A. The Croatian government maintained a concentration camp in Jasenovac; then there was an enlarged prison, which may also be termed concentration camp, in the neighborhood of Warastin and a similar institution in Nitrowiza. Another camp in Semlin was maintained by the commander of the Security Police in Belgrad. This camp was later handed over to the Croats and dissolved after a few weeks.

71.Q. Are these all?

A. Yes.

72.Q. Were you constantly kept informed about what occurred in these concentration camps?

A. No.

73.Q. Which German Head-Quarters was informed, in your opinion, about what was going on in the concentration camps?

A. No German Head-Quarter is likely to have had exact knowledge. I myself once tried, by order of the Reichsfuehrer SS, to enter these concentration camps, as I was searching volunteers of the SS Police, who according to several reports had been brought there. My efforts, which were in every way supported by General GLAISE-HORTSMAN, were flatly turned down by the Croatian Government. For several weeks afterwards collaboration was even hampered by considerably strained relations.

74.Q. To which Croatian Head-Quarters were these camps subordinated?

A. To the Security Department in the Croatian Ministry of the Interior and to a special deputy of Poglavnik named LUBANIC.

75.Q. Have you yourself ever suggested certain persons to be arrested in these camps?

A. No.

(page 13 of original)

76.Q. Were there ever Croatian persons, Jews or gypsies arrested in these camps as a result of German requests?

A. When I was transferred to Croatia there were only those Jews left in this area who were excepted from all persecution by the Croatian Government. There may have been 300 or 500 Jews in question. The Security Police had also been instructed to fully respect this exception and so they did.

77.Q. Did you have an intelligence service of your own?

A. The whole intelligence service was entrusted to the SD-Assignment-Command and its sub-divisions which found out the enemy's position for me.

78.Q. Were you in touch with SAUCKEL's commissioners?

A. A branch in Wesserg repeatedly asked the SD-Assignment-Command to examine some volunteers for the Reich.

79.Q. Did you help to procure workers?

A. No.

(page 13 of original cont'd)

80.Q. Are you of the opinion that the workers who left for Germany consisted exclusively of volunteers?

A. The workers who left for Germany consisted mostly of volunteers. But it is also known to me that the Croatian Government had engaged several 100 men for the carrying out of certain kinds of work in Germany.

81.Q. Did the German Police play a part in the forced recruitment, or not?

A. No, it did not.

82.Q. Mr. KAMMERHOFFER, since when were you a member of the Party?

A. I was admitted to the Party on 1 May 1938.

(page 14 of original)

83.Q. Did you not say that you participated in the July coup d'etat?

A. At that time I was a member of the Styrian Home Guard which at that time had an agreement with the Party.
I was Austrian and could not join the Party.

84.Q. That is not quite correct, as the Party existed legally.

A. I was not a member at that time. Then, coming into the Reich in 1934, I was a foreigner. Later on the Party admitted no more members.

85.Q. Would you still call yourself a convinced National-Socialist to-day?

A. No.

86.Q. Why not?

A. Because in the practice of National-Socialism difficulties arose which disturbed the relations between the nations.
I add that the ideal program of National-Socialism, which has nothing to do with the criticized measures of the past, as before represents my conception of an ideal program.

87.Q. Do you know that RENDULIC held a rather important position in the Party?

A. Yes. He enjoyed the absolute confidence of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

88.Q. How do you come to suppose that?

A. The Reichsfuehrer SS himself told me so in March 1943.

(page 15 of original)

89.Q. Do you approximately remember what he said?

A. The Reichsfuehrer said to me at that time: RENDULIC certainly will have a good knowledge of the conditions in that area as a former Austrian officer and being thoroughly familiar with them, on the other hand is a man to be fully relied on. I myself remember that in former times in Austria the name of RENDULIC was held in best repute.

90.Q. Did you have any opportunity later during the time you were in connection with RENDULIC to talk with him about politics? For instance, about the position of the Party?

A. No.

(page 15 of original cont'd)

91.Q. Did you consider the troupes of Tito to be a belligerent force, and since when?

A. Since about the end of fall 1943.

92.Q. The expression "Bandit" was used till the end, was it not?

A. Unfortunately the expression was used till the last moment. We had even expressly been instructed to use it in the reports.

93.Q. To whom were these reports directed?

A. To the commander of the anti-guerilla fighting units (Bandenkampfverbände).

94.Q. How long did you report to Hach-Zelewski?

A. Commencing at the end of 1943, the daily reports were sent to the commander of the anti-guerilla fighting units (Bandenkampfverbände) till these battle-formations were placed under the command of the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in July 1944. of the/

95.Q. Did the partisans wear uniforms?

A. That depended very much on whether that was opportune. They had insignia for their caps and armbands, which they could put on or take off.

96.Q. Thank you.

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CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

April 8, 1947

I ANNETTE WALLACH, 20101, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages and that the above is a true and correct translation of the interrogation of Konstantin Kammerhofer, 13 March.

ANNETTE WALLACH
No. 20101

"END"

- 10 -


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OFFICE OF U.S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES
APO 696 A
EVIDENCE DIVISION
INTERROGATION BRANCH



INTERROGATION SUMMARY NO. 1543.

Interrogation of : Konstantin KAMMERHOFER, Index No. 935 B.
Interrogated by : Mr. Kreilishain, 18 March 1947, Nuremberg.
Division & Att'y : Military - Mr. Fenstermacher.
Compiled by : : E. K.

PERSONS MENTIONED:

KORN - Lt. Col. (p.1)

SUMMARY
SUMMARY

KAMMERHOFER states that the operation in Syria started in August 1943 and took 6 weeks. The purpose of the operation was to bring in the crop. Subject had at his disposal 4 battalions, also the aid of members of the armed forces. Subject's operational staff was in charge, commanded by Lt. Col. KORN. The operation was ordered by KAMMERHOFER and was called "Kornblume". At the beginning there were some engagements. Informant states that on the occasion of this police action, no hostages were shot.

KAMMERHOFER declares that there was never an "Operation KAMMERHOFER". He adds that hostages were never taken by him.

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Interrog. v. 31.3.47

21.3.48-53

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TRANSLATION OF INTERROGATION KAMMERHOFER
OFFICE OF CHIEF OF COUNSEL FOR WAR CRIMES

(page 1 of original)

Interrogation-No. _____

Inst. f. Zeitgeschichte München ARCHIV 1948/56

Interrogation of Constantin KAMMERHOFER
on 31 March 1947, from 14.00 to 15.30 hours
conducted by: Walter H. RAPP
stenographer: Koniberta BRILMANN

- 1 Q. What is your full name?
A. Constantin KAMMERHOFER.
- 2 Q. How many times have you been interrogated here in Merenberg?
A. Three times.
- 3 Q. You have stated in your interrogations that you were in charge of the district south of the river Sava.
A. North of the river Sava. The term "in charge" holds true in a limited sense only. I was responsible for building up of a police force in the entire territory of Croatia.
- 4 Q. Your territory was mainly north of the river Sava.
A. Yes. Between the rivers Sava and Drava.
- 5 Q. Was Croatia regarded as operational territory?
A. When I arrived in 1943 the district south of the river Sava was operational territory in Croatia.
- 6 Q. And in the north?
A. Not until later when the enemy fronts had approached the district.
- 7 Q. In the spring of 1945?
A. Already in 1944; the invasion of the Russians into the eastern part took place in the fall of 1944.

(page 2 of original)

- 8 Q. Did you have a predecessor in Croatia?
A. No, I was the first one.
- 9 Q. What was the part called which is located north of the river Sava? Was that occupied territory or territory in a state of peace?
A. No, no special name was known for this territory.
- 10 Q. What, in your opinion, was the difference between the territory north and that south of the river Sava?
A. In the territory north of the river Sava only the Croatian Government was responsible.
- 11 Q. Were German troops stationed north of the river Sava?
A. Very few.
- 12 Q. What were your tasks?
A. There was a division subordinated to the German general in authority in Agram, GLASSE, and a German railroad safeguarding staff in Bred.

TRANSLATION OF INTERROGATION KAMMERHOFFER
CONTINUED

- 13 Q. Under whose command was this staff ?
A. That I cannot tell.
- 14 Q. Was it under the commander of the Armed Forces Southeast or PELLES ?
A. I cannot say for certain, whether directly under the commander-in-chief Southeast, or under the German general in authority.
- 15 Q. What forces were in the territory south of the river Sava ?
A. At the time I arrived, i.e. in the summer of 1943, the military leader in charge of the territory south of the river Sava was the commander of the German forces in Croatia, Lieutenant General LUTTERS.
- 16 Q. To whom was he subordinated ?

(page 3 of original)

- A. I am not quite familiar with the set-up, he was either subordinated to the commander-in-chief Southeast or to the II. armored division.
- 17 Q. Probably to the II. armored division.
A. That can be assumed.
- 18 Q. What division did LUTTERS have that you can recollect ?
A. I suppose the VII. SS-Division "Prinz Eugen".
- 19 Q. Under OBERRAMP at that time ?
A. Under PELLES. There were also parts of a mountain-division. I cannot recollect whether it was the I. or II. division.
- 20 Q. The I. The II. division was somewhere else.
A. Later on there was also an army-corps command.
- 21 Q. Was it the 15th or the 21st ?
A. I remember the 21st.
- 22 Q. Was FEHN or L. EYER in command ?
A. That I cannot tell.
- 23 Q. What were your experiences with regard to guerilla bands in the part of the territory north of the river Sava at the time when, in your capacity of Gruppenfuhrer, you were the deputy ~~representative~~ of the Reichsfuhrer-SS. Were there FITO-bands or CHETNIK-bands ?

- A. At the beginning of my activity the bands in the territory north of the river Sava could, generally speaking, be divided into two groups, first the irregular units, in whose case it could never be determined on whose side they were, the other were CHETNIKS, along the railroad line in the district of Mitrovitz up to the Illova depression, with headquarters in the district of Nova-Gradiska.

(page 4 of original)

- 24 Q. The CHETNIKS were engaged in terrible hostilities against the USTASCHA. The Serbs did not like the Croats, and the USTASCHA had caused a horrible massacre two years ago.
A. I have already written once before about this subject in detail.
- 25 Q. To what extent have, at the time when you arrived - that was shortly before the Italians withdrew - the German Armed Forces and their office received orders to reorganise there, i.e. to support the USTASCHA where the Italians had left off. The Italians had supported the USTASCHA up to that time.
A. The USTASCHA originated in Italy.

TRANSLATION OF INTERROGATION KAMMERHOFFER
Continued

- 26 Q. To what extent was the USTASCHA supported ?
 A. It was neither supported by me nor by the Armed Forces.
- 27 Q. If one considers your answer as an outsider it may perhaps be acceptable, however, it was in the interest of the Armed Forces to support the USTASCHA. For what was done by the USTASCHA no German soldiers were necessary.
- A. It is a little different. Upon my arrival I had an order from the Reichsfuehrer-SS to be initiated into the situation among others also by General CLAISE-HORSTENAU and a commander of the SS-division Prinz Eugen. These two officers were of the opinion that one of the reasons for the sanguinary encounters in Croatia was the USTASCHA, and the Armed Forces were determined to reduce the USTASCHA and to bring it down to reasonable proportions; At that time the USTASCHA was therefore neither supported by the Armed Forces nor by the SS.

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- 28 Q. But it is a fact that the USTASCHA fought against the same enemies as the German Armed Forces.
- A. The USTASCHA was a cause of trouble, an element which was opposed to pacification. Since its leaders - I am referring to the units - were unreliable it was of no great use to the Armed Forces. We have refused altogether to cooperate with them.
- 29 Q. All this is true and, if carefully considered even logical. But even highly capitalistic America has cooperated with highly communistic Russia. That does not prove at all that the USTASCHA has caused unrest. That is still no reason why it was not supported by the German Armed Forces. One enters upon marriage for reasons of convenience.
- A. But the facts were that at that time one did not want anything from the USTASCHA in Croatia. The Armed Forces rather intended - and I was also given an order to that effect - to throw out the people from the USTASCHA units and to transfer them to the SS and the police.
- 30 Q. Were there any people in Croatia who rejected the USTASCHA ?
 A. Yes.
- 31 Q. Did these Croatians under certain circumstances seek refuge with the TITO bands ? Perhaps the hostile attitude between TITO and MICHALOWIC originated from that fact. In the eyes of the CHETNIKs every Croatian belonged to the USTASCHA.
- A. The CHETNIKs had no uniform leadership.

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- 32 Q. Were they Serbs ?
 A. Of course, they were Serbian Nationalists.
- 33 Q. Was there an assignment staff KAMMERHOFFER ?
 A. Never. An assignment staff in the sense of the word or with this name never existed. This is the very first time that I hear about this.
- 34 Q. If General PANWITZ talks to his officers of an assignment staff KAMMERHOFFER, he must have thought that his officers know what he is talking about.

- A. If FANSHWITZ did this it may be due to the fact that he was new in the district, and that he knew me and my name.
- 35 Q. It is written down here.
A. What is the date of it?
- 36 Q. 8 October 1943.
A. That was the time when FANSHWITZ had just come to the Croatian district, it was the time when he first appeared, September/October, and he most probably did not know the names of the individual offices. But he knew me personally. I suppose that this concerns my operational staff of which I was put in charge at that time.
- 37 Q. Did you have any troops under your command?
A. The police.
- 38 Q. Which police?
A. The German-Croatian police units, organized by me, in as far as they were not assigned to the Armed Forces for certain operations.
- 39 Q. Was HERDMANN himself under your command or did he only have to report to you?

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- A. HERDMANN was subordinated to me in as far as he had to make reports to me.
- 40 Q. Did you have the right to object to his decisions?
A. No.
- 41 Q. Was there a senior SS- and Police Chief in Croatia?
A. No.
- 42 Q. Did you also have to carry out his tasks?
A. No. There was no senior SS- and Police Chief because Croatia was an independent state, therefore I had only limited authority in my capacity as deputy of the Reichsfuehrer-SS.
- 43 Q. What were HERDMANN's tasks in Croatia?
A. Mainly enemy reconnaissance, intelligence and morale.
- 44 Q. What was his attitude with regard to the liquidation of the Jews?
A. At that time he was not yet there. HERDMANN only came down there after me, i.e. approximately in July or August 1943. At that time a Jewish problem did not exist in Croatia any longer, that was all settled during the invasion. The Jews who were still in Croatia at the end, were persons who had been exempted from every persecution, so-called honorary arians. Their status was respected by the Armed Forces as well as by us. Nothing was to happen to these people.
- 45 Q. You were talking of an independent government? In principle, that, is correct of course. Still, POCLAVNIC was not independent, he was a willing tool in the hands of the Nazi-hierarchy. There was an understanding between the POCLAVNIC government and Adolf HITLER, it was what one calls a QUIESCENT government, a government that was willing to adapt itself to the new era of that time. How large was your influence on the government as far as the recruiting of your units was concerned?

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- A. I did not have any influence at all. I was not commissioner of the government, but deputy for the Reichsfuehrer-SS. The German general in authority GLAISE was the liaison officer between myself and the government. He was ^{my} superior. I had to inform GLAISE of all my wishes and objections with regard to the Croatians.

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TRANSLATION OF INTERROGATION KAMMERHOFER
CONTINUED

- 46 Q. On the other hand you were not responsible to GLAISE for the tasks given to you by the Reichsfuehrer-SS ?
- A. No. - I also had to carry out orders from HIMMLER via GLAISE.
- 47 Q. Did GLAISE object ?
- A. Yes, that has happened. He took the view, I thought he was right....
- 48 Q. Didn't you run the risk that HIMMLER would dismiss you as a rival ?
- A. At that time I had taken a few such risks.
- 49 Q. What did you do, before you went to Croatia ?
- A. Before that - from September 1942 until I was appointed in January 1943 - I was training a police-operational group which was destined for Russia and was trained in Hindenburg in Upper-Silesia.
- 50 Q. Are you an old member of the police ?
- A. No. I was taken over by the police in 1942. This here was a purely military training.
- 51 Q. Did you ever make the acquaintance of Gottlob BERGER there ?
- A. I knew him from former times.
- (page 9 of original)
- 52 Q. Did he cooperate with you and GLAISE in order to carry out the recruiting for the Waffen-SS ?
- A. This recruiting and also the recruiting for the police was done through the SS-replacement command Croatia, and this was a branch of the SS-Main Office of which Obergruppenfuehrer BERGER was in charge.
- 53 Q. Who was in charge of this office in Croatia ?
- A. At the time when I first went there, First Lieutenant KERNMANN, later on Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. VOGL, and finally Hauptsturmfuehrer R. QUERF. As I said, this office was subordinated to the SS-Main Office and Obergruppenfuehrer BERGER entered twice into direct negotiations with the Croatian Government, respectively with POCLAVIC to determine the quota of volunteers which could be recruited for the SS.
- 54 Q. Did you have anything to do with Holland ?
- A. I was never in Holland, I was in Belgium.
- 55 Q. Did you recruit there too for the SS ?
- A. I had to look after the Flemish-SS which was newly organized at that time.
- 56 Q. What was your relationship to BERGER ?
- A. I mean officially, in regard to your duty ?
- A. I suppose that I was transferred from Belgium by order of BERGER.
- 57 Q. Who was your Chief of Staff when you went there in August ?
- A. In Croatia ?
- 58 Q. Who was your Chief of Staff ?
- A. At that time I did not have a Chief of Staff.
- 59 Q. Who was Lieutenant Colonel KOHN ?
- A. He was chief of the operational staff who was assigned to me in the fall of 1943. He was appointed by the leader of the units, which fought against guerilla bands, who was attached to the Reichsfuehrer-SS.

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- 60 Q. Was KORN assigned to you by BACH-ZELENSKI ?
A. Yes.
- 61 Q. Did KORN at that time belong to the staff of the Reichsfuehrer-SS, together with KNOBLAUCH and RHODE ?
A. If I remember rightly KORN was previously active with a police division.
- 62 Q. Was he a Lieutenant Colonel in the army or in the police ?
A. In the police.
- 63 Q. This document contains the terms "Chief of Staff" and "Assignment Staff KAMMERHOFER".
A. That should be operational staff, operational staff for the fight against partisans. It was a sort of Headquarters which BACH-ZELENSKI intended to set up in Croatia, respectively had setup, having been of the opinion that he was responsible for Croatia, respectively the district down there as far as the fight against partisans was concerned. That was actually never the case and therefore the operational staff was later on dissolved again.
- 64 Q. During one of your last interrogations you have stated that neither you nor your office had actively participated in the fight against partisans, i.e. that you have neither commanded troops, nor assigned troops to fight against partisans.
A. That is not correct. I gave orders, to be precise 3, to carry out several operations.
a) The operation in Truska Gora in the fall of 1943
b) the operation in the district of Viro Viditza.

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- 65 Q. The code name for it was "Wilson 1"
A. Yes, that was probably Viro Viditza. I was told it was operation KAMMERHOFER, but this can only be identical with the operation "Kornblume".
- 66 Q. An operation KAMMERHOFER is mentioned here and a battle report was sent to the 69th corps.
A. By whom ?
- 67 Q. First Cossack-division, PAKSWITZ.
A. He has made the same mistake before in the other document.
- 68 Q. He must have been a very careless man.
A. It might be explained by the fact that he had only just come to this district.
- 69 Q. The report is about the bridgehead at Gradina, mopping up the place Hlinki, furthermore it states enemy losses, own losses, booty (a large sack of secret papers and 4 sacks of explosives, delivered to the Security Service), 335 men were shot and 29 men taken prisoners by order of the assignment staff KAMMERHOFER.
A. (KAMMERHOFER laughs) That is indeed very bad, when is all that supposed to have taken place ?
- 70 Q. This took place on 6 November 1943.
A. On 6 November 1943 was neither my assignment staff nor I in that area, to my knowledge I had already been at Agram for a long time. The operation Kornblume came to an end when PAKSWITZ came unexpectedly.
- 71 Q. All this is taken from the war diary of the 1st Cossack division. At that time BREMER was in command of the 69th corps, and Major General

von PANSHWITZ in command of the First Cossack division.

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- A. The Cossack division got mixed up with the operation Kornblume, and was the reason why it was broken off.
- 72 Q. Another reference to you: 300 of the male population were shot by order of the assignment staff, 338 men on 7 November.
- A. An assignment staff could not give any such orders at all.
- 73 Q. The last time you stated categorically in one of your interrogations that during your time you never knew of any reprisals and that you have never heard of the reprisal order laying down a proportion of 50:1 and 100:1.
- A. It is correct that I never heard anything about the order regarding the proportion of 50:1 and 100:1, it is not correct that I never heard anything of reprisals.
- 74 Q. I mean reprisals on the part of the German Armed Forces against the population.
- A. I have already explained in my last interrogation that the police was obliged, on account of an arrangement with the Croatian Government and GLAISE-HORSTENAU, to request the Croatian Government that reprisals be taken, if such had to be taken or were considered necessary, and that the Croatian Government then carried out such reprisals at their own discretion.
- 75 Q. When you say "carried out", do you mean the actual execution?
- A. Also the selection, and the fixing of the number.
- 76 Q. In other words: when Croats ambushed members of the German Armed Forces, GLAISE-HORSTENAU demanded satisfaction, so to say, from the Croatian Government.

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- A. In the area north of the river Sava yes, definitely.
- 77 Q. And no requests were made on the part of the German Occupation Forces?
- A. No, but in very many cases the particulars of the persons used for reprisals by the Croatian Government were checked upon, in order to prevent that persons were removed who were wanted by the Main Headquarters of the FIRO-Forces for the purpose of exchanging them.
- 78 Q. Supposing, if what you just said is correct, it is a very obscure affair. The situation was that GLAISE-HORSTENAU asked the Croatian Government or even put pressure on them, and the Croatian Government turned round and shot a number of men to the best of their knowledge and belief. This is murder, and all people who had to do with it, participated in the murder. As you know there should always be a spiritual or actual connection between the acts and the individuals selected for the reprisals. If 5 of your officers were liquidated today at Agram and the Croatian Government is then asked to liquidate 10, 5 or 3 or 20 to the best of their knowledge and belief, what guarantee was there that these people who were liquidated were spiritually connected with the crime? How did the victims know why they were shot?

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A. The situation in Croatia was actually a little different, as the request to carry out reprisals had to be made via the local GROSSGESPAN (Lord), who was also chief of police. Furthermore, as far as I know it had been definitely arranged that only such people were to be selected for reprisals who took an active part in the respective attack or cooperated with the respective group.

79 Q. But you cannot possibly have the necessary number and the necessary kind of perpetrators in a refrigerator, so to speak, on ice, while all you had to do is to run to the Croatian Government, which in turn goes and gets the ringleaders out of the ice-box. I cannot imagine that the Croatian Government took very much pain to make sure that the persons they arrested were guilty in any way, that they were connected at all with the assault, as long as they belonged to those whom the Croatian Government disliked. Why should it have been handled differently there than in Macedonia, Greece, Albania and Montenegro. The reproach which is being made, is that you commanders absolutely omitted to make sure that only such people were killed during these reprisals who either actually or spiritually had something to do with the assault. People have said here that, when a car was blown up in Belgrade, ten priests were shot for that. It is complete madness to think that these priests had

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anything to do with the assault. Of course it is obvious that the priests belonged to a group which was a thorn in the flesh of the German Armed Forces.

I ask you, as I asked Mr. GLAISE-HORSTENAU, what steps did you take, apart from getting the assurance from the Croatian Government, to check up that the people who were shot were actually those who took part. You know as well as I do that, when the German forces invaded the Balkans, they had lists - just as we had when we invaded Germany - and as soon as a town was occupied the Security Service came and put 15 doctors, nurses, clergymen - what is generally called intelligentsia - in jail, and when the moment came to take reprisals, they got it in the neck. When I asked General FRIEDER whether he himself ever believed that those people had been in connection with the perpetrators, he told me he had to assume that. But "noblesse oblige", when one is a general in the German Armed Forces one does not have to believe everything that is served up to one. Did you make sure that the people were connected with the perpetrators?

A. When I started my activities in Croatia it did not come to my knowledge that, before my arrival and after the German troops had marched in, the German Armed Forces - Security Service was not there at all -

80 Q. You mean before your arrival?

A. that before my arrival, the German Armed Forces had taken hostages or that

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executions took place which could be called reprisals. Later on when such reprisals were carried out by Croats I pointed out in frequent discussions with the German general in authority and with the chief of the Security Service Assignment Command that everything must be done to prevent in the course of reprisals arbitrary murders. Only such persons should always be taken - and General GLAISE-HORSTENAU was of the same opinion - who were immediately connected with the plot or the act, or who were active members of the gang.

81 Q. I do not doubt all that. The question is only this: are you of the opinion that everything was actually done that way?

TRANSLATION OF INTERROGATION KAMMERHOFER
CONTINUED

- A. I hold the view that, where the Security Service had the opportunity to check the matter, it actually did not come to any executions.
- 82 Q. You have today a somewhat naive attitude towards the Security Service. I have never heard that the Security Service showed great sentimentality or great softness in its activities.
- A. I know how bad a reputation the Security Service has in general today. But I must say that the chief of the Assignment Command attached to me, HERMANN, had great understanding for General GLAISER-MORSTENAU's considerations and for mine, too, and that he was the one who made it possible to carry out the exchange of prisoners with the TITO-Army for months on end, although we had no authorization to do so by the Reichsfuehrer-SS or the Armed Forces.
- (page 17 of original)
- 83 Q. What I should like to know from you is the following: In your opinion, are reprisals, under certain conditions, a military affair and, if so, give us an explanation, please.
- A. In the sort of warfare as conducted in the Balkans, reprisals are definitely a military necessity.
- 84 Q. For instance? Construct a hypothesis.
- A. When rear units, supply lines, personnel belonging to the Armed Forces, were attacked by partisans who frequently could not be regarded as a recognized enemy, but rather, as it was customary in this country for a long time, carried on a predatory war of their own, as it is explicitly prohibited in the Hague convention, reprisals are undoubtedly necessary to stop such actions which violate international law. I am sure that very often commanders of the enemy forces did the same thing in other countries. But in the case of reprisals one has to distinguish between reprisals directed against institutions and executions of human beings.
- 85 Q. What is, in your opinion, the purpose of the reprisals?
- A. The purpose of the reprisals is to prevent that the individuals mentioned by me before be further supported by parts of the population, resp. that they continue their sinister work without fear.
- 86 Q. Are you of the opinion that the reprisals taken in the Balkans have borne any fruit for Germany?
- A. No.
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- 87 Q. Have they rather worked like a boomerang?
- A. I am of the opinion that too rigid reprisals have undoubtedly a detrimental effect on an occupational power, resp. a power which have to keep order.
- 88 Q. So-called Draconian reprisals?
- A. Too rigid ones.
- 89 Q. Did you ever consider, when you lived down there and the male population of a place was executed as a reprisal for an attack, that the population would come to the conclusion that they might as well join the TITO-forces. The psychological aspect of the reprisals is something which must not be overlooked.
- A. Yes.

TRANSLATION OF INTERROGATION KAMMERHOFFER.
CONTINUED

- 90 Q. Are you of the opinion that such reprisals should not have been preceded by an investigation through an army judge ?
- A. Wherever a judicial investigation is possible, any judicial investigation must be given preference to a reprisal.
- 91 Q. Do you know that the reprisals have weakened the population's war-potential for years on end ?
- A. No.
- 92 Q. Do you think that any population can stand up to being deprived of 50 or 100 men of military age again and again ?
- A. That is a great loss for any population.
- 93 Q. I believe that there is no population on earth that could stand up to that in the long run.

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Are you familiar with the details of the conference on the Wevelsburg ?

- A. No.
- 94 Q. But you know what it was about ?
- A. It is the first time I hear about it.

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION

I, Brigitte TURK, No. 35130 herewith certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the English and German languages, and that the above is a true and correct translation of interrogation KAMMERHOFFER.

Brigitte TURK
No. 35130.

Interview Summary v. 15.4.47


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APO 696 A
EVIDENCE DIVISION
INTERROGATION BRANCH

INTERROGATION SUMMARY NO. 1855



Interrogation of : Konstantin KAMMERHOFER, SS Gruppenführer
and Generalleutnant of the Police
Interrogated by : Mr. DeVries, 15 April 1947, Nuremberg
Division & Att'y : SS - Mr. Dobbs
Compiled by : HEW

PERSONS MENTIONED

BERGER, Gottlob	- Obergruppenführer, Chief of the SS Hauptamt
REEDER	- Chief of Military Administration in Belgium and Northern France
GLAISE-HORSTELAU	- General
HEERMANN	- Hauptsturmführer, Commander of the SS Replacement Command in Croatia
Dr. VOGEL	- Sturmbannführer, HEERMANN's successor
ROESCH	- Obersturmbannführer, VOGEL's successor
PHILIPS	- Brigadeführer

SUMMARY

KAMMERHOFER, who last held the rank of SS Gruppenführer and Generalleutnant der Polizei, states that he was responsible (Betreuer) for the Flemish SS from June 1941 until May 1942. His main office was in Brussels. KAMMERHOFER states that a branch office of the SS Replacement Command "den Haag" in Antwerp had charge of the recruiting of volunteers for the Waffen SS and later on for the Flemish Legion in Belgium. The Antwerp office handled the recruiting of voluntary Flemings according to an agreement between the Chief of the SS Hauptamt, Obergruppenführer BERGER, and the Military Administration Chief for Belgium and Northern France, REEDER. Subject claims never to have heard that force was used in the execution of the recruitment. According to source, the SS Hauptamt also financed the Flemish SS. The amounts, however, were not important and were paid out in cash. It was the task of the Flemish SS to form an armed

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organization, similar to the "Allgemeine SS" in Germany. KAMMERHOFER states that an organization "Foerdernde Mitglieder" (supporting members) existed in Belgium, which was to supply the necessary funds for the SS. Informant received his political directives from HIMMLER and BERGER.

KAMMERHOFER was HIMMLER's representative in Croatia from March 1943 until May 1945. He received his orders directly from HIMMLER and was subordinate to GLAISE-HORSTENAU, who was Plenipotentiary for all military and political tasks of the German Armed Forces in Croatia. It was KAMMERHOFER's task to establish a mixed German-Croatian police force, to take over the welfare of German minorities in Croatia, to support the SS Replacement Command in its duties and to look after natives of Croatia who had been drafted for the SS and police.

KAMMERHOFER asserts that the entire responsibility for recruitment for the Waffen SS in Croatia rested with the SS Replacement Command in Croatia, which was subordinate to the SS Hauptamt. When subject arrived in Croatia, the chief of the SS Replacement Command was Hauptsturmfuehrer KEERLMANN, succeeded by Sturmbannfuehrer Dr. VOGEL, who, in turn, was succeeded by Obersturmbannfuehrer ROESCH. Certain agreements had been reached between the German and Croatian governments which regulated the manner of recruiting and which fixed the number of men who could be recruited. This arrangement referred to Croatian citizens as well as to members of the German minority.

Towards the end of 1942 or the beginning of 1943, negotiations took place concerning the activation of a division consisting chiefly of Musselmans. These negotiations were held between BERGER, Brigadefuehrer PHLEPS, General GLAISE-HORSTENAU on one side and the Croatian government on the other. In May 1943 a treaty was signed concerning the activation of a German-Croatian police organization. This treaty was signed by PHLEPS, GLAISE-HORSTENAU and the Croatian chief of state, Dr. Ante PAVELIC, called the Poglavnik. This treaty made the provision that members of the German minority in Croatia who, according to Croatian legislation, were obliged to serve in time of war were to be placed at the disposal of HIMMLER. According to informant, these provisions were subsequently verified through the Foreign Office in Berlin and the Croatian Foreign Minister in Zagreb for the Croatian government. The treaty concerning recruitment for the German-Croatian police was signed by GLAISE-HORSTENAU and the former Croatian Foreign Minister, Dr. LORKOWITZ. KAMMERHOFER claims that he personally ascertained that the men who were recruited for the German forces came on a voluntary basis. Instead of signing individual statements indicating that they had joined of their own free will, entire groups of peasants who had been recruited signed such statements, under order of their superior. KAMMERHOFER admits that the treaties concerning the draft of Croats did not express

the opinion or desire of the majority of the Croatian people.

Asked about the Ustascha, KAMMERHOFER asserts that this was a political organization (politische Kampforganisation), which had been established in 1931 or 1932 in Italy by Croatian emigrants based on the principles of fascism. Subject estimates the number of the Ustascha troops in Croatia to have been 80,000 men. The leader of these Ustascha units was the Poglavnik.

The Germans shifted part of the responsibility for the unrest which prevailed in Croatia to the Ustascha. In fact, GLAISE-HORSTENAU called on the Poglavnik concerning the excesses which the Ustascha had committed. Informant claims that there was no connection between the Ustascha and the SS Hauptamt.

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
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Interrogation Nr. 1034 A.

auf Veranlassung von
Mr. DUBES 22-Section



VERNEHMUNG

Konstantin Kammacher am 16. April 1947
18,00 Uhr durch Mr. Dr. VOIGT
Stenogr.: R. Kessler.

F: Ihren Namen bitte!

A: Konstantin Kammacher.

F: Sind Sie sich bewusst, dass Sie unter Eid stehen,

A: Ja.

Bitte, darf ich zu meinen Aussagen von gestern hören,
welche Hinweise ich gegeben habe von Männern, die aus Kroatien eingezogen
waren?

F: Ich habe das Protokoll jetzt nicht hier.

A: Ich habe etwas nachgedacht, ich weiß nicht genau, ob das
uebereinstimmt. Es müssen gewesen sein 15-16 000 Volkdeutsche und 35 bis
40 000 Kroaten.

F: Für die Waffen-SS?

A: Und Polizei.

F: Für die Waffen-SS und Polizei im Laufe Ihrer Zeit,

A: Nein, auch schon bevor ich da unten war, Gewandzeichnung
aus den kroatischen Teilen von Region der Einziehung wie von Kammacher.

Dann war gestern die Rede von einem Brief des Herrn Bley.

F: Welcher Dienstgrad.

A: General-Lieutenant. In dem Brief hieß es "SS-Unterschieds-Verbande"

Ich habe auch da nachgedacht: Es war einmal in der Zeit, bevor ich kam, ich weiss nicht genau aus welcher Zeit der Brief datiert, eine Ustacha-Einheit; sie nannte sich "Schwarze Teufel", die wurde geführt von einem gewissen Franzeditz. Es bestünde die Möglichkeit, dass er sich einmal die Bezeichnung SS-Ustacha zugelegt hat. Sie haben schwarze Rosen getragen im Kampf.

F: Wen unterstand diese Einheit?

A: Dem Kroten nicht, Herrn Phleps. Ich muss mich berichtigen, es besteht die Möglichkeit, weil diese Einheit im Bereich des General Phleps gestanden ist, dass sie ihm unterstellt war in diesem Raum.

Dann eine dritte Sache: Auf die Frage, "was kukuk hatte das SS-Hauptamt mit der Ustacha zu tun gehabt, habe ich gestern geantwortet, "mir ist nichts davon bekannt? Nun muss ich hinzufügen, dass etwa im Spätsommer 1944 etwa 15 Offiziersanwärter einer Ustacha-Abteilung (Poglavnik-Leibgarde) zu einem SS-Junkerlehrgang zum übernommen wurden. Das ist eine Angelegenheit, die mir nachträglich bekannt wurde vom SS-Hauptamt Berger vereinbart wurde.

F: Herr Kammerhofer, ich möchte mich fuer heute beschränken auf eine Angelegenheit, die sich auf die Rekrutierung in Ungarn bezieht. Wir haben darüber gesprochen, auch darüber, dass ein Vertrag gemacht wurde zwischen der ungarischen Regierung und Deutschland. Ich möchte zuerst von Ihnen wissen, woher stammt Ihre Kenntnis ueber die Rekrutierung in Ungarn, und wie weit sind Sie direkt oder indirekt mit diesem Vertrag in Verbindung gewesen,

A: Ich hatte mit der Rekrutierung in Ungarn gar nichts zu tun gehabt; mir wurden lediglich aus dem ungarischen Raum auch eine bestimmte Anzahl Volkdeutsche fuer die Polizeieinheiten zugewiesen. Als diese Ueberweisungen von Maennern fuer mein Aufgabengebiet begannen, habe ich mich interessiert, wie die Aushebung und die Rekrutierung dieser Maenner in Ungarn erfolgte, und da wurde ich, wie ich gestern ausgesagt habe, von dem Sachbearbeiter der Ergaenzungsstelle informiert.

F: Welche Ergaenzungsstelle?

A: Kroatien.

F: Wer war Sachbearbeiter?

A: Sturmabfuhrer Dr. Vogel, oder aber Hauptsturmabfuhrer Hegmann.

F: In welchem Jahr war das?

A: Sommer 1944.

F: Erklaren Sie mir jetzt, was Sie zu der Zeit darueber erfahren haben?

A: Nach Uebereinkommen, die zwischen Berliner Dienststellen und der ungarischen Regierung getroffen wurden, hat die ungarische Wehrmacht bestimmte Jahrgaenge der volkdeutschen Gruppen in Ungarn zur Kriegsdienstleistung einberufen, die Maenner durch das fuer Ungarn zustaeendige SS-Kreiskommando in Budapest mustern (rekrutieren) zu lassen, und bei Tauglichkeit diese Maenner an die betreffenden Einheiten ueberweisen.

F: Wissen Sie, wer diesen Vertrag auf deutscher und ungarischer Seite unterschrieb,

A: Nein; aber sachgebietsmässig war es fuer die SS zweifellos SS-Truppenfuhrer Berger von SS-Hauptamt.

F: Sind Ihnen naechere Einzelheiten bekannt ueber die Verhandlungen ueber Ungarn mit Berger?

A: Nein.

F: Ist Ihnen bekannt, wie sich dieser Vertrag ausgewirkt hat?

A: Zahlenmässig?

F: Wie war die Rekrutierung tatsaechlich und wieviele Leute hat man schaetungsweise herangezogen?

A: Ich kann ueber die Gesamtzahl keine Aussagen machen.

F: Schaetungsweise?

A: Es kann nur eine rohe Schaetzung sein: 1500 bis 2 000 Mann im Lebensalter ueber 40 Jahren.

F: Waren das Volkdeutsche?

A: Ja.

F: Koennen Sie nach Ihrer persoenlichen Ansicht sagen, ob alle die Leute tatsaechlich Freiwillige waren? Oder wissen Sie das nicht?

A: Nein. Ich habe mich bemueht, mit sehr vielen Menschen einzeln zu sprechen, kann dabei aber nicht annehmen, dass ich mit jedem gesprochen habe; wobei ich in jedem einzelnen Fall festgestellt habe, dass es sich zweifellos um Angehoerige der deutschen Volksgruppe handelte. Mir ist auch in Erinnerung, dass die Auswahl dieser Leute nicht von den deutschen SS-Truppenkommando erfolgt ist, sondern von Seiten der ungarischen Wehrmacht auf Grund der bei der ungarischen Wehrmacht vorliegenden Volkstammskartei.

F: Haben Sie je mit Berger, oder mit anderen Leuten ueber die Rekrutierung in Ungarn gesprochen?

A: Ich habe mit Obergruppenführer Berger darüber nie gesprochen, wohl aber mit dem Leiter des SS-Ersatzkommandos in Budapest, der früher einmal in Agram tätig war.

F: Wer war das?

A: Sturmbannführer Heermann.

F: Hatte Heermann persönlich mit dieser Angelegenheit zu tun?

A: Er war Leiter der Ergänzungsstelle in Budapest.

F: War er dabei, als dieser Vertrag zustande kam?

A: Das kann ich nicht genau sagen.

F: Haben Sie von Heermann, oder von anderen Stellen je erfahren, wie die Rekrutierung in Ungarn tatsächlich finanziert wurde?

A: Nein, darüber wurde nicht gesprochen.

F: WER wurde darüber Bescheid wissen?

A: Der Mitarbeiter dieses Ersatzkommandos und ganz bestimmt der von der Ersatzinspektion in Wien, die die vorgesetzte Dienststelle war, denn da ist alles durchgelaufen.

F: Haben Sie SS-Hauptsturmführer Dr. Erich Fuchrer gekannt?

A: Ich habe eine ganze Anzahl mit dem Namen Fuchrer gekannt-- ein Rechtsanwalt in Wien?

F: Ja.

A: Den Namen nach ist er mir bekannt.

F: Welche Funktionen hatte er?

A: Ich weis nur, dass er vor den Kriege im Zivilberuf Rechtsanwalt war. Ob er später eingezogen wurde, weiss ich nicht.

F: Kannten Sie Brigadeführer Edmund VERSENHART?

A: Ich habe Voessener einmal persönlich kennengelernt 1938, nach dem Anschluss in Wien, habe von ihm später wieder gehört, dass er vor meiner Zeit in Kroatien war, und nachher Gesandter in Ungarn. Wieder gesehen habe ich ihn auch jetzt, hier im Hause.

F: Sind Ihnen noch weitere Einzelheiten über die Rekrutierungen in Ungarn bekannt?

A: Nein.

F: Wir wollen dann zu einem anderen Punkt übergehen, und zwar kommen wir zur Rekrutierung in Kroatien. Wie Sie gestern ausgelegt haben, ist ein Vertrag zustandgekommen zwischen der deutschen Regierung und den kroatischen Behörden, nicht wahr?

A: Ja.

F: Und nach diesem Vertrag sollten sogenannte Volksdeutsche in Betracht kommen fuer die Rekrutierung fuer die Waffen-SS, oder fuer irgendwelche andere Einheiten, wo sie eben benoetigt werden wuerden. Dieser Vertrag ist abgeschlossen worden, wie Sie sagten, zwischen dem Fuehrer der Kroaten---

A: Volksgruppe Altgeyer.

F: Der Vertrag ist zwischen der Regierung abgeschlossen worden Juglawnik und---

A: Und den Auswärtigenminister.

F: Wenn ich Sie nun richtig verstehe, ^{sind} ~~haben~~ die Verhandlungen geführt worden nicht mit dem Fuehrer der Volksgruppe, aber der offizielle Vertrag wurde mit dem Fuehrer der kroatischen Regierung abgeschlossen; stimmt das?

A: Soweit es sich um Volksdeutsche handelte, ja.

F: Ich spreche nur von den Volksdeutschen?

A: Ja.

F: Wann wurde der Vertrag abgeschlossen?

A: Der erste Vertrag muss abgeschlossen worden sein in der zweiten Hälfte 1941. Diese Verträge wurden dann laufend ergänzt und erweitert. Im Sommer 1943 wurde dann grundsätzlich festgestellt, dass ohne Beschränkung, ohne zahlenmässige Beschränkung, alle Angehörigen der deutschen Volksgruppen, die nach den kroatischen Gesetzen zur Kriegsdienstleistung verpflichtet sind, dem Reichsführer SS zur Ableistung dieser Kriegsdienstverpflichtung zur Verfügung stehen.

F: Schildern Sie mir bitte von Anfang an, wie die Verhandlungen geführt wurden, wer die Verträge unterschrieben hat usw.

(Berger mit ungarischen Dienststellen)

A: Ende 1941, Anfang 1942 wurde in Suedostran mit der Aufstellung einer fuer das dortige Gebiet bestimmten SS-Division begonnen, die spaeter den Namen "Prinz Eugen" bekam. Unter Suedostran versteht sich das Gebiet des ehemaligen Jugoslawien, Rumänien und den suedlichen Teil von Ungarn. Mit der Aufstellung dieser Einheit war der aus dieser Gegend beheimatete SS-Brigadefuehrer Generalmajor Franz Kraljitz Philaps von Reichsfuehrer-SS betraut. Fuer die Einziesung der Wehrmacht stand ihm eine Aussonstello des SS-Kroatienkommandos Suedost in Wien zur Verfuegung. Die damals abgeschlossenen Uebereinkommen, oder Verträge mit den in Betracht kommenden Nationalisten sind mir in Wortlaut oder im Detail nicht bekannt.

Ende 1942, Anfang 1943 wurde von Reichsfuehrer-SS der Auftrag gegeben, neben dieser Division Prinz Eugen in kroatischen Raum eine in Wesentlichen aus Muselmännern bestehende Division aufzustellen. Diese Division erhielt spaeter den Namen "Handar".

F: Das waren Leute aus dem Bereich von Bosnien?

A: Das waren im Wesentlichen Leute, hauptsächlich aus Bosnien. Die fuer diese Aufstellungen notwendigen Besprechungen zwischen der kroatischen Regierung und deutschen Dienststellen, wurde nach meinem Wissen in Kroatien selbst vom Brigadefuehrer Filipps und dem deutschen Bevollmaechtigten, General Glaise Horstenau gefuehrt in Berlin, von Seiten des SS-Hauptamtes, Gruppenfuehrer Berger, ueber die kroatische Gesandtschaft.

F: Von wem haben Sie das erfahren?

A: Als ich spaeter nach Kroatien gekommen bin, habe ich mich interessiert, ich wollte mir selbst ein Bild machen, auf welcher Grundlage die Eingebungen erfolgt sind, wobei ich vorstehende Feststellungen gemacht habe. Von wem ich die Einzelheiten habe, kann ich nicht mehr sagen.

In Mai 1943 wurden fuer die Aufstellung der deutsch-kroatischen Polizeiverbaende, auf Grund von Besprechungen zwischen dem deutschen Bevollmaechtigten und der kroatischen Regierung, weitere kroatische Kontingente (erstmalig 7 500 Mann) bewilligt. Diese Absprache wurde in Form eines Gedaechnisprotokolls niedergelegt und von Filipps, Dr. Antopavelic und dem deutschen Bevollmaechtigten General Glaise Horstenau unterzeichnet. In diesem Gedaechnisprotokoll war auch festgelegt, dass ueber die vorstehenden Absprachen hinaus die Angehoerigen der deutschen Volksgruppen, soweit sie nach den kroatischen Landesgesetzen zur Kriegsdienstleistung verpflichtet waren, dem Reichsfuehrer-SS zur Ableistung dieser Kriegsdienstverpflichtung zur Verfuegung stehen. Die Aufteilung der Maenner auf Wehrmacht, SS und Polizei oblag von diesem Zeitpunkt an

den deutschen bevollmächtigten General, der seinerseits einem deutschen General Jappe mit der Durchführung beauftragte. Ab diesem Zeitpunkt musste das SS-Ersatzkommando Kroatien jeden weiteren Bedarf an Nachersatz bei diesem genannten General Jappe anwenden, der seinerseits die Besprechungen mit den kroatischen Dienststellen führte.

Im Herbst 1943, es mag auch Spätsommer 1943 gewesen sein, wurde von Seiten des Ersatzkommandos nochmals ein Zwangs-Kontingent von etwa 10 bis 12 000 Mann angefordert, da eine zweite kroatische SS-Division mit dem Namen "Kama" aufgebaut werden sollte. Die Polizei beanspruchte etwa vierteljährlich ebenfalls über Ersatzkommando General Jappe einen Nachersatz von rund 2 000 Mann. Die Einschiebungen aus dem gesamten jugoslawischen Raum gingen, von Einzelfällen abgesehen, etwa Juni 1944 zu Ende. Nach dieser Zeit befasste sich das Ersatzkommando Kroatien, das gleichzeitig auch Entlassungsstelle war, von Einzelfällen abgesehen, nur noch mit Entlassungen.

F: Können Sie mir irgend welche weiteren Angaben machen über die Personen des SS-Hauptamtes, die sich evtl. aktiv an den Verhandlungen mitgewirkt haben,

A: Nein; das kann nur Gruppenführer Berger gewesen sein, der Leiter der SS-Ersatzinspektion in Wien, Stabsamtsführer (?)—

F: Haben Sie jemals diese Verträge gesehen?

A: Über die Polizei habe ich sie gesehen.

F: Wer hat diese unterschrieben?

A: Das habe ich gesagt: Poglavnik und Glaise Horstensau.

F: Wann wurde Poglavnik eingesetzt?

A: Er wurde bei Errichtung des kroatischen Staates eingesetzt. Stabschef

F: Wann ungefähr?

A: Anfang Sommer 1941.

F: Ist Ihnen bekannt, wie Poglavnik die Macht bekommen hat?

Von wem ist er ernannt worden?

A: Bei Kriegsausbruch mit Jugoslawien befand sich in Italien eine Gruppe kroatischer Emigranten etwa seit dem Jahre 1926. Diese Emigranten gründeten in Italien in der Zeit von 1930 bis 1932 die Organisation "USTASCHA" (auf Deutsch Rebellen oder Aufständische). Als Führer dieser USTASCHA hat sich in Italien der spätere Dr. Dabellito, ehemals Abgeordneter in Agram, zum Führer entwickelt. Nach dem Einmarsch der deutsch-italienischen Truppen in Jugoslawien war das Gebiet von Kroatien wohl auf Grund früherer Abgraben italienisches Interessengebiet und die italienische Regierung setzte dort diesen Führer der Ustascha, Dr. Dabellito, der in der Zwischenzeit den Titel Poglavnik (neue kroatische Bezeichnung für Stabschef) erhalten hatte, ein. Eine Volksgruppe, Volksvertretung, die aus allen Teilen des kroatischen Landes geschickt war, legitimierte diesen Poglavnik und die Ustascha-Regierung. Wie bekannt, wurde später die Ustascha-Regierung und noch ein italienischer Thronkandidat (Herzog von Aosta) überraschend bei einer Besprechung in Rom oder Venedig, eingesetzt, doch vertrat dieser Thronkandidat nie das Land.

F: Damit bestätigen Sie also noch einmal, dass die Verträge, die zwischen Jugoslawien und Deutschland abgeschlossen worden sind, durch eine illegale Regierung gemacht wurden? Das gehen Sie doch zu, nicht wahr?

A: Sicher, die Regierung wurde eingesetzt. In Dussenden von anderen Fällen wird das leider auch so gemacht.

F: Wie Sie gestern erwähnten, waren grosse Schwierigkeiten mit den militärischen Einheiten in Jugoslawien. Ich habe hier einen Brief----

A: Welche Schwierigkeiten?

F: Schwierigkeiten mit den Jugoslawen, mit den militärischen Einheiten, also den kroatischen Einheiten usw.?

A: Ob Schwierigkeiten bestanden zwischen deutschen- und kroatischen Einheiten?

F: Es sind im Allgemeinen grosse Schwierigkeiten gewesen.

A: Sicher.

F: Ich habe hier einen Brief von Himmler an den Beauftragten in Kroatien.

A: Das muss ich gesehen sein.

(Brief wird vorgelesen)

F: Auf was haben sich diese Schwierigkeiten bezogen auf Einheiten, die fuer die Waffen-SS geworben worden sind, oder die der Waffen-SS unterstanden?

A: Ueber die Möglichkeiten von Aufstellungen bewaffneter Einheiten in diesem Raum bestanden zwischen mir und dem SS-Hauptamt tatsächlich beachtliche Anschauungs-Differenzen. Da ich von meiner Auffassung überall, wo ich Gelegenheit hatte, Gebrauch machte, führte das wohl dazu, dass ich mehrmals dienstunzulässig wegen von Reichsführer-SS und seinen Dienststellen einstecken musste. Es war praktisch unmöglich, bei den nicht vorhandenen oder gestörten Verkehrsmitteln, die Aufstellung

1. den Tempo durchzuführen, beziehungsweise die Menschen nur heran-
zuziehen, wie das irgendwelche Sachbearbeiter sich in Berlin zurecht-
gelegt hatten. Es war ja nicht allein damit getan, dass man Werbeauf-
sätze rufe betreiben sollte, sondern jeder Angestellte und Angenommene
musste wegen der gesundheitlichen Verhältnisse in diesen Raum, ja auch
noch durch Quarantäne-Lagern geführt werden, was oftmals 4 bis 6 Wochen
in Anspruch nahm, um die Leute zu entlassen und festzustellen, dass sie
Fleckfieberfrei sind. Das alles führte wohl auch dazu, dass der Reichs-
führer-SS teilweise der Auffassung war, dass ich selbst als sein
Beauftragter, oder irgend welche kretischen Dienststellen, auch deutsche
Vernehmungsstellen, die von ihm gewünschten Aufstellungen nicht ent-
sprechend unterstützte, beziehungsweise vorwetzte trieb. Den Reichs-
führer-SS waren solche Winkelzüge auch nicht bekannt, dass neben
der SS ja auch die deutsche Wehrmacht gewisse Verbände aufstellte
und sich ihrerseits auch von den anfallenden Mannern ihren Teil weg-
nahm.

F: Herr Kammröder, wie erklären Sie Ihren Ausdruck
"das von Reichsführer gewünschte Tempo der Rekrutierung" und der
Aussage, dass es sich ausschließlich um Freiwillige handelte. Wie kann
man Freiwilligen ein bestimmtes Tempo vorschreiben? Wollen Sie mir
das erklären?

A: Doch. Unter Rekrutierung verstehen wir, wenn der sich
Freiwillig Gemeldet--- An welchem Datum war das?

F: 1. Juli 1943.

A: Ja, es handelte sich nur um Freiwillige.

aufgefordert zur Musterung wird, u.d., wie ich schon vorher gesagt habe,
diese vorgeschriebene Prozedur, bis er an die Truppe abgegeben wurde,

durchgelaufen ist. Das bezeichnen wir als Rekrutierung: Anwerbung, Musterung, erste gesundheitliche Überprüfung bis zur Abgabe des Mannes an eine Truppendienststelle, das war die Rekrutierung.

F: Nun, in Bezug auf diese Freiwilligenwerbung mochte ich Ihnen einen Paragraphen aus diesem Schreiben zitieren:

"Ich" - das heisst der Reichsführer - "habe Meldungen darüber, dass unsere kroatischen Dienststellen in den Gegenden, in denen sich Freiwillige zur SS-Freiwilligen-Division gemeldet haben, wobei Nacht wilde Rekrutierungen vornehmen; die jungen Männer aus den Betten holten und sie angeblich in Kasernen der kroatischen Wehrmacht steckten."

Nun, das bedeutet doch bestätigt nicht, dass das eine Freiwilligen-Aktion war, wenn man die Leute nachts aus den Betten holt?

A: Nachts aus den Betten holt? Das haben bestimmt nicht die Deutschen gemacht. Diese Freiwilligen wurden von kroatischen Dienststellen aus den Betten geholt, um sie zu verhindern, ihrer Freiwilligenmeldung zuzustimmen. So ist das zu verstehen. Ich weise auch, auf was Sie Bezug nehmen. Ich habe darüber schon meine Aussagen gemacht.

An und für sich war die Information des Reichsführers etwas übertrieben. Sie kam, wie ich später festgestellt habe, von irgend welchen Führern bei der Division Prinz Eugen, die gelegentlich beim Reichsführer waren. Tatsächlich haben zwischen den deutschen Einheiten der Wehrmacht einschliesslich der Waffen-SS und der Ustaša Spannungen geherrscht, die ganz beachtlichen Umfang annahmen. Die Ustaša (certlich) versuchte verschiedentlich mit allen möglichen Mitteln auch den Aufbau

der SS-Verbände zu stoeren und ging soweit, dass sie Maenner, die sich fuer die SS freiwillig gemeldet haben, aus den Betten holte, auf den Weg zum Bahnhof selbst abfingen, ja sogar aus Transportwagen herausscholt. Diesen Maennern wurde meist nahegelegt, in die Ustascha-Verbände einzutreten, in mehreren Faellen jedoch ergaben die Ermittlungen, dass erst solche Maenner in kroatische Gefangenenlager gesteckt wurden, K.Z.lager.

F: Die Ustascha war doch faschistisch eingestellt und wollte mit Italien und Deutschland zusammenarbeiten, und warum wollte sie die Freiwilligen zur Waffen-SS oder zu anderen Einheiten bringen?

A: Die Ustascha war zu der Zeit noch keine festgefugte Organisation, weil jede Gruppe weit weg von der Obersten Fuehrung in Agram war, um das auszufuehren, was von dieser Obersten Fuehrung befohlen wurde. Die deutsche Wehrmacht musste deshalb oftmals auch gegen solche Ustascha-gruppen einschreiten, weil diese durch ihr Verhalten -von mir schon mehrfach angegeben- nach Auffassung der deutschen Wehrmachtsdienststellen mit Unruhen der Ruhe in Kroatien waren.

F: Ich werde noch auf einen Punkt zurueckkommen. Sie haben gestern einen Unterschied gemacht zwischen den Leuten, die sich der Waffen-SS freiwillig zur Verfuegung stellten, und den Leuten, die sich zur Verfuegung stellen mussten. Sie wissen, worauf ich mich beziehe? Diesen letzten Punkt wollen Sie mir deutlich nun erklæren.

A: Die kroatische Regierung -bereits in der Zeit, wo ich ^{hatte} unten war- ~~mehr~~ versucht, die Freiwilligenwerbung in der Form abzu-
ändern, dass nicht Freiwillige eingestellt werden sollten, sondern die von der kroatischen Regierung fuer diese Zwecke zur Verfuegung Gestellten-- also die kroatische Regierung wollte die vom Reich gewünschten Kontingen-
te zur Verfuegung stellen. Die SS ihrerseits aber wiederum legte auf die

nur Verfügung Gestellten weniger Wert, als auf die Freiwilligen, aus leicht begreiflichen Gründen. Es hat sich auch tatsächlich herausgestellt, als die kroatische Regierung einmal etwa 2 000 Mann solcher Art abgestellt hatte, wobei wiederum auf Seiten der kroatischen Regierung betont wurde, es handle sich um Freiwillige, dass diese 2 000 Mann sich aus Elementen zusammensetzten, die bei der Musterung durch das SS-Ersatzkommando nur eine Auslese von etwa 15% ergeben haben. Also, von 2 000 Mann waren nach den Musterungs-forderungen des Ersatzkommandos nur 150 tauglich, wegen der Rest der Männer nach dem ganzen Erscheinungsbild fuer eine Dienstleistung ungeeignet war. Sie wurden dann zum Teil fuer einen leichteren Dienst in der Polizei eingestellt. Ist das jetzt fuer Sie klar?

F: Es handelt sich nach meinem Dafürhalten nicht darum, ob die Leute fuer Sie geeignet waren zur Waffen-SS zu kommen, sondern ^{sondern} ~~ob~~ ob die Leute freiwillig aus Uebertreibung zur Waffen-SS wollten.

A: Ich selbst habe mich um die Freiwilligkeit dieser von der kroatischen Regierung abgestellten Männer nachher interessiert und habe mit Hilfer von Dolmetschern auch eine ganze Anzahl von Männern gefragt. Das Bild, das sich dabei ergeben hat, war wider. Ein Teil der Männer sagte "ja" und sie haben auch Freiwilligen-Erklärungen unterschrieben, ein anderer Teil der Männer sagte, dass ihre ganze Einheit die Freiwilligkeitserklärungen abgegeben haben, nicht der einzelne persönlich. Also, es war kein einheitliches Bild.

F: Das heisst also, dass auf Befehl die Männer ihre Freiwilligkeit erklärt haben?

A: Ja, was man da so Befehl nennen kann.

F: Wo kam das ganze Geld her, das fuer die Propaganda, Registrierung, die Kosten, die fuer die Fuersorge der Angehörigen entstanden sind, noetig war?

A: Der Werbe-Apparat der SS-Ergaenzungsstelle in Kroatien war verhaeltnismaessig klein, die Kopfstaerke durfte kaum ueber 5 bis 6 Mann hinausgegangen sein, denn diese Werbestelle hatte ja keine andere Aufgabe, als Flugblaetter, Flugschriften, Plakatenwaerke, herdrucken zu lassen, und diese Drucksorten dann an verschiedene Verteilungsstellen:

A) der landeseigenen Verwaltung und Verbände,

B) der deutschen Wehrmacht (Wehrmachtsambassaden), und spaeter der SS und Polizei, weiterzugeben. Ich glaube auch, dass diese Drucksorten den wesentlichen Teil der Kosten dargestellt haben. Wenn der Mann sich freiwillig gemeldet hatte, wurde ihm ein Einberufungsschein zur Musterung zugesandt. An diesen Einberufungsschein war die uebliche Wehrmachtsfahskarte dran, sodass er von dem Augenblick an bei der naechsten deutschen Wehrmachtsstationstelle verpflegt und kostenlos mit der Eisenbahn (Verrechnungsweg) zur Musterungsstelle fahren konnte.

F: Und wann er gefallen ist?

A: Ueber den ueblichen Wehrgeld, der sich auch fuer landeseigene Verbände in gleicher Hoehc hielt, wie fuer die deutschen Verbände, hatte der Reichsfuehrer befohlen, dass in Kroatien eine Familienversorgung nach deutschen Grundsuetzen eingefuehrt wurde, also die Familie des Eingezogenen, die ja mit dem Abgang des Wehrmanns keine Einnahmen mehr hatte, bekam ab dem Zeitpunkt der Eingiehung eine Familienunterstuetzung, sogenannte oder die sogenannte Kriegsbegeldung. Die Hoehc der Familienunterstuetzung richtete sich nach einem bestimmten Existenzminimum, das der Leiter der Fuersorgestelle

in Kroatien -genannt SS-Fuersorge-Offizier Kroatien- mit der kroatischen Regierung festlegte, beziehungsweise der Kriegsbesoldung, die nach dem Dienstgrad des Betroffenen von Unteroffizier aufwärts gestaffelt war. Sowohl bei der Fuersorgeunterstuetzung, wie bei der Kriegsbesoldung gab es noch sogenannte Kinder- und Angehoerigen-Zulagen.

Ab Herbst 1943 wurde ^{neben} dieser Bargeldunterstuetzung zur Steuierung der in der Zwischenzeit eingetretenen Geldentwertung auch noch eine Natural-Unterstuetzung gewahrt, d.h. die Familien der eingezogenen Krieger bekamen entsprechend ihrer Kopfaahl Lebensmittel usw. zugeteilt. Die notwendigen Verträge fuer die Bargeldunterstuetzung musste von den Fuersorge-Offizier direkt, oder ueber den SS-Wirtschaftler Kroatien bei dem Intendanten, der deutsche bevollmaechtigte General in Kroatien, angefordert werden, der seinerseits ein Monats-Budget von der kroatischen Regierung zur Verfuegung hatte.

Die von der kroatischen Regierung zur Verfuegung gestellte Landeswahrung wurde meines Wissens im Verrechnungsweg mit Bar-Lieferungen aus Deutschland nach Kroatien abgegolten, da ausdruesslich in einem Staatsvertrag zwischen Kroatien und Deutschland festgelegt war, dass die wirtschaftliche Versorgung der deutschen Truppen in Kroatien, zu welchen spaeter auch die gemischten Verbände zaehten, zu Lasten des Reiches gingen. Die Naturalien, welche den Familien zugeteilt wurden, kamen ausschliesslich aus Nachschublagern der Wehrmacht zur Verteilung.

K: Es hat doch in Kroatien grosse Schwierigkeiten gegeben gerade mit der Versorgung der Familien, und man musste doch auf andere Quellen, Finanzquellen, zurueckgreifen.

A: Die Schwierigkeiten der Familienversorgung in Kroatien

lagen nicht in der Beschaffung der Geldmittel. Das kam wohl nach kürzeren oder längeren Buzungen zustande, auch dann, wenn sie oftmals sprunghaft erhöht werden mussten auf Grund der Inflation. Die Schwierigkeiten bestanden eigentlich in der Übermittlung des Geldbetrages vom Ky Fuersorge-Offizier an die Familien.

F: Herr Kammerhofer, verstehe ich Sie richtig, wenn ich sage, dass Sie die Rekrutierung als illegal betrachten, wenn Volksdeutsche, die tatsächlich schon fuer den kroatischen Staat selbst aufgerufen waren, oder aufgerufen werden sollten, dann von kroatischen Staat der Waffen-SS zur Verfuegung gestellt wurden?

A: Ich glaube, das muss ein Irrtum sein, das ist nicht illegal, sondern das waren die Maenner, die aufgerufen waren, die von der Reichsregierung zur Verfuegung gestellt wurden.

F: Ich frage Sie, ob Sie das als illegal betrachten. Sie haben doch gewisse Unterschiede gemacht zwischen den verschiedenen Rekrutierungen?

A: Ich machte einen Unterschied zwischen den tatsächlichen kroatischen Freiwilligen und ---

F: Welche Maenner haben Sie als unfreiwillig betrachtet?

A: Die Maenner, die von der kroatischen Regierung zur Dienstleistung bei der deutschen Wehrmacht, oder bei anderen Einheiten des Reichsfuehrers-SS abgestellt wurden.

F: Ist das nicht das Gleiche?

A: Nein, Sie sprachen hier von Freiwilligen, die aufgerufen werden sollten. Ein Jahrgang, der nicht aufgerufen ist, stand auch dem Reichsfuehrer nicht zur Verfuegung.

Den Reichsfuehrer standen immer nur diejenigen Jahrgaenge zur Verfuegung nach schriftlicher ^{freiwilligen}meldung, die von der kroatischen Regierung aufgerufen waren, zum Beispiel Jahrgang 1910, 1926-- da konnte man in Rahmen dieser Jahrgaenge werben. Bei den Volksdeutschen konnte der Reichsfuehrer nicht mehr werben, sondern er konnte nach diesen aufgerufenen Jahrgaengen mustern.

F: Und das betrachten Sie als unfreiwillig?

A: Das betrachte ich bei den Volksdeutschen als unfreiwillig.

Das ist keine persoenliche Freiheitsaeusserung mehr, sondern hier war festgelegt: "Du hast die Pflicht, diesem Genuge zu leisten. Die Regierung hatte mit der deutschen Regierung vereinbart da und daz da gehst Du hin. Daher kann nach den Leuten von da unten, so einen 18/19/20, auch 40 Jaehrigen um Gottes Willen nicht den Vorwurf machen, Du hast Dich zu einem SS-Blutward gemeldet.

F: Gut, das ist alles fuer heute.

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BIESTÄTTLICHE ERKLÄRUNG.

Institut f. Zeitgeschichte
München
ARCHIV
1948/56

Ich, KONSTANTIN KAMMERMEIER, schwöre sage aus und erkläre:

1. Ich bin am ^{23.} ~~15.~~ Januar 1899 in Thurnau/Steiermark geboren.

Ich besuchte die Volksschule, Bürgerschule und Handelsschule. Nach dem ersten Weltkrieg war ich als Kaufmann beruflich tätig.

2. Von Januar 1935 bis März 1935 war ich als Zivilangestellter beim Flüchtlingshilfswerk in Berlin, hiernach wurde ich SS-Führer. Mein höchster Dienstgrad war SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei. Von Juni 1941 bis Mai 1942 war ich Betreuer der Flämischen SS, mit dem Sitz in Brüssel. Von Mai 1942 bis Juli 1942 habe ich dann einen Polizeiausbildungskurs in Berlin mitgemacht. September 1942 bis März 1943 war ich beauftragt mit der Aufstellung und Ausbildung eines ~~SS-~~ Kommandos in HINDENBURG/SCHLESIESEN und wurde dann zum Generalmajor der Polizei ernannt.

3. Von März 1943 bis zum Zusammenbruch am 6. Mai 1945 war ich Beauftragter des Reichsführers SS für Kroatien. Ich hatte von REINER den Auftrag, in Kroatien eine geeichte deutsch-kroatische Polizei aufzubauen, die deutsche Volksgruppe Kroatien zu betreuen, das SS ~~Ersetz~~ Kommando Kroatien in ihren Aufgaben zu unterstützen und die Fuereorge für die zur SS- und Polizei eingezogenen Landeseinwohner zu errichten.

4. Als ich Ende März 1943 nach Kroatien kam bestand in Agram eine Nebenstelle des SS Ersatzkommandos Sudost in Wien, welche sich mit der Rekrutierung für die Waffen SS befasste. Diese Dienststelle unterstand ~~dem~~ dem SS Hauptamt in Berlin deren Chef ADOLF BERGER war und der die gesamte Verantwortung für die Rekrutierung der Waffen SS trug. Nach meiner Ankunft wurde diese Nebenstelle auch beauftragt, die zur Einstellung in die neu aufzustellenden Polizeiverbände notwendigen Männer anzuwerben. Später erhielt diese Dienststelle den Namen SS -Ersatzkommando Kroatien.

5. Ende 1941, anfangs 1942 wurde in Sudostraum, also im Gebiet des ehemaligen Jugoslawien, Rumänien und des südlichen Teiles von Ungarn, mit

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der Aufstellung einer SS-Division begonnen, die später den Namen "PRINZ ROGER" bekam. Mit der Aufstellung dieser Einheit war SS-

Brigade-Fuehrer Generalmajor PHILIPS von HENKLER beauftragt. Fuer die

Einziehung der Maenner stand ihm ^{eine} ~~die~~ ^{der Besatzungsposition} Nebenstelle ~~in einem der~~

4/1 — Südost in Wien zur Verfügung.

6. Ende 1942 anfangs 1943 wurde von HENKLER der Auftrag gegeben, im kroatischen Raum eine weitere im wesentlichen aus Muselmanen bestehende Division aufzustellen, die später den Namen HANDEAL erhielt. Diese Einheit bestand hauptsächlich aus Bewohnern BOSNIENS. Die fuer diese Aufstellung notwendigen Besprechungen zwischen der kroatischen und deutschen Regierung wurden unter anderem von Brigadefuehrer PHILIPS und dem deutschen bevollmächtigten General CHAISE-KRSTENAU geführt. Auch das SS-Hauptamt die fuer die Waffen SS verantwortliche Dienststelle nahm an den Verhandlungen teil. Der damalige Gruppenfuehrer GOTTLOB

Fr. Ljubo Juricic
BERGER Chef des SS-Hauptamtes verhandelte mit POGLAYEN, Staatsfuehrer des kroatischen Volkes. *Diese und spätere Verhandlungen führten zu Übereinkommen.*
Diese betrafen:

Der Vertrag betrafte etwa: 1.) Dass die Angehörigen der deutschen Volksgruppe in Kroatien zur Ableistung ihrer nach dem kroatischen Gesetz bestimmten Kriegsdienstpflicht dem Reichsfuehrer SS zur Verfügung stehen, der seinerseits entschied, in welchen Einheiten die Kriegsdienstpflicht abzuleisten ist. 2.) Dass eine jeweils bestimmte Anzahl von Landeseinwohnern kroatischer Nationalität, im wesentlichen Muselmanen zur SS-Division HANDEAL eingezogen werden, und dass eine bestimmte Anzahl fuer den Zweck der deutsch-kroatischen Polizei erfasst werden. Es wurden also dann nicht nur mehr Freiwillige der Volksgruppen gemustert, sondern einzelne Jahrgänge ganz oder teilweise eingezogen.

4/1 7. Im Herbst oder Spätsommer 1943 wurde von seiten des Kroatischen Kommandos nochmals ein ~~ein~~ Kontingent von etwa 10-12.000 Mann angefordert, da eine 2. kroatische SS-Division mit dem Namen "KAMA" aufgebaut werden sollte.

Ab Herbst 1941 bis zum Schluss wurden etwa 15 - 16.000 Volksdeutsche und etwa 35 - 40.000 Kroaten erfasst.

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8. Ich bin mir bewusst, dass die zwischen dem SS-Hauptamt und der von Deutschland in Kroatien eingesetzten Regierung POGLAVNIK OKUPATIONSENEN Rekrutierungsverträge; Abkommen waren, die nicht die parlamentarische Genehmigung des Volkes erhalten hatten, da POGLAVNIK nach der Invasion der deutschen Wehrmacht ohne Volksbefragung durch die Deutschen mit der Staatsgewalt beauftragt worden war.

Auch die Freiwilligkeit der von der kroatischen Regierung fuer die Waffen SS abgestellten Maenner war nach meiner eigenen Information sehr fraglich. Statt eine individuelle Freiwilligkeitserklärung abzugeben, folgten gesamte Einheiten, grösstenteils aus einfachen ungebildeten Bauern bestehend, unter moralischem Druck dem Befehl und Beispiel der Vorgesetzten, ohne sich der Konsequenzen und Verpflichtungen bewusst zu sein.

Ich habe obige Erklärung bestehend aus 3 Seiten in deutscher Sprache gelesen und erkläre, dass es nach meinem besten Wissen und Glauben die volle Wahrheit ist. Ich hatte Gelegenheit, Änderungen und Berichtigungen in obiger Erklärung vorzunehmen. Diese Erklärung habe ich freiwillig gemacht, ohne jedwedes Versprechen auf Belohnung und ohne keinerlei Drohung oder Zwang ausgesetzt.

Munich, Germany den 19. April 1947

Konstantin Hammerhofer
Unterschrift


Before me, DAN DE VRIES, U.S. Civilian, AGO identification number A 443938, Interrogator, Evidence Division, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, appeared KONSTANTIN HAMMERHOFER, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement (EINGESTANDENLICHE ERKLÄRUNG) consisting of 3 pages in the German language and swore that the same was true on theday of April 1947 in Munich, Germany.

Signature.

Датум 30.12.47

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K. Schmidt

Vernehmung des Konstantin KAMMERHOFER,
SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei,
am 30. Dezember 1947 von 14,00 bis 14,20 Uhr
durch Mr. Joseph TANCOS
requested by: Ministries Division - Mr. PETERSEN
Stenographin: Lilly Daniel.

1.F. Herr KAMMERHOFER, Sie befinden sich weiterhin unter Eid.

A. Ja.

2.F. Welchen Dienstgrad hatten Sie zuletzt?

A. SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei.

3.F. Wann waren Sie in Belgien?

A. Von Juni 1941 bis März 1942.

4.F. ~~Was~~ ~~Wakaker~~ war Ihre Funktion?

A. Betreuer der flämischen SS. Ich war dem SS-Hauptamt - Germanische Leitstelle - unterstellt.

5.F. War das JACOBSEN?

A. Nein, das war RIEDWEG.

6.F. Wann sind Sie zum ersten Mal zur Germanischen Leitstelle, SS-Hauptamt, gekommen?

A. Auf meiner Reise nach Belgien zum ersten Mal, also 1941.

7.F. Seit wann bestand die Germanische Leitstelle?

A. Meines Wissens wurde sie unmittelbar zuvor gegründet.

8.F. Hat sie JACOBSEN oder RIEDWEG gegründet?

A. Ob JACOBSEN sie gegründet hat, weiss ich nicht; damals war er Mitarbeiter von RIEDWEG.

9.F. Wie wurde die flämische SS finanziert?

A. Die hat sich zu meiner Zeit finanziert in ihrem Barbetrag aus Mitgliedsbeiträgen, die eingingen; die Uniformen und die Ausrüstung hat das Reich bezahlt.

10.F. Auf welcher Weise wurde das bezahlt?

A. Auf dem normalen Beschaffungsweg der Verwaltung. Waffen haben sie zu meiner Zeit nicht gehabt. Mit der Ausrüstung meine ich Bekleidung, Leibriemen, Rucksack, - was eben zur bekannten Ausrüstung der SS gehört.

11 .F. Was war der Zweck der germanischen SS?

A. Das waren dieselben Aufgaben der Allgemeinen SS im Reich, übertragen auf die Landesbewohner in diesen germanischen Gebieten.

12.F. Was war eigentlich der politische Zweck der germanischen SS?

A. Ich glaube, man kann von einem politischen Zweck weniger sprechen, als von einem völkischen Zweck. Politisch gemessen an Parteien hat sich die SS nicht, und parteiische Tätigkeit hatte sie nicht zu erfüllen.

13.F. Haben sie nicht Anschluss an Deutschland gesucht?

A. Die Bewegung, die Anschluss gesucht hat...

14.F. De GRELLE?

A. ...nein, das waren die Wallonen. Bei der flämischen SS war die Vertreterin der Zusammenarbeit die Deflag (Deutsch-flämische Arbeitsgemeinschaft).

15.F. Wie war es mit den Rexisten?

A. Das war de GRELLE.

16.F. Dann war noch van der WIELE.

A. Das war Deflag.

Sie meinen den flämischen Nationalverband: Staf van de CLERK.

17.F. Wann & hat das SS-Hauptamt in Belgien zum ersten Mal Verbindung mit diesen Parteien aufgenommen?

A. In etwa: Zu Beginn 1941, also 3 - 4 Monate vor & meinem Kommen. Ich betone ausdrücklich: ungefähr.

18.F. Bestand damals schon die Germanische Leitstelle?

A. Das weiss ich nicht.

19.F. Wer hat zuerst Verbindung mit diesen Parteien aufgenommen?

A. Auf der einen Seite die flämische Arbeitsgemeinschaft, deren Präsident im Reich BERGER war, in Flandern van der WIELE, auf der anderen Seite die Ergänzungsstelle der Waffen-SS...

20.F. Das ist die Partei, die den Anschluss suchte?

A. Das ist die Bewegung, die die weitgehendste Zusammenarbeit gesucht hat. Von einem Anschluss war zu meiner Zeit überhaupt nicht die Rede.

21.F. Wann war die Besetzung Belgiens?

A. 1940.

22. F. Ist Ihnen bekannt, was für Verbindungen vor der Besetzung bestanden?

A. Das weiss ich nicht.

23. F. Auf welche Weise wurde die Unterstützung der flämischen SS und der Parteien seitens des SS-Hauptamtes gemacht?

A. Von der Partei weiss ich nicht. Die SS wurde von dem SS-Hauptamt mit der Ausrüstung und den Dienstvorschriften versehen.

24. F. Wann war BERGER das letzte Mal in Belgien?

A. Das weiss ich nicht. Zu meiner Zeit war er zweimal da: ich glaube, einmal im zeitlichen Herbst und einmal d. um das Jahresende 1941 oder anfangs 1942.

25. F. Was war der Zweck seiner Reise 1941.

A. Das waren Aufstellungsfragen und Fragen der Ergänzungsstelle. Er hat sich um interne Sachen damals nicht gekümmert.

26. F. Bestanden irgendwelche Übereinkommen mit der Regierung in Bezug auf die Organisationen ?

A. Ganz sicher. Es bestanden Übereinkommen sowohl betreffend der Annahme von Freiwilligen wie über die Aufstellung der flämischen SS. Über den deutschen Militär-Verwaltungschef zur flämischen Regierung. Verhandlungspartner waren in diesem Fall: Militärverwaltungschef RAEDER. Direkte Abmachungen von seiten des SS-Hauptamtes oder einer anderen Stelle sind mir nicht bekannt.

27. F. Ich habe geglaubt, dass die flämische SS vom SS-Hauptamt allein finanziert wurde.

A. Nein.

28. F. Wann wurde die flämische SS gegründet?

A. Vor der Okkupation bestimmt nicht. Vielleicht 2-3 Monate, bevor ich kam.

29. F. Hat sie BERGER aufgestellt?

A. Das weiss ich nicht. Ob diese flämische SS von der Deflag aufgestellt wurde oder vom Ersatzkommando, das kann ich heute nicht mehr sagen.

30. F.

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30.F. Auf welcher Weise wurde die Rekrutierung in Belgien durch
für die Waffen-SS durchgeführt?

A. Auf freiwilliger Grundlage, durch die Ergänzungsstelle.

31.F. Wie hat es die Rexistenpartei durchgeführt?

A. Zu meiner Zeit haben die Rexisten mit der SS nichts zu tun gehabt. Sie sind von der Wehrmacht ausgeschieden später und dann zur SS gestossen. Zu meiner Zeit haben die Werbungen alle belgischen Parteien unterstützt, sowohl der Flämische Nationalverband - als die stärkste Partei - sowie die Deflag.

32.F. War BERGER Präsident der Deflag in seiner Eigenschaft als
Chef des SS-Hauptamtes?

A. Nein, sondern persönlich. Es gab einen Präsidenten im Reich
und einen in Flandern, ^{WILLIKINGS.} Ich muss mich berichtigen: Ob WILLI-
KINGS oder einer der bekannten Flamenführer BORMS oder WORMS..

33.F. Hat BERGER ausser dieser Organisation noch irgendwelche anderen Organisationen betraut?

A. Nein, das ist mir nicht bekannt.

34.F. Weshalb wurden die Leute in 2 Volksgruppen in Belgien aufgeteilt?

A. Die belgische Staatsbevölkerung schied sich in 2 Landesteile: in den wallonischen und flämischen Landesteil. Auch sprachlich war das bedingt.

35.F. Hat die SS das angestrebt?

A. Nein.

36.F. Hatte das einen politischen Zweck?

A. Politischer Zweck - das würde zu weit gehen. Völkischer Zweck.

37.F. War nicht eine gewisse Quote für die Rekrutierung der Waffen-SS festgelegt?

A. Ich kenne die näheren Bestimmungen der Rekrutierung nicht, weil ich nichts damit zu tun hatte. Soweit mir aber in Erinnerung ist, wurden bestimmte Kontingente festgelegt, und zwar in einer Vereinbarung zwischen der Ergänzungsstelle und dem flämischen Nationalverband, wieviel von den ~~Rixxx~~ Frei-

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Freiwilligen zur Waffen-SS und wieviel zur sogen. flämischen Legion kommen sollten.

38.F. Wer hat das gemacht?

A. Das Ergänzungscommando.

39.F. Wie hat die Division geheissen?

A. Zu meiner Zeit gab es keine Division. ^{Da} ~~Rann~~ sind die Falamen im wesentlichen, soweit sie keine Spezialisten waren, zur Division Wiking gekommen (das ist eine ~~ganz~~ gesamt-deutsche Division). Die Spezialisten kamen zu den Spezialtruppen, also Artillerie, Nachrichten usw. und die grosse Masse kam in ^{die} ~~das~~ damals auf Wunsch in die durch den flämischen Nationalverband aufgestellte flämische Legion.

40.F. Was haben Sie von Mai 1942 bis Mai 1943 gemacht?

A. Von April 1942 bis Juni 1942 war ich zu einem Polizeiausbildungskurs in Berlin, dann machte ich von Juni 1942 bis anfangs September 1942 eine Informationsreise in die Ukraine. Von September 1942 bis März 1943 hatte ich die Aufstellung und Ausbildung einer Polizeiabteilung in Hindenburg in Oberschlesien, die für einen späteren Einsatz bestimmt war und blieb in Kroatien.

Die Polizeiverbände, die in Kroatien aufgestellt waren, waren gemischt deutsch-kroatische Kontingente, wovon die ~~letzteren~~ letzteren ebenfalls durch das dort zuständige Ersatzcommando angeworben und eingestellt wurden.

41.F. Wer hat die Verträge in Kroatien angestrebt?

A. Erst kam die Waffen-SS, dann 3 Jahre später die Polizei.

Die Waffen-SS-Werbung in Kroatien begann Ende 1941 unter der dortigen deutschen Volksgruppe zum Zwecke der Aufstellung der SS-Division "Prinz Eugen".

42.F. Ich glaube, das war zwangsweise.

A. In der Zeit wurden da nur Freiwillige genommen.

43.F. Wann kam die Zwangseinzziehung in Kroatien?

Nach Beendigung der Aufstellung der Division "Prinz Eugen" wurden dann aufgrund ~~des~~ von Übereinkommen, die zwischen dem kroatischen Staat und der deutschen Volksgruppe in Kroatien einerseits, dem Reich, SS-Hauptamt, andererseits geschlossen wurden, die Freiwilligenwerbung weiter auch der anderen SS-Einheiten durchgeführt. Die individuelle Freiwilligkeitserklärung wurde dann später, vielleicht in der zweiten Hälfte 1942 durch eine Pauschal-Freiwilligkeits-Erklärung der Volksgruppe in Kroatien ersetzt. Ab dieser Zeit wurden durch das SS-Ersatzkommando solche Jahrgänge der deutschen Volksgruppen gemustert, die nach dem kroatischen Kriegsdienstleistungsgesetz zur Kriegsdienstleistung aufgerufen wurden.

44.F. Was verstehen Sie unter pauschaler Freiwilligkeitserklärung?

A. Die Volksgruppe hat pauschal erklärt, sich freiwillig zur Ableistung ihrer Wehrpflicht in der Waffen-SS zu melden.

45.F. Eine individuelle Freiwilligkeit ~~hat~~ hat es nicht gegeben?

A. Die individuelle Freiwilligkeit war aufgehoben durch die erlassenen Vorschriften.

46.F. Wann hat es die ersten Verträge mit Kroatien gegeben?

A. Die ersten Verträge sollen geschlossen worden sein 1941 für die Aufstellung der Division "Prinz Eugen".

Ich kenne sie nicht mehr, ich kam 2 Jahre später herauf.

47.F. Wurde da schon die Quote festgelegt?

A. Ich kenne die Vereinbarungen nicht näher.

48.F. Sind Ihnen die späteren Verträge bekannt?

A. Die Verträge nach 1943 kenne ich alle. Die Verträge nach 1943 besagten (Abkommen zwischen dem Poklawnik und dem Deutschen Bevollmächtigten General GLAISE-HORSTENAU vom etwa 17. 4. 1943), dass grundsätzlich alle Angehörigen der deutschen Volksgruppe dem Reichsführer zur Ableistung ihrer Kriegsdienstpflicht zur Verfügung stehen mit nachstehenden Ausnahmen: ... Unter diesen Ausnahmen wurde eine Gruppe von etwa 1200 bis 1500 Mann genannt, die das kroatische Heer weiter als Dolmetscher und höhere Stabsoffiziere behalten würde. In diesem

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Abkommen war weiter festgelegt, dass für Zwecke der deutsch-kroatischen Polizeiverbände eine erste Rate von etwa 20 000 kroatischen Staatsbürgern, kroatischer Nationalität, ebenfalls geworben und eingestellt worden sind.

49.F. Wurden sie eingestellt?

A. Sie wurden dann eingestellt für die Polizeiverbände. Sie wurden neben dem Poklavnik auf äßen Führer vereidigt.

50.F. Das SS-Hauptamt hat die Polizeiverbände rekrutiert?

A. Jawohl. - Unter Rekrutierung verstehen Sie ja nicht Zwangseinziehung?

51.F. Ja. - Gab es in Albanien eine Division?

A. Da gab es später eine Division SKANDEBEK. Das waren Freiwillige.


52.F. Wann hat die Einziehung in Kroatien begonnen? - 1943?

A. Nein, 1942.

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Eidesstattliche Erklärung.

Ich, Konstantin SAMOHROFFER, SS-Gruppenführer und Generalleutnant der Polizei, schwöre, sage aus und erkläre:

1. Die Waffen-SS-Rekrutierung in Kroatien begann im Jahre 1941 unter der dortigen deutschen Volksgruppe aus Zwecke der Aufstellung der SS-Division "Prinz Eugen". Dies geschah auf Veranlassung des SS-Hauptamtes.

2. Nach Beendigung der Aufstellung der Division "Prinz Eugen" wurden dann auf Grund von Übereinkommen, die zwischen dem kroatischen Staat und der deutschen Volksgruppe in Kroatien einerseits, dem Reich, (SS-Hauptamt) andererseits geschlossen wurden, die Rekrutierungen fuer die SS eingefuehrt.

3. Die individuelle Freiwilligkeitserklärung wurde ungefaehr in der zweiten Haelfte des Jahres 1942 durch eine kollektive Freiwilligkeitserklärung der Volksgruppe in Kroatien ersetzt. Von dieser Zeit ab wurden von dem SS-Brückenkommmando, das dem Brückenkommmando Sudost in Wien unterstand, Jahrgaenge der deutschen Volksgruppe fuer die SS gemustert, die nach dem Kroatischen Kriegsdienstleistungsgesetz zur Ableistung der Wehrdienstpflicht aufgerufen wurden. *Von der Volksgruppenführung gemacht gemacht*

4. Einem weiteren Verträge vom April 1943 zufolge mussten alle Angehörigen der deutschen Volksgruppe grundsätzlich dem Reichsfuehrer SS zur Ableistung ihrer Kriegsdienstpflicht zur Verfügung gestellt werden, mit Ausnahme von ungefaehr 1.500 (eintausend fuenfhundert) Mann, die das kroatische Heer weiter als Holmetzsch und hoehere Stabsoffiziere behalten durfte.

In diesem Abkommen war weiterhin festgelegt, dass fuer Zwecke der deutsch-kroatischen Polizeiverbaende eine erste Quote von etwa 20.000 (zwanzig tausend) kroatischen Staatsbuergern (kroatischer Nationalitaet) ebenfalls eingestellt werden.

Die Rekrutierung fuer die Polizeiverbaende wurde ebenfalls von SS-Hauptamt durchgefuehrt.

Diese Aussagen habe ich freiwillig gemacht, ohne jedweden

25-348-82

Versprechen auf Belohnung, und ich war keinerlei Zwang oder Drohung ausgesetzt. Ich habe jede der zwei Seiten dieser Erklärung sorgfältig durchgelesen und eigenhändig gegengezeichnet, habe die notwendigen Korrekturen in meiner eigenen Handschrift vorgenommen und mit meinen Anfangsbuchstaben gegengezeichnet und erkläre hiermit unter Eid, dass alle die von mir in dieser eidesstattlichen Erklärung angegebenen Tatsachen nach meinem besten Wissen und Gewissen der vollen Wahrheit entsprechen.

Muenberg, den 7. Januar 1948.

Konstantin Kammhuber

 Konstantin KAMMUBER

Before me, Joseph YANCOS, US. Civilian, AGO identification number 441548, Interrogator, Evidence Division, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes appeared Konstantin KAMMUBER, to me known, who in my presence signed the foregoing statement (Erklärung) consisting of two pages in the German language and swore that the same was true on the 7th of January 1948.

Joseph Yancos

 Joseph YANCOS