

ZAKLJUČAK

U drugoj polovini delovanja Nedićeve kvislinške uprave (period 1943—1944) nije bilo bitnijih promena, koje bi ukazivale da Nedić sa svojom vladom menja kurs bilo u kom pitanju na relaciji odnosa prema nemačkim okupacionim vlastima, s jedne, i stanovništvu okupiranog dela Srbije, s druge strane. Suštinskih promena nije ni moglo biti s obzirom na činjenicu da su Milanu Nediću, njegovim ministrima, kao i celom kvislinškom aparatu, kompetencije bile ograničene do te mere da oni nisu mogli nijedno važnije pitanje rešiti bez odobrenja nadležnih nemačkih okupacionih vlasti.

Pa ipak, „vlada narodnog spasa“ pokušavala je da sa nekim „reformama“ da izvestan pečat svojoj službi nemačkim okupacionim vlastima, odnosno vladi Rajha u Berlinu. Jedna od mera koju je Nedić sa svojom vladom predviđao, jeste plan o novoj organizaciji srpskog stanovništva, gde bi seljaštvo imalo dominantnu ulogu. Ta organizacija trebalo je da počne već prvih meseci 1943. godine. U vezi s tim Milan Nedić je uputio vojnoupravnom komandantu Srbije dva opširna memoranduma u kojima su bile tačno precizirane mere koje „vlada narodnog spasa“ treba da preduzme, kako bi se stanovništvo Srbije organizovalo na novoj osnovi. Međutim, svi njegovi zahtevi bili su odbijeni. Jer određene institucije nemačkih okupacionih vlasti, koje su bile nadležne da rešavaju ovakva ili slična pitanja, bile su jedinstvene u mišljenju da nije vreme da Nedić vrši bilo kakvu reformu svog kvislinškog aparata; da on treba samo da sprovodi odluke nemačkih okupacionih vlasti, a o konačnom uređenju Srbije, naglašavali su, odlučiće se posle drugog svetskog rata.

Tokom 1943. godine Milan Nedić se jasnije opredeljuje i u ključnim pitanjima društveno-ekonomskog, političkog i kulturnog života u Srbiji. Na primer, odnos prema seljaštvu, prema radničkoj klasi, prema prosveti i kulturi, prema Beogradskom univerzitetu i mnogim drugim pitanjima. Za seljaštvo je Nedić smatrao da ima dominantnu ulogu u društvu, s obzirom na to da je ono tada bilo najbrojnije (preko 80% tadašnjeg srbijanskog stanovništva). Srpski kvislinški predsednik je tvrdio da je ovaj sloj srpskog stanovništva najkonzervativniji; da je najveći njegov deo antikomunistički raspoložen i da će ono predstavljati bazu za stvaranje takozvane „Velike Srbije“ u okviru Nemačkog Rajha. Međutim, praksa je Nedića potpuno demantovala. Znatno deo seljaštva tokom celog rata simpa-

tisao je NOP ili ga je aktivno pomagao. Naročito je u tome prednjačila seoska omladina, koja je u znatnom broju stupala u redove partizanskih odreda, u udarne diverzantske grupe i mnoge druge akcije koje su organizovali KPJ i SKOJ u toku rata.

Prema radničkoj klasi, naprotiv, Nedić i njegovi istomišljenici imali su drugi odnos. Iako ona brojem nije bila velika, imala je revolucionarnu tradiciju. Znatno broj radnika bio je pod uticajem KPJ i njene ideologije — marksizma-lenjinizma. Veliki broj ih je stupio u narodnooslobodilački pokret već prvih meseci oružanog ustanka u Srbiji (jul—avgust—septembar 1941). Taj procenat se znatno povećao tokom narednih godina okupacije. Zbog svega toga, okupacione kvislinške vlasti gledale su na ovaj sloj društva sa izvesnim nepoverenjem, ali, uprkos svemu, ulagale su maksimalne napore da se radnici Srbije uključe u ratnoprivredne mere Nemačkog Rajha. Međutim, svaki politički rad među radnicima bio je zabranjen. Šikaniranje, prenaporan rad, glad, nezaposlenost, bolest i nečuvena eksploatacija, bile su osnovne karakteristike položaja radničke klase u uslovima okupacije. Kvislinške i okupacione vlasti naročito su se surovo obračunavale sa radnicima pripadnicima oslobodilačkog pokreta.

Jedno od pitanja koje je bilo prisutno u drugoj polovini 1942. i u celoj 1943. godini na relaciji Nedićeva vlada — nemačke okupacione vlasti u Srbiji — vlada Rajha u Berlinu — bila je Nedićeva poseta Ribentropu i Hitleru. U mnogim poglavljima našeg teksta pokazali smo da je za sve vreme okupacije Milan Nedić bio marioneta u nemačkim rukama, ali mu je nemački okupator stalno obećavao izvesne ustupke, iako je to zavisilo uglavnom od ministra spoljnih poslova Ribentropa, a naročito od Hitlera. Skoro godina dana je prošla otkako je srpski kvislinški predsednik zavaravan lažnim obećanjima da će biti pozvan u posetu od vlade Rajha i da će se tom prilikom razmotriti pitanje njegovog položaja, položaja njegove vlade i vojno-političke situacije u Srbiji uopšte. A kada je došlo do te posete 18. septembra 1943; Milan Nedić i njegovi ministri doživeli su još jedno teško razočaranje. Nijedan od njegovih zahteva (da se učvrsti položaj srpskog ministra-predsednika, davanje vlasti i samostalnosti njegovoj vladi; da se prošire granice okupirane Srbije; da okupacioni troškovi budu fiksirani; da se pod njegovu komandu stavi ponovo Srpska državna straža i Srpski dobrovoljački korpus) Hitler i Ribentrop nisu hteli da prihvate. Naprotiv, Hitler mu je zapretio, ukoliko kvislinška srpska uprava ne bude sprovodila uredbe i naredbe nemačkih okupacionih vlasti, da će Nemci preduzeti još surovije represalije prema stanovništvu Srbije. Tako je Nedić sa svojim ministrima i nadalje radio po starom. Slušao je Nemce, izvršavao njihove uredbe i naredbe i sve dok nije oktobra 1944. napustio teritoriju Srbije, bio je saučesnik u nacističkim zločinima prema stanovništvu Srbije.

Međutim, kada nije mogao da udovolji zahtevima svojih naredbodavaca, izlaz iz kriznih situacija Nedić je češće tražio u personalnim promenama svog kabineta. Rekonstrukciju „vlade narodnog spasa“ izvršio je više puta, ali je najvažnija ona od 5. novembra 1943, kada je smenio sa položaja svoje glavne rivale, a ujedno najveće germanofile: Dragog Jova-

novića sa dužnosti šefa srpske državne bezbednosti, a Tanasija Dinića sa položaja ministra unutrašnjih poslova. Oba ova resora Milan Nedić je zadržao za sebe, tako da je od tada, pored predsedničke dužnosti, rukovodio i dvama najvažnijim resorima u vladi. Nemačke okupacione vlasti su nerado prihvatile ovaj Nedićev predlog. Ali, sticajem mnogih okolnosti, morale su da pristanu iz sledećih razloga. Prvo, zbog toga što se vodila oštra borba, gotovo nepomirljiva, između D. Jovanovića i T. Dinića, dakle, Nedićevih najbližih saradnika; drugo, što su oba ova visoka kvislinška funkcionera radila na tome da smene Nedića, kako bi jedan od njih zauzeo predsedničko mesto; treće, Nemci su računali da će se centralizacijom vlasti u Nedićevim rukama efikasnije voditi borba protiv NOP-a Srbije. Ipak, nacisti nisu dozvolili da njihovi verni saradnici ostanu bez ikakve vlasti. Jovanović je i dalje ostao predsednik Beogradske opštine i upravnik grada Beograda, a Tanasije Dinić dobio je resor ministra socijalne politike i narodnog zdravlja.

Posebno u zaključnom delu druge knjige ističemo saradnju Milana Nedića sa četničkim pokretom Draže Mihailovića. Ta saradnja je usledila odmah po dolasku Nedića na čelo srpske kvislinške vlade i ima više razvojnih faza, bolje reći, etapa. Prva predstavlja razdoblje od septembra do novembra 1941. kada Nedićevi i Mihailovićevi predstavnici intenzivno koordiniraju akcije radi uništenja NOP-a u Srbiji; druga faza nastupa krajem 1941. i traje gotovo celu 1942. godinu, kada je najveći broj četnika DM bio „legalizovan“ kod Nemaca i organizovan u posebne odrede takozvane „legalne četnike“, koji su bili pod Nedićevom komandom i koji su sa kvislinškim vojnim formacijama vodili neprekidne borbe protiv partizanskih odreda u Srbiji. To je istovremeno period kada se Draža Mihailović sa svojim najužim štabom nalazio u Crnoj Gori. Treća faza zahvata drugu polovinu 1943, kada se Mihailović vraća u Srbiju, a njegov pokret dobija znatno u intenzitetu. U to vreme gotovo svi kvislinški funkcioneri u Srbiji zauzimaju čvrst stav da Mihailovića treba svim sredstvima pomagati. Naročito se u ovome eksponirala Nedićeva Srpska državna straža, tako da najveći deo njenog rukovodećeg i znatan broj boračkog sastava pomažu četnike u svakom pogledu. I najzad, četvrti, karakterističan period saradnje kvislinške uprave u Srbiji i četnika DM zahvata prvu polovinu 1944. kada se sve „nacionalne snage“ ujedinjuju radi odsudnih borbi protiv partizanskih odreda i divizija NOVJ, koje su sa svih strana prodirale u Srbiju. Iako su sve četiri etape, odnosno faze bile povezane, iako su se nadovezivale jedna na drugu, one se bitno razlikuju po svom intenzitetu. Bitna obeležja pojedinih etapa data su u odgovarajućim glavama teksta.

Više osvetljavaju ličnost Milana Nedića iz poslednje dve godine okupacije, njegovi nerealni zahtevi za proširenjem granice Srbije, odnosno stvaranjem „Velike Srbije“. Iako za to nije bilo nikakvih realnih mogućnosti, Nedić je u vreme kada su Nemci vodili rat širokih razmera na Istočnom i Zapadnom frontu, tražio da proširi granice Srbije. Molio je da mu se pripoji Sandžak, Crna Gora, delovi istočne Bosne, Srem i mnogi drugi okupirani delovi Jugoslavije. Međutim, sem Nojbahera, koji je Nedića u

izvesnom smislu podržavao, sve ostale nemačke instance u Jugoslaviji, pa i u Berlinu, kategorički su bile protiv toga da se Nediću dozvoli teritorijalno proširenje bilo u kom opsegu.

Zanimljiv je i Nedićev odnos prema susedima; zatim, odnosi između kvislinške vlade u Beogradu i emigrantske kraljevske vlade u Londonu; odnos kvislinških vlasti prema Srpskoj pravoslavnoj crkvi itd. Od više suseda sa kojima se graničila okupirana Srbija, Bugarska i Nezavisna Država Hrvatska bili su najviše na udaru Nedićeve kritike. Ustašku vladu u Zagrebu Nedić je osuđivao najviše zbog zločina koji su se odigrali na njenoj teritoriji u vezi sa stanovništvom srpske nacionalnosti. Bugarske okupatore nije podnosio jer su stalno proširivali granice svoje okupacione teritorije. Međutim, Nedićevi protesti vojnoupravnom komandantu Srbije, nikada nisu imali takvu težinu da bi nacisti morali menjati bilo što u svojoj okupacionoj politici. Zbog toga je Nedić i kasnije, tako reći, „pucao u prazno“ uvek kada bi kritikovao bilo kog nemačkog satelita: Mađarsku, Rumuniju, Bugarsku, Nezavisnu Državu Hrvatsku; zatim kvislinške vlasti na Kosovu, folksdojčere u Banatu itd.

Kada je reč o odnosima između kvislinške srpske vlade u Beogradu i emigrantske kraljevske vlade u Londonu, treba istaći da je to bila jedna čudna ili, bolje rečeno, apsurdna situacija. I jedni i drugi su pozivali stanovništvo Srbije na red i mir. Nedić i njegovi ministri su koristili svaku priliku da osude emigrantsku vladu (ali nikada ne i kralja). Isto tako, sve jugoslovenske kraljevske vlade (a one su se često menjale u emigraciji), osuđivale su Milana Nedića i njegove ministre zbog kolaboracije sa okupatorom. Međutim, utvrđeno je na osnovu znatnog broja sačuvanih dokumenata da je bilo i nekih kontakata između ovih nacionalističkih i, ujedno, antikomunističkih garnitura, naročito tokom 1943. godine. U poslednjoj godini okupacije, kada je tabor kontrarevolucije bio na ivici poraza, Nedić, njegovi ministri i drugi kvislinški funkcioneri, pozivali su javno, u govorima preko radija i štampe, kralja Petra II da im pomogne, odnosno da ih „spase“ poraza pred naletom jedinica NOVJ i Crvene armije; da spase Dražu Mihailovića, odnosno sve one antikomunističke snage u Srbiji, koje su u vreme drugog svetskog rata verno služile okupatoru.

Neophodno je na ovom mestu istaći još dva problema: prvo, napore koje je kvislinška uprava u Srbiji činila uz podršku Nemaca, Bugara i četnika Draže Mihailovića u prvoj polovini 1944. godine radi efikasnijeg suprotstavljanja oslobodilačkom pokretu Srbije. S tim u vezi je sprovedena masovna mobilizacija mladih godišta u proleće i leto 1944. kako bi se popunile desetkovane kvislinške vojne formacije. Paralelno s tim preduzimane su snažne represalije kvislinga i ostalih neprijatelja NOP-a nad rukovodećim kadrovima Partije i Skoja.

Iz svega izloženog može se zaključiti da je neprijatelj i dalje bio agresivan i da je, s vremena na vreme, uspevao da redovima NOP-a zada ozbiljnije udarce, bez obzira na to što je vojno-politička situacija u zemlji i svetu za neprijatelja bila izuzetno teška. U svojoj nemoći da se odupre silnom naletu partizanskih odreda i jedinica NOVJ u Srbiji i prodoru

Glavne operativne grupe divizija pri Vrhovnom štabu, dolazi tokom leta 1944. do obrazovanja koalicije: okupator—Nedić—Mihailović. Zanimljivo je da se neposredno pre potpunog objedinjavanja kvislinških i četničkih snaga (noću 28/29. avgusta 1944) u selu Pranjani (čačanski okrug), spustila u štab Draže Mihailovića nova Američka vojna misija. Šef misije pukovnik Mak Daul obilazio je sa Dražom Mihailovićem pojedina sela i prisustvovao zborovima seljaka kako bi se popravio narušeni ugled četničkog pokreta. Pored toga, on je primao pojedine četničke vojvode, predstavnike profašističkih organizacija, predstavnike vlade Milana Nedića i nemačkih okupacionih vlasti. Sve sa težnjom da se spase četnički pokret, koji je pod udarcima NOVJ u Srbiji bio na ivici definitivnog poraza. Ali sve je bilo kasno. Ni savez Nemci—Nedić—Draža Mihailović, ni dolazak Mak Daula — ništa nije pomoglo. Potpun poraz svih neprijateljskih snaga u Srbiji bližio se kraju.

Drugi problem koji je povezan sa prethodnim, vezan je za period kada se Nedićeva vlada pripremala za bekstvo iz Srbije početkom oktobra 1944; zatim, samo bekstvo Nedićeve vlade, „Nedićeve oružane sile” i četnika Draže Mihailovića i aktivnost srpskih kvislinga i ostalih kontrarevolucionarnih snaga u izbeglištvu do završetka drugog svetskog rata. Dok su jul i avgust 1944. godine bili u znaku napora nemačkih okupacionih vlasti u Srbiji, u prvom redu Nojbahera, da se objedine sve kvislinške i četničke snage radi što snažnijeg pružanja otpora jedinicama NOVJ, dotle je ceo septembar bio posvećen pripremama kontrarevolucionarnih snaga za povlačenje iz Srbije kako ne bi pale u ruke jedinicama NOVJ. Razume se, ceo plan bekstva koordiniran je u saradnji sa okupatorom, koji je, u stvari, i davao ton celoj ovoj akciji.

Međutim, mada su kvislinzi i četnici Draže Mihailovića tokom jula i avgusta 1944. pokušavali da ujedine svoje snage za borbu protiv jedinica NOVJ, oni u tome nisu uspeli. Isto tako, kada su se pripremali da napuste Srbiju pred naletom jedinica NOVJ i jedinica Crvene armije, nedićevsko-četničke snage nisu bile jedinstvene. Draža Mihailović sa svojim užim štabom još krajem septembra prebacio se preko Mačve i Drine u istočnu Bosnu, a odatle u Crnu Goru, zaboravivši na sve klauzule sporazuma koje je zaključio sa Milanom Nedićem 12. i 13. avgusta 1944. godine. Njegovim jedinicama pridružila se i Srpska državna straža, Srpska granična straža i takozvana Narodna garda, ali ne i Srpski dobrovoljački korpus, koji je, umesto u Bosnu, odlučio da krene u Sloveniju. Pored toga, ni dva najistaknutija kvislinška funkcionera (Nedić i Ljotić) nisu imali jedinstveno gledište o pravcu odstupanja. Dok se Nedić još ranije opredelio da se, u pratnji Nemaca, sa celom vladom povuče u Beč, Ljotić se odlučio da sa svojim dobrovoljcima krene u Slovenačko primorje.

Međutim, iako su odstupale u raznim pravcima, kontrarevolucionarne snage iz Srbije ponovo su počele da se povezuju, nadajući se da će ipak jednog dana povratiti „majku Srbiju”. Nedićeva vlada, koja je bila u Austriji, imala je vezu sa kvislinškim vojnim formacijama, koje su se koncentrisale u Slovenačkom primorju. Tamo je Dimitrije Ljotić imao glavnu

ulogu. Kvislinške vojne formacije u Sloveniji imale su radio-vezu sa štabom Draže Mihailovića koji se i dalje nalazio u Bosni. Ali kontrarevolucionarnim snagama u Srbiji ništa nije pomoglo. Ni kolaboracija sa Nemcima u novim uslovima, niti zajednička saradnja svih kontrarevolucionarnih snaga. Kapitulacija Hitlerove Nemačke, koja je potpisana 8. maja 1945, značila je i definitivni poraz svih njihovih saradnika u Jugoslaviji. Ovi su, doduše, pružali organizovani otpor još izvesno vreme, ali i oni su doživeli neminovni poraz. Time je konačno prestala svaka aktivnost Nedićeve vlade, a Nedić, njegovi ministri i ostali kvislinški funkcioneri, postepeno će biti izručivani organima narodne vlasti nove Jugoslavije, gde će svi dobiti zaslužene kazne. Milan Nedić, kao što smo već pomenuli, skočio je sa trećeg sprata u istražnom zatvoru 4. februara 1946, kada je bio doveden na saslušanje, i tako je sebi prekratio život.

COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN SERBIA
Quisling Administration 1941—1944
(Volume I and II)

•— S u m m a r y —

The first of the two books dealing with the problems we analyze (period 1941—1942) could be divided into four stages or phases. The first phase comprises the period of activity of the Council of Commissaries, presided over by Milan Aćimović (April 30 to August 29, 1941); the second phase is the period from the forming of Nedić's government (August 29, 1941) to the administrative division of Serbia (December 26, 1941); the third phase is the period of reorganization of Nedić's quisling machinery of government (the first half of 1942) and the fourth one, the interval of time when Nedić's government experienced a general crisis (second half of 1942).

Although all the four phases were connected with one another and followed immediately on one another, they differ essentially in all the elements of the system of occupation in Serbia. Characteristics and essential features of individual stages are set forth in the corresponding chapters of the text.

It is a known fact, that after the capitulation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, Serbia was occupied, too, like other parts of the country. The Germans built up a complex mechanism of occupying authority, but at the same time they worked at the restoration of the former, pre-war machinery of government, i.e. to form a quisling administration in order to be able to carry out undisturbedly their policy of occupation.

There were many candidates, considered to be appropriate to stand at the head of the first quisling government in Serbia. But the most serious one were: Dragiša Cvetković, Aleksandar Cincar Marković, Milan Aćimović, Dimitrije Ljotić, Dragi Jovanović and other pro-German individuals from the political life of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

After several conversations between general Foerster, commander of Military Administration and chief of the Administrative staff dr Harold Turner on one side and the representatives of former bourgeois parties who declared their willingness to collaborate with the occupier on the other, there was finally formed, on April 30, 1941, the government of "Commissaries,, with Milan Aćimović, a typical representative of the pro-fascist orientation, at the head.

The Council of Commissaries were set several tasks, but the most important of them were undoubtedly the following ones: 1. to secure or-

der, peace and public safety in Serbia; 2. to secure an undisturbed exploitation of natural and other resources of Serbia for the Germans. From the very beginning, however, one could see that the commissariat administration would not be very successful. First of all, it was discredited with the people as the servant of the occupier; in the second place, within the quisling administration itself there manifested themselves mutual dissensions between the partisans of Dimitrije Ljotić and those of Milan Stojadinović, i.e. of Milan Aćimović. And, as the most important fact, there broke out in Serbia, at the beginning of July 1941, an armed insurrection of wide scope, directed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. The Council of Commissaries was powerless to crush out the struggle of the people of Serbia in arms, and it was transmitted, like a torch to all the parts of this province. The Germans were disappointed with the quisling administration and made up their mind to change it. They looked for a new candidate and found him in the person of Milan Nedić, former general of the army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The new quisling government was formed on August 29, 1941. It meant the end of the activity of the Council of Commissaries, which had been in power four months only. However, the so-called "Government of People's Salvation" will not have, either, a much greater success in its struggle against the partisans.

But, in our opinion, it is indispensable to point out here why Milan Nedić, chief actor in the quisling movement in Serbia, took so unreservedly service with the German occupier and served him faithfully throughout the occupation. The motives of such a behaviour are certainly to be looked for in the pre-war period, i.e. in the period of rule of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in which the Serbian quisling prime minister occupied high military functions. He was, among other things, for instance, commander of the divisions of Timok, Kosovo and Drava, commander of the third army, chief of the General staff, member of the Military council and, finally Minister of War. He performed this last and highest function in the second government of Milan Stojadinović (December 21, 1938, to February 5, 1939); in the first government of Dragila Cvetković (February 6 to August 26, 1939) and in the Cvetković—Maček government. Consequently, he occupied very responsible positions in those governments which consciously carried out the pro-Fascist foreign policy and prepared the conditions for Yugoslavia to sign, on March 25, 1941), the act of adherence to the Tripartite.

Following the policy of governments whose member he was, Milan Nedić, in his capacity as minister of War, established many contacts even the most intimate ones, with individual functionaries of the government of Reich. This fact is corroborated by many German sources and particularly by the statement of Nazi functionaries in the occupied Serbia they were making during and after the World War II. Analogous are also the statement of Nedić's nearest collaborators, for instance of Dragi Jovanović, Tanasije Dinić, Cincar Marković and many others which they made in 1946 and even later in the prison of UDB (Administration of State Security) in Belgrade, where they had been confined awaiting trial. All of them

were almost unanimous in asserting that the above mentioned Nedić's contacts were decisive for the Germans to choose him and place him at the head of the "Government of People's Salvation" on August 29, 1941, for they considered him to be the one who would best carry out their policy of occupation. The practice showed that the Nazis were not mistaken in their belief.

Nedić himself did not deny, in this interrogations after the war, that he endeavoured, in the years which preceded the outbreak of the World War II, to maintain close, friendly relations with Germany. In addition, he admitted that he saw in Communism, during his entire long military career, his principal enemy. He was afraid that the "Red dragon" (as he called the Soviet Union) "would subdue" Europe and, consequently, Yugoslavia, too. For all these reasons, he, as the representative of the most reactionary circles of the Serbian bourgeoisie, tried to rely on the Fascist Germany, for he was convinced that it was the only power that could effectively resist Communism.

Many sources point also out that Milan Nedić, as the member of the economic delegation of the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which had visited Germany repeatedly in the course of 1939 and 1940, began to collaborate with the intelligence organs of this country. At the same time he was connected with the German Legation in Belgrade, which he informed of the most important events in the policy of the government of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Dimitrije Ljotić, too, contributed certainly, with his pro-Fascist movement "Zbor" to determine Nedić, in the years following the outbreak of the World War II, to collaborate most intimately with the powers of the Axis. This can be inferred also from the Memorandum which Nedić submitted, in November 1940, to Prince Paul and to the prime minister Dragiša Cvetković. This document contained Ljotić's ideas of foreign policy, with whom Nedić maintained close relations. In Nedić's opinion, considering the existing situation in Europe, it was impossible for Yugoslavia to remain neutral. He believed that it was impossible to rely on Anglo-American aid and concluded: "Along with the Axis, I think, there is still time. Germany conquered the European continent and is its unlimited master. With its ninety million Germans, it will be its master for a very long time".

As Nedić's relations with Ljotić had been established on that occasion, as well as the fact that Ljotić's Bulletin had been printed in the printing office of the Ministry of War, Nedić was dismissed and placed under surveillance; Ljotić's movement "Zbor" was prohibited, Ljotić himself placed under house arrest and the members of "Zbor" chiefly taken into custody, for the police authorities of that time asserted that Dimitrije Ljotić with the leading members of "Zbor" and Milan Nedić with a group of officers were hatching a conspiracy to effect a coup d'état in the given moment and to seize power for themselves. Thus Nedić was dismissed, but not exclusively because he had suggested the Yugoslavia lean on the Axis, but also because he was suspected to prepare with Ljotić the overthrow of the regency and of the government Cvetković—Maček.

When the war broke out, in April 1941, Milan Nedić, though retired, was appointed as commander of the group of armies in the South. However, he did not succeed even in forming his headquarters. The things went on so badly and, still, they told the legends about him; about his "successful" resistance to the German troops. Even a leaflet was distributed in Belgrade on April 8, stating that Nedić had been promoted to voivode and defeated Germans in the gorge of Kačanik, capturing 300 tanks, which was a falsehood.

Thus ended Milan Nedić's mission as general of the army of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. He was the only Yugoslav general who had not been deported to a prisoner of war camp in Germany. This did not happen accidentally. It was due to the intentions of the government of Reich, manifested immediately after the capitulation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, to offer one of the leading functions in the occupied Serbia to their friend from the pre-war period. Consequently, the forming of the Council of Commissaries was but a temporary measure of the German occupying authorities in Serbia. As early as in this period, they had, in the person of Milan Nedić, a potential candidate for the quisling prime minister in Serbia. Therefore, instead of taking him to a POW camp, they held him in Belgrade under "house arrest" and at the same time negotiated with him about the conditions under which he would accept to form the new quisling Serbian government.

Three days only after having taken up his duties (consequently, on September 2, 1941), Milan Nedić proclaimed his political programme in the so-called "declaration". In this document he set forth, though in vague and confused outlines, the main objectives and essential tasks of his government. These tasks, of course, were set by the German occupation authorities and they could be summarized as follows: 1) that he (Nedić) should break down, by his own forces, the liberation movement and the Communist Party which led it; 2) that he should establish order and secure peace in the country; 3) that he should provide people with food and fuel for the coming winter, and 4) that he should organize the Serbian army.

The first task — struggle against the movement for people's liberation of Serbia, was the most complex of all for the "Government of People's Salvation". All human and material forces which Nedić's quisling machinery of government had at its disposal, were subordinated to it. In the first place were strengthened the so-called "Nedić's armed forces" which consisted of the gendarmerie and police, which had been re-established and served the Council of Commissaries of Milan Aćimović, further of the members of Ljotić's "Zbor" (called volunteers) and finally of chetniks of Košta Pećanac, who also entered the occupier's service with the majority of his men.

The creation of Nedić's government and of its armed units for the struggle against the liberation movement meant a success for the German occupiers in Serbia in carrying out their political line. This political success, however, was not by far sufficient to enable the occupation and quisling authorities to resist successfully the armed insurrection. In spite

of all the decrees and orders, issued by the occupier and the quisling administration in Serbia, in spite of reprisals made upon the population of Serbia, the movement of people's liberation spread more and more at the end of August and in the first half of September. On account of the failure on the very start, the Germans even proposed that Milan Nedić should resign with his government. But, the Nazis, too, came a little later to the conclusion that, under the given circumstances, they had no better personality to be put at the head of a collaborators' team, so that Nedić served the Germans faithfully to the end of the war.

Until the end of 1941, Nedić was chiefly occupied also by the following problems: the arrival of refugees and their accommodation; "care" to be taken of the Serbian prisoners of war, over 200,000 of whom were in German POW camps; further, the offensive taken by the Germans together with his units in November 1941 against the territory of Šumadija and West Serbia, liberated by the partisans. Nedić became particularly worried by the Bulgarian occupation of the parts of South-East Serbia, which was commenced at the end of 1941 and in the beginning of 1942.

At the end of 1941 (or more precisely: on December 26), Nedić's government issued the Decree on the administrative division of Serbia, which would be put in practice in the course of the first half of 1942. According to this Decree, the former regional units, called "banovine", were abolished and the entire Serbian zone of occupation was divided into 15 districts, whereas the city of Belgrade with its surroundings (under the name of Administration of the city of Belgrade) was put on an equal footing, from the administrative point of view, with individual districts. The first half of 1942 was characterized by the "legalization" of Draža Mihailović's četniks through Nedić's armed units; Nedić was in contact with Jezdimir Dangić and his četnik movement in East Bosnia, with a view to winning him over to his conception of expanding the limits of Serbia to the detriment of East Bosnia, which was under the rule of the Independent State of Croatia. In addition to this, in the beginning of March there was issued the Decree on the forming of the Serbian State Guard, which would be put into effect throughout 1942. In the Chapter III of this book have analyzed also the following questions: Nedić's request that sanctions should be used against the prisoners of war — sympathizers with the Movement for People's Liberation (MPL); the relation between Nedić's government and the German occupation authorities in Serbia in the first half of 1942; reprisals made by the occupying and quisling forces upon the population of Serbia; further affluence of refugees into Serbia in the course of 1942; crimes committed by the Bulgarian Fascist army on the population of the south-eastern parts of Serbia.

In the Chapter IV, last chapter in this book, there were specially treated the following sections: Great crisis of Nedić's government in the second half of 1942; Conflicts among the leaders of the quisling administration in Serbia! Reconstruction of Nedić's cabinet (November 7, 1942); plunders made by quisling organs for the needs of the German occupier; activity of the CPY in strengthening and stabilizing the MPL in Serbia in

the second half of 1942. We paid the greatest attention to the problem — Crisis of Nedić's government and of the entire quisling machinery in the second half of 1942. During the whole occupation, one could say, Nedić's government was in a permanent crisis. The fundamental reason resided in the fact that the Serbian quisling administration was unable to fulfill very complex and complicated tasks, set by the German occupation authorities in Serbia. In the second half of 1942, however, this crisis reached its culmination.

The crisis situations of Nedić's government manifested themselves always in the same way, i.e. in difficult circumstances Nedić always announced his intention to resign. However, it is very questionable whether he wished to blackmail the German occupation authorities in Serbia in this way. For, it is obvious that the Germans could not find a more suitable person for this position. And the Nazis emphasized this on every occasion and made all they could to prevent Nedić's cabinet from resigning. "I know also that, several times, when Nedić threatened with his resignation, Veessenmayer came to Belgrade and that, in these moments, from the surroundings of Ljotić and of Kronholz, the rumours were spread about Nedić's definitive departure, whereas, in fact, this was never seriously taken into consideration, for they knew well that Nedić had not come by pure chance and that he was going to stay as long as the Germans were here", declared in this respect at the interrogation after the war Dragomir Dragi Jovanović, mayor and chief of Police Department of Belgrade.

In the second half of activity of Nedić's quisling administration (period 1943—1944) there occurred no significant changes which would point out that Nedić and his government changed the course in any question concerning their relations to the German occupation authorities on one hand and to the population of the occupied part of Serbia on the other. The substantial changes could not take place, either, considering the fact that the competences left to Milan Nedić, to his ministers and to the entire quisling machinery of government were limited to such an extent that they were unable to solve any serious question without the approval of competent German occupation authorities.

And still, the "Government of People's Salvation" tried to introduce certain "reforms" in order to give a certain mark to its service to the German occupation authorities, resp. to the government of Reich in Berlin. One of the measures Nedić anticipated with his government was the plan concerning the new organization of the Serbian population, in which the peasantry would play the dominant part. This organization ought to have begun its activity as early as in the first months of 1943. In connection with this Milan Nedić addressed to the commander of the Military Administration in Serbia two detailed memoranda in which were precised the measures which the "Government of People's Salvation" should take in order to organize the population of Serbia on a new basis. However, all his requests were rejected. For, the determined institutions of the German occupation authorities, which were competent for solving such or similar questions, were unanimous in the opinion, that the time was not suitable

for Nedić to make any reforms of his quisling machinery of government; that he should only carry out the decisions of the German occupation authorities and the final organization of Serbia, they emphasized, will be decided upon after the end of the World War II.

In the course of 1943 Milan Nedić decided more clearly on some crucial questions of socio-economical, political and cultural life in Serbia, too. For instance, the relation to the peasantry, to the working class, to the education and culture, to the university of Belgrade and many other questions. Nedić considered the peasantry to play a dominant part in the society, considering the fact that it was the most numerous social stratum at that time (over 80 p.c. of the population of Serbia in this period). The Serbian quisling prime minister asserted that this layer of the Serbian population was the most conservative one; that its majority is of anti-Communist disposition and that it would constitute the basis for the creation of the so-called "Great Serbia" within the framework of the German Reich. But he was entirely contradicted by the practice. A considerable part of the peasantry sympathized during the whole war with the MPL or even helped it in an active way. Particularly number the partisan detachments, the outstanding sabotage groups and many other activities, organized by the CPY and SKOJ (Association of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia) in the course of the war.

The working class, on the contrary, was treated in a different way by Nedić and his adherents. Though it was not very numerous, it had a revolutionary tradition. A considerable number of workers was under the influence of the CPY and of its ideology — Marxism-Leninism. Many workers adhered to the Movement of People's Liberation in the first months of the armed insurrection in Serbia (July—August—September 1941). This percentage considerably increased in the course of the following years of occupation. On account of all this, both occupation and quisling authorities looked upon this layer of society with a certain distrust, but in spite of all, they made the greatest efforts to include the workers of Serbia into the measures of the war economy of the German Reich. But every political activity among the workers was prohibited. Harassments, strenuous work, famine, unemployment, diseases and unprecedented exploitation were the principal characteristics of the situation of the working class under the conditions of the occupation. The quisling and occupation authorities dealt very harshly with the workers, adherents of the liberation movement.

One of the questions which was present in the second half of 1942 and throughout 1943 on the relation Nedić's government — German occupation authorities — government of Reich in Berlin — was Nedić's visit to Ribbentrop and Hitler. In many sections of our text we demonstrated that Milan Nedić was a puppet in German hands during the entire period of occupation, but the German occupier kept promising that some concessions would be made to him, though it depended chiefly on the minister of Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop, and particularly on Hitler. Almost a year elapsed since the Serbian quisling prime minister had been lulled with

false promises that he would be invited by the government of Reich to a visit and that, on that occasion, there would be considered the question of his situation, the situation of his government and the military-political situation in Serbia in general. And when this visit took place, on September 18, 1943, Milan Nedić and his ministers experienced another keen disappointment. Hitler and Ribbentrop refused to acquiesce in any of his claims (the position of the Serbian prime minister to be consolidated; power and independence to be given to his government; the frontiers of the occupied Serbia to be extended; the occupation expenses to be fixed; Serbian State Guard and Serbian volunteers' corps to be put again under his /Nedić's/ command). On the contrary, Hitler threatened him with the still more brutal reprisals upon the population of Serbia by the Germans unless the Serbian quisling administration carries into effect the decrees and orders of the German occupation authorities. Thus Nedić and his ministers continued going on in the same track. He obeyed the Germans, carried out their decrees and orders and was an accomplice in the Nazi crimes against the population of Serbia until he left the territory of Serbia in October 1944.

However, when he was unable to satisfy the demands of his commanders, Nedić frequently looked for an issue out of the crisis situations in personal changes within his cabinet. He made several times the reconstruction of the „Government of People's Salvation“, but the most important of them was the one on November 5, 1943, when Nedić dismissed his principal rivals and at the same time the greatest Germanophiles: Dragi Jovanović from the duty of the chief of Serbian State Security and Tanasije Dinić from the post of minister Interior. Milan Nedić kept both these functions for himself, so that he performed from that time, in addition to the duty of prime minister, also two most important functions in the government. The German occupation authorities agreed unwillingly to this proposal of Nedić's. However, as events turned out, they had to do it for the following reasons. Firstly, because a desperate, almost irreconcilable struggle was on between D. Jovanović and T. Dinić themselves, i. e. between Nedić's closest collaborators; secondly, because both these high quisling functionaries endeavoured to dismiss Nedić from his position in order that one of them should take the prime minister's post; thirdly, the Germans reckoned that the struggle against the MPL of Serbia would be more efficacious if the power were centralized in Nedić's hands. But the Nazis did not allow their faithful collaborators to remain without any power. Jovanović remained mayor and chief of Police Department of Belgrade and Tanasije Dinić was given the post of minister of social policy and health.

We particularly emphasize the phenomenon of collaboration between Milan Nedić and Draža Mihailović's četnik movement. This collaboration took place immediately after Nedić's arrival at the head of the Serbian quisling government and it developed in several phases. The first phase is the interval from September to November 1941, when Nedić's and Mihailović's representatives intensively co-ordinated the actions aiming

at the extinction of the MPL throughout 1942, when most of D. M. četniks were „legalized" with the Germans and organized into special units, the so-called „legal četniks", who were under Nedić's command and fought permanently together with quisling military formations against the partisan units in Serbia. At the same time, this is the period when Draža Mihailović with the closest associates of his headquarters sojourned in Montenegro. The third phase comprises the interval of time of the second half of 1943, when Mihailović returned to Serbia and his movement became considerably more intensive. At that time almost all of the quisling functionaries assumed a firm attitude in claiming that Mihailović ought to be given aid by all the possible means. Nedić's Serbian State Guard particularly advocated this policy, so that the greatest part of its officers and a considerable number of its soldiers helped the četniks in every respect. And finally, the fourth characteristic period of collaboration between the quisling administration in Serbia and the D. M. četniks falls in the second half of 1944, when all „national forces" were united with a view to decisive struggles against the partisan units and divisions of the Army of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, which penetrated from all sides into Serbia. Although all the four phases were connected with one another and continued one another, they differ very much both in power and in intensity. Characteristics and essential traits of particular phases are given in corresponding chapters of the text.

Milan Nedić's unrealistic claims to the extension of the frontiers of Serbia, i. e. to the creation of „Great Serbia" shed some more light on the personality of Milan Nedić in the last two years of occupation. Although there were no real possibilities, Nedić demanded, at the time when the Germans waged a war on a large scale both on the Eastern and Western fronts, the frontiers of Serbia to be extended. He asked Sandžak, Montenegro, parts of East Bosnia, Srem and many other occupied parts of Yugoslavia to be annexed to the territory under his administration. However, except Neubacher who supported Nedić to some extent, all the other German offices in Yugoslavia, and even in Berlin, were categorically against any territorial enlargement to any extent whatever to be allowed to Nedić.

Nedić's relations to the neighbours is also interesting, as well as the relations between the quisling government in Belgrade and the royal government in exile in London and the relations of the quisling authorities to the Orthodox church, etc. From among several neighbours with whom the occupied Serbia had frontiers in common, Bulgaria and the Independent State of Croatia were most frequently a target for Nedić's criticism. The ustasha government in Zagreb was most severely accused by Nedić because of the crimes effected on its territory on the population of Serbian nationality. He could not stand the Bulgarian occupiers because they constantly enlarged the frontiers of the territory under their occupation. However, Nedić's protests to the commander of the Military administration of Serbia had never such a weight as to make Nazis change anything whatsoever in their policy of occupation. Therefore Nedić „bayed at the moon", so to say, even later whenever he criticized any of

the German satellites: Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Independent State of Croatia, further quisling authorities in Kosovo, „Volksdeutschers" in Banat, etc.

As to the relations between the Serbian quisling government in Belgrade and the royal government in exile in London, there ought to be emphasized that it was a strange, or, more precisely, an absurd situation. Both these governments invited the population of Serbia to maintain order and peace. Nedić and his ministers took advantage of every opportunity to condemn the government in exile (but never the king). In the same way, all the Yugoslav royal governments (and they changed very often in exile), accused Milan Nedić and his ministers of collaboration with the occupier. Nowever, it was completely established, on the basis of a great number of preserved documents, that there were also some contacts between these nationalist, and at the same time anti-Communist teams, particularly in the course of 1943. In the last year of occupation, when the camp of the counterrevolution was on the brink of defeat, Nedić, his ministers and other quisling functionaries, invited, in public speeches on the radio and in the press, king Peter II to help them, i. e. to „save" them from the defeat in face of the assault of the units of the Army of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia and of the Red Army; to save Draža Mihailović or all those anti-Communist forces in Serbia, which served faithfully the occupier during the World War II.

It is necessary to point out here two more problems: first, the efforts made by the quisling administration in Serbia with the support of Germans, Bulgarians and D.M. četniks in the first half of 1944 in order to oppose as efficaciously as possible the Movement of People's Liberation of Serbia. In connection with this, there was effected mass mobilization of younger classes in spring and summer 1944 in order to fill the decimated quisling military formations. Simultaneously with this, there were undertaken mighty reprisals by the quislings and other enemies of the Movement of People's Liberation upon the leading cadres of the Party and of SKOJ.

From all the above facts it can be inferred that the enemy continued being aggressive and managed from time to time to strike serious blows to the ranks of the MPL, regardless of the military-political situation in the country and in the world which was exceptionally difficult for the enemy. Powerless to resist the mighty attack of partisan detachments and units of the Army of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia in Serbia and the penetration of the Principal operative group of divisions by the General staff, the occupier formed a coalition with Nedić and Mihailović in the course of summer 1944. It is interesting that immediately before the complete unification of quisling and četnik forces (in the night from August 28 on August 29, 1944) in the village of Pranjani (district of Čačak), the new American military mission landed in the staff of Draža Mihailović. The chief of the mission, colonel Mac Daull, visited in company of Draža Mihailović individual villages and attended the peasants' meetings in order to increase the impaired reputation of the četnik move-

ment. In addition to this, he received individual četnik voivodes, representatives of pro-Fascist organizations, representatives of Milan Nedić's government and of German occupation authorities. All this with a view to saving the četnik movement which was nearing its end under the blows of the Army of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia. However, everything was already late. Nothing could help — neither the alliance Germans-Nedić-Draža Mihailović nor the arrival of Mac Daull. A complete defeat of all the enemy forces in Serbia was near.

The second problem, connected with the previous one, is related to the period when Nedić's government made preparations for the flight from Serbia in the beginning of October 1944; further the act itself of the flight of Nedić's government, of „Nedić's armed forces" and of Draža Mihailović's četniks and the activity of Serbian quislings and other counter-revolutionary forces in exile until the end of the World War II. While July and August 1944 were characterized by the efforts of the German occupation authorities in Serbia, in the first place of Neubacher, to unite all quisling and četnik forces with a view to offering as mighty a resistance as possible to the units of the Army of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, the entire September was spent in preparations of counterrevolutionary forces for their retreat from Serbia lest they be caught by the forces of the MPL. The entire plan of flight was, of course, co-ordinated in co-operation with the occupier who, in fact, set the tone to the whole action.

However, although the quislings and Draža Mihailović's četniks tried, in the course of July and August 1944, to unite their forces for the struggle against the units of the Army of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia, they did not succeed in this. In the same way, when they were making preparations to leave Serbia in the face of the assault of the units of the Army of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia and of the units of the Red Army, Nedić's and četnik forces were not united. Draža Mihailović with his narrower headquarters went over Mačva and the Drina to East Bosnia and from there to Montenegro, forgetting all the clauses of his agreement with Milan Nedić, concluded on August 12 and August 15, 1944. Serbian State Guard, Serbian Frontier Guard and the so-called National Guard joined his units, but not Serbian Volunteers' Corps which, instead of going to Bosnia, made up its mind to travel to Slovenia. In addition to this, the two most eminent quisling functionaries (Nedić and Ljotić), were not of the same opinion, either, as to the direction in which to retreat. While Nedić decided still at an earlier date to follow the Germans, with all the members of his government to Vienna, Ljotić made up his mind to travel, with his volunteers, to Slovenian Littoral.

However, though they retreated in different directions, the counter-revolutionary forces from Serbia began to come again into contact with one another, hoping that they would some day return to „mother Serbia". Nedić's government, which was in Austria, had relations with the quisling military formations, concentrated in the Slovenian Littoral. Dimitrije Ljotić played there the principal part. The quisling military formations

in Slovenia were connected by radio communications with Draža Mihailović's headquarters which was still in Bosnia. But nothing could help the counterrevolutionary forces in Serbia. Neither the collaboration with the Germans under new circumstances, nor the common action of all the counterrevolutionary forces, everything was in vain. The capitulation of Hitler's Germany, signed on May 8, 1945, meant the definitive defeat of all their collaborators in Yugoslavia. The latter, truth to say, offered an organized resistance for some time, but they were unavoidably defeated, too. Thereby finally ceased every activity of Nedić's government and Nedić, his ministers and other quisling functionaries will be gradually extradited to the organs of the people's authority of the new Yugoslavia, where they will all get the deserved punishment. Milan Nedić threw himself from the third floor of the prison on February 4, 1946, when he was brought to the interrogation and shortened thus his life.

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